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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research was, in order to forestall future failures of 
foresight, to provoke those responsible for risk governance into new ways of 
thinking through a greater exposure to and understanding of the body of 
existing academic knowledge.  
The research, which focused on the scholarship of application, synthesised the 
existing knowledge into a “coherent whole” in order to assess its practical utility 
and to examine what is to be learnt about existing knowledge by trying to use it 
in practice. 
The findings are in two parts. The first focuses on how one “thinks about 
thinking” about an issue. Early work identified three issues that were seen as 
being central to the understanding of risk governance. The first is the concept of 
risk itself, the second is to question whether there is a single paradigm used 
and the third is what is meant by the term “risk indicator”. A “coherent whole”, 
structured around seven-dimensions, was created from the range of definitions 
used within existing literature. No single paradigm was found to be used when 
discussing risk issues. Three paradigms were identified and labelled “Line”, 
“Circle” and “Dot”. It was concluded that Risk Indicators were used to 
performance manage risk mitigation barriers rather than as a mechanism by 
which organisations may identify emerging risks. 
The second focus was the synthesis of academic work relevant to risk 
governance. It produced a list of statements which encapsulated the concerns 
of previous writers on this subject. The research then operationalised the issues 
as questions, which were seen to have practical utility. The elements of the 
“coherent whole” suggest a way to provide access into the original research. 
The research suggests that it is unlikely that practitioners would wish to access 
the original research in its academic format. Further work therefore needs to be 
done to present the original work in a format that is more digestible to the 
practitioner community if it is to be used effectively. 
The results of this research are considered to be preliminary. No claim is being 
made that these questions are definitive. The research is however addressing 
an area which is of concern to those in practice and has not been previously 
examined. 
Keywords:  
Failure of Foresight, Coherent Whole, Cross-understanding, Practical Utility. 
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CHAPTER 1 - LINKING DOCUMENT 
INTRODUCTION  
The aim of this linking document is to draw together the three projects 
undertaken in fulfilment of my DBA studies and to describe how each piece of 
work relates to the others in pursuit of a common purpose.  
The purpose of this research is to help forestall future failure of foresight by 
provoking, in those responsible for risk governance, new ways of thinking 
about risk through a greater understanding of the body of existing academic 
knowledge.  
As will be demonstrated in Project 2, academics have criticised management 
and executives within organisations that have been deemed to fail and have 
accused them of having had a failure of foresight. The academic work goes on 
to recommend what should have been foreseen and what would have 
therefore, in the view of these academics, forestalled that unwanted 
occurrence.  
The aim of this research is to synthesise this body of work and to make it 
accessible to practitioners (the result of Project 3) with the expectation that this 
may help to forestall future organisational failures. As the work to synthesise 
the body of existing academic work proceeded, as I tried to apply the existing 
knowledge, three issues emerged that needed to be clarified before the 
synthesis could be completed; this became Project 1. 
In outline, the three projects were structured as follows: 
Project 1 consisted of three theoretical papers, each examining a 
fundamental building block of any discussion of risk. These were: 
 Whether the range of ways risk had been defined within 
academic literature could be reconciled and seen as a coherent 
whole. 
 Whether there was a single paradigm used when risk was 
discussed. 
 To determine how the term “Key Risk Indicator” was used. 
Project 2 was a synthesis of relevant literature in order to establish 
those areas considered by academics to be key risk governance 
considerations. 
Project 3 operationalised the knowledge synthesised in Project 2 in 
order to provoke new ways of thinking (or to prevent “seeing as a way 
of not seeing”) amongst risk governance practitioners. 
This chapter is presented in six main sections: 
(1) An abstract of the entire thesis.  
(2) The background and rationale for the research. 
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(3) A summary of the research process which includes refinement of 
research questions and an overview of methodology across the 
projects. 
(4) A summary of key findings; each separate project report is a 
subsequent chapter following this chapter (the “linking documents”). 
(5) An analysis of the contribution that this work makes. 
(6) A summary of the limitations of the study and an identification of areas 
for further research. 
Having provided the abstract at the start of the document, I will start with the 
background and rationale for the research. 
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH 
In this section, I start by looking at the practical problems under consideration. 
I will then articulate the context in which this research is set and finally I will 
elaborate on my starting point which is the concept of risk management. 
The Problem 
The problem is the issue of corporate failures and what those at board and 
executive level can do to prevent them. These failures can come in many 
forms. Widely cited examples include the chemical spill at Bhopal, the 
destruction of the NASA Columbia and Challenger spacecrafts, the Exxon 
Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spills, business failures such as Barings 
Bank, Enron, Worldcom, and the 2008 banking crisis to name but a few. 
Enquiries have been held, reports presented and commentators have pointed, 
in each case, to failure of management at the highest level. 
As a result of these events, codes of conduct have been produced as a way to 
enhance the effectiveness of management at this level, which is referred to as 
governance. These codes of conduct make reference to the governance 
responsibilities for risk management. This provides the starting point for my 
research. It also raises the question as to whether there is a different approach 
at this level between what might attract the label “risk governance” as against 
risk management. The label risk governance was, at the beginning, a 
speculative proposition based on the differentiation made between 
management and governance. It was based on the proposition that if 
management was different from governance, then might there not be a 
differentiation between risk management and a construction given the label 
“Risk Governance”?  This research set out to explore this concept. 
Corporate failures have generated a wide body of academic research. My 
research planned to use this body of knowledge to explore how others have 
characterised the failures and the mechanisms leading to those failures and to 
synthesise them so that they may be of use to those practising governance. 
The premise behind the research was “if I knew what had been discovered 
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about the mechanisms of failure identified previously, how might this suggest 
the risk governance function may be performed?” 
We therefore now need to look at the context in which risk governance (the 
“the governance of risk management”) is performed. 
Context 
The UK’s Combined Code for Corporate Governance requires that board 
members and / or members of the executive have due regard for risk 
management within their organisations. The purpose of the code is to establish 
good corporate governance practices and thereby, by implication, forestall the 
potential for organisational failures. Details of the requirement of this code are 
described in Project 3 Table 5. However, as the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) acknowledges (FRC 2010b), they are not yet clear about what this 
requirement actually means. Therefore the question becomes one that is 
concerned with how the existing body of academic knowledge might be 
operationalised for the benefit of those looking to implement the FRC’s 
Combined Code. Before this can be done however, we must first examine the 
term “governance”. 
Rhodes (1996:652), who has a political perspective, says that the term 
“governance” is ‘popular but imprecise’. He describes and defines six separate 
uses, these being: the minimal state, corporate governance, the new public 
management, “good governance”, a socio-cybernetic system, and self-
organizing networks. It is also recognised that around the world these ideas 
are seen from very different perspectives. While many writers take a business 
based perspective, Shipley and Kovacs (2008) and Graham et al. (2003) trace 
the development of the subject within the United Nations. These overviews 
provide evidence of a theme running through the literature that the concept of 
governance can be culture dependent and its application is organisation 
specific. For the purpose of this research, the focus is on enabling 
organisational compliance within the UK on the requirements of the current 
code of practice (FRC, 2010a). The key subsections of that code are C.2 and 
C.3: 
C.2 - The board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of 
the significant risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic 
objectives. The board should maintain sound risk management and 
internal control systems. 
C.3 - The board should establish formal and transparent arrangements 
for considering how they should apply the corporate reporting and risk 
management and internal control principles and for maintaining an 
appropriate relationship with the company’s auditor. 
In particular, this research is concerned with how those engaged within the 
discourse may go about “determining the nature and extent of the significant 
risks”. The assumption is that if this is not effective then efforts to satisfy the 
requirements of “C.3” are unlikely to be successful. 
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While the Combined Code makes reference to Risk Management, I considered 
this term to be inadequate for the activities necessary at the corporate board/ 
executive level. I will therefore use the term “risk governance” to provide a 
distinction. Work by Vaughan (1996) and Grint (2008) suggests that, in 
practical terms as well as conceptual terms, governance (or executive level 
management) is different from the activity conducted at a lower level. Vaughan 
(1996:94 & 259) describes how the activities at this level change from 
managing the detail, to managing by exception. Grint (2008) describes how 
management at this level also changes from consideration of the routine to 
consideration of the novel, from examining the specific to considering the 
principles (a point emphasised by one respondent within Project 3) and from 
being the expert to being an investigator. It is this distinctly different approach 
that means that one should question whether the processes and procedures 
appropriate to risk management at lower levels within an organisation are 
appropriate at the level being examined by this research (again a point 
emphasised by a respondent within Project 3).  
In order to understand the construct of risk governance (“the governance of 
risk management”), I now examine the concept of risk management. 
Defining Risk Management 
BS31100:2008 (the ISO standard) defines “risk management” as the 
‘coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk” 
(2008:2). Other definitions endorsed by the Institute of Risk Management are 
listed in Table 1 (Hopkin, 2010:37). Dallas (2006:372) was more specific about 
what needed to be controlled; he defines risk management as ‘The process of 
controlling the impact of risk’. Immediately, however, the words “direct” and 
“control” within the ISO might be seen to be at odds with the UK’s Financial 
Reporting Council’s code for Corporate Governance (FRC, 2010a) where the 
same words “direct” and “control” are used to define their concept of 
“governance”. The term “risk management” also can be seen to embrace a far 
wider range of activity than does the term “governance” (“governance” is 
examined in more detail later). As a practitioner, Hillson (2007) sees risk 
management as providing a framework and common language for dealing with 
and reacting to uncertainty. At the lower levels, these are the everyday risk 
assessments required as part of an organisation’s risk management process 
required to handle such issues as compliance with health and safety 
legislation. This spectrum extends to a role for risk management within the 
management of projects, both large and small, and the management of high 
risk processes such as those found within heavy manufacturing or the oil and 
gas industry. 
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Table 1 - Definitions of Risk Management 
Institute of Risk 
Management 
Process which aims to help organisations understand, evaluate 
and take action on all their risks with a view to increasing the 
probability of success and reducing the likelihood of failure. 
HM Treasury All the processes involved in identifying, assessing and judging 
risk, assigning ownership, taking actions to mitigate or anticipate 
them, and monitoring and reviewing progress. 
London School of 
Economics 
Selection of those risks a business should take and those which 
should be avoided or mitigated, followed by action to avoid or 
reduce risk. 
Business 
Continuity Institute 
Culture, process and structures that are put in place to 
effectively manage potential opportunities and adverse effects. 
 
Rizzi (2010:312) sees governance as a ‘key, but often neglected component of 
risk management’. My research concentrates on the governance end of the 
risk management spectrum. Klinke and Renn (2001:159) see three 
approaches to risk management. These are labelled precautionary based risk 
management, risk-based risk management and discourse-based risk 
management. (Renn later produced an anthology of his work in this area which 
he titled “Risk Governance” (Renn, 2008a).) Klinke and Renn (2001) say: 
The third category, i.e. discursive strategies, is essential if either the 
potential for wide ranging damage is ignored... or – the antithesis – 
harmless effects are perceived as threats… The hazardous nature of 
the risks are [sic] mainly based on subjective perceptions that can lead 
to stress, anxiety and psychosomatic malfunctions.  
These risk classes require strategies to build awareness, confidence, or 
suggest some strength and trustworthiness… and initiate collective 
efforts… to take responsibility and… accountability... Together with 
confidence building, the improvement of knowledge to do with risk 
comprehension is an appropriate means to reduce the uncertainties of 
life. Clarification of facts, however, is not enough... What is needed is 
the involvement of affected people so that they are able to integrate the 
remaining uncertainties and ambiguities into the political deliberation. 
Klinke and Renn (2001:169) summarise the strategies for action within 
discourse risk management as (1) Consciousness building, (2) Confidence 
building, (3) Introducing substitutes, (4) Improving knowledge and (5) 
Contingency management. This may be seen to be very different from the 
procedural based approach utilised within such areas as project and 
programme or process management, as explored during the course of this 
research. Here also lies a far greater emphasis on qualitative methodologies. 
There is an issue as to whether there is a utility for qualitative as well as 
quantitative methodologies for evaluating risk (see for example Hubbard 
(2009) who argues in favour of privileging quantitative methods). While it is 
recognised that there is a place for quantitative methods, a basic premise of 
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this research is that there is also a place for qualitative methods. This is seen 
to be especially true when it involves the higher levels of abstraction, 
ambiguity or complexity, such as found within risk governance. The view taken 
here is that part of the purpose of any risk governance exercise is to increase 
consciousness (making the implicit explicit), improve knowledge and to build 
confidence amongst the stakeholders; in other words, engage in risk 
discourse. 
Therefore in summary, for the purpose of this research, the term “risk 
governance” is used to denote the activity at board and executive level 
required by governance “best practice” (as exemplified within the relevant 
code of governance) to oversee the risk management practice within their 
organisation. The research looked to identify how risk governance may in 
practice be significantly different from risk management. 
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH PROCESS  
Emergence was a key theme within this research. The basic premise behind 
this work is Boyer’s construct, the scholarship of application (Boyer, 1990:21-
23). Within the scholarship of application, the focus of research is to determine 
what the body of existing knowledge has to teach others and what we learn 
about that knowledge by trying to use it in practice. For this type of research 
the issue is to identify work that is relevant and useful (has “practical utility”, 
Corley and Gioia, 2011) to the issue under examination. This links to a 
construct derived from Wildavsky. He spoke about “thinking about how to think 
about safety” (1988:8). For this research, Wildavsky’s idea is modified to 
become a question of how to think about how to think about risk. 
In complex and ambiguous situations, an alternative perspective is seen as an 
aid to clarity. At the end of the scoping study, I was clearer about what not to 
research, rather than what was to be researched. The initial research process 
therefore involved identifying what was important. There were many false 
leads pursued in an effort to winnow what was not of interest. The process of 
examining “what was not” rather than “what is” became an important construct 
within the research. Through this process of elimination the core of the 
research was identified. In its final shape, the research can be seen to consist 
of three steps. These steps need to be explained. 
Step 1 arose directly out of my aspiration to explore the existing body of 
relevant knowledge which in turn was driven by my perception of the limited 
language that was available for risk discourse. The core of the research is 
reported in Chapters 5 and 6. It was designed to extract from the existing body 
of academic research, knowledge that may have practical utility for those 
involved in risk governance. In order to provide structure to the synthesis a 
triptych of seeing, appreciating and acting was formulated from the literature. 
This is described in Chapter 5. The aim of the triptych was to provide a broad 
structure around which I could organise the phenomena described within the 
literature. Through an iterative processes that tested each idea against the 
criteria of "foresight" and "utility", the emergent phenomena were coded, 
recoded and reorganised, Twenty four categories of phenomena emerged and 
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these categories provided the basis upon which I looked to operationalise the 
existing knowledge.  
However, as the literature was reviewed, it became clear that three issues 
needed to be resolved before I could make full sense of the literature. This 
became Step 2. Step 2 was consistent with the idea within the scholarship of 
application that new intellectual understanding would arise out of the act of 
trying to apply particular knowledge in practice. The three issues were (1) how 
might I make sense of the term “risk”, (2) was only a single paradigm used 
within the literature and (3) what did the term “Key Risk Indicator” denote? 
Each of these issues was explored as described in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
respectively and they suggest new ways to think about risk. It is important to 
note that, while these issues may help an individual to think about risk, they 
did not necessarily have a direct link to Step 3; they may be seen as a positive 
by-product of the central analytical process.  
Step 3 looked to operationalise each of the 24 categories by turning them into 
questions that those undertaking risk governance could ask of their risk 
management experts. The 24 categories were initially structured, as in Step 1, 
into the groupings of seeing, appreciating, and acting. The categories were 
reformulated as questions. The validity of this formulation was then tested for 
its practical utility through a pilot study based on the criteria of feasibility, 
usability and utility taken from Platt (1993). The pilot study consisted of a serial 
process through four reviewers and a final step where all the reviewers 
approved the question set that was subsequently sent to the main 
respondents. During this review process the 24 categories became 20 
questions and these questions were reorganised into four groupings which 
were labelled “problem”, “group”, “process” and “general”. This question set 
was then sent to the 17 main respondents, all of whom worked at 
board/executive level within their organisation and therefore fell within the 
target audience. As in the pilot study, the main respondents were asked to 
comment, for each question, on their practical utility based on the criteria 
provided by Platt. The responses for each question were collated under Platt's 
criteria. The comments reported in Chapter 6 are designed to represent the 
range expressed. No attempt is made to reconcile conflicting views. However, 
there was considered to be enough consistency in the responses to suggest 
that the questions, when modified, would provide the target audience with 
practical utility. The final question set articulated in Chapter 6 incorporates 
comments from the main respondents. In addition to the direct comments on 
the Platt criteria, the respondents raised a number of other issues that they 
considered to have important implications for the practical utility of the 
proposed questions. These issues are also discussed.  
The key variables within the process were “existing knowledge” and 
“individuals working at board/executive level” where the purpose of the 
knowledge was to stimulate the individuals to think more about the issue of 
their risks. The process moved from a researcher’s proposition, that being an 
initial set of questions (developed through an iterative process) to a set of 
questions validated by representatives of the user community. The staged 
process is summarised in Figure 1. 
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This process should be seen to be consistent with my philosophical position 
(this is laid out in more detail later in the paper) that individuals understand the 
“real world” in their own way and this is affected by their world view, training 
and experience; this has been called “seat of understanding”. In this document 
I have looked to articulate how I have interpreted the work that I have read and 
analysed. Accepting that my view may differ from that of others, I have looked 
to use the process of cross-understanding in order to contrast my views with 
those of others with the purpose of enriching both our understanding of the 
issues addressed. This process took place during Project 3 and the resulting 
enhanced understanding is reported in Chapter 6. 
Therefore, in this section I will discuss (1) the overall approach that I will take 
to this research, (2) the relationship of risk to performance issues, and (3) how 
the construct of “risk” might be articulated by risk governance practitioners. I 
will start by looking at the factors that are central to my research overall. 
 
Legend
Limited 
language 
available to 
discuss risk 
problems
Aspiration to explore 
“existing body of 
relevant knowledge”
Step 2: To find new intellectual 
understandings arising out of 
the act of application
Step 1: Collation, Analysis 
and Synthesis of existing & 
relevant knowledge
(criteria: foresight & utility)
•7-Dimension of Risk
•Multiple paradigms of Risk
•KRIs as Performance 
Measure
“20 Question” 
Framework
24 categorises of 
relevant knowledge
Step 3:
• Operationalisation of the 
knowledge  as questions
• Validation of “Practical 
Utility” by target audience
Findings
Action
 
Figure 1 - Steps of My Research Process 
Core Aspect for the Research 
The approach that I took to this research was seen to be governed by two 
groups of factors. The first group pertains to more general academic 
considerations. These were (1) my level of analysis, (2) my unit of analysis, (3) 
my ontological position and (4) my use of the “first person” to report my results. 
The second group are factors that specifically drove my research. These are 
firstly a desire to maximise the “Practical Utility” (Corley and Gioia, 2011) of 
the body of existing relevant knowledge, secondly the desire to develop good 
questions rather than answers, the third is the desire to  communicate the 
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research area as a “coherent whole” (Editor AMR, 2011). The fourth is the idea 
of “cross-understanding” (Huber and Lewis, 2010), important to any form of 
discourse. The fifth and final factor that drove my research was the criteria to 
be used to assess the validity of the research. I will start by looking at my level 
of analysis. 
Level of Analysis:  Corporate Board Level  
The level of analysis is the individuals who are concerned with the governance 
of risk and operate as a group at board or executive level. The level of analysis 
has been defined using a premise provided by Vaughan (1996) and Grint 
(2008). At this level, management activity might be characterised as being 
more abstract than that necessary for day to day management. This level of 
activity may therefore be characterised as the “direct and control” which is the 
‘classic definition’ of Governance within the UK (FRC, 2010a). It is recognised 
however that there are many competing explanations for and definitions of the 
term “governance”, hence my use of the term “risk governance” within this 
research. This is one of the key assumptions within this research.  
Unit of Analysis:  The Risk Management Process 
The unit of analysis is the risk management process; specifically, I will be 
looking at the phase of the process where those involved conceptualise 
(create their mental model) the issues they face. Within all risk management 
processes there is a phase where the potential risks are identified and 
assessed for inclusion in a number of action categories. These are: take, 
mitigate, deflect and remove. The part of the process that is of specific interest 
to this study is where the risks are conceived and categorised. More 
specifically, as part of an ongoing process, how new risks are conceived and 
how once pertinent risks are removed from further consideration. More 
specifically still, the work examines ways of conceptualising and cross 
communicating (Huber and Lewis, 2010) facts, ideas and constructs within the 
stakeholder group and within the prescribed level of analysis. 
Ontological Position 
The position taken by me in this research is that there is a world outside the 
personal perceptions (hence the dangers posed by “risk”), yet aspects of risk 
appear different to different people (hence the advantages and disadvantages 
of variety). In addition, the limited capacity of individuals makes it impossible 
for humans to perceive the world accurately because of the imperfections of 
the human senses and hence the emphasis on cross-understanding. 
The term “risk” may be seen to be amongst one of the most widely used 
words, with the greatest number of meanings, in the English Language. In 
understanding the term, the first issue to be tackled is whether risk is a 
tangible “thing” or an intangible “mental construct”.  
At the more tangible end of the spectrum are the engineering sciences where 
at a more general level of usage, the term “risk” is defined using a succinct 
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phrase or a simple tripartite format (e.g. Risk = Probability x Impact; using 
quantitative methods to resolve technical problems. See Table 5 of Project 1 – 
Paper 1 for other examples).  
The constructionist end of the spectrum can be seen in Renn’s contribution to 
the debate. Renn (2008a:110) states that ‘Perceptions have a reality of their 
own’. He goes on to characterise these perceptions of risk as a fatal threat/ 
stroke of fate/ personal thrill (test of strength)/ a gamble (game of chance) and 
an indicator of insidious danger (early warning indicator) (Renn, 2008a:110-
117). Post-Modernist writers (such as Lupton, 1999 and Mythen, 2004) see 
risk as a device to maintain cultural boundaries (referred to as the “Cultural-
Symbolic” debate), as a way to maintain order through self-discipline (referred 
to as the “Governmentality” debate) or whether the benefits of technology are 
worth the risks involved (referred to as the “Risk Society” debate). According to 
Mythen, (2006:13), Giddens sees risk as a political concept, as it is used to 
attribute blame. These are all seemingly legitimate uses of the terms which 
have their own detailed warrants. 
Renn (1998:49) states 'both extremes, the constructivist and the realist 
perspective, miss the point, as risks are always mental representations of 
threats that are capable of claiming real losses’. I argue that this requires an 
“ontological oscillation” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:266) between being a 
constructionist (in order to understand risk) and a positivist (in order to manage 
it effectively and efficiently). This approach was justified elsewhere by Snook 
(2000:76) in his award winning PhD dissertation at Harvard. 
Therefore, in summary, the ontology to be used here accepts that while risk 
may be a mental construct, it does have real, tangible consequences and it is 
from the perspective of managing these issues that the term has been 
examined. 
First Person Enquiry 
This research will be reported using the first person construct. I have 
described the ontological oscillation associated with the study of risk and how 
studies oscillate between tangible phenomena that may cause an unwanted 
outcome to examining the mental constructs central to the perception of risk. 
As this research is concerned with how to think about how to think about risk, 
the focus is on the mental construction involved. Mental constructions are an 
individual issue. In this paper I intend to describe my understanding of risk in 
order to communicate my ideas to those involved in risk governance. I 
therefore do not consider it would be valid to give the subject an “illusion of 
certainty” (Gigerenzer, 2003:9-22) that is inherent in any third person narrative. 
My detailed reasoning is set out in Appendix A. 
Practical Utility 
Corley and Gioia, (2011) discussed what constitutes a theoretical contribution 
and the utility of academic work. They distilled existing literature on theoretical 
contribution and divided it into two dimensions. These are originality and utility. 
 Chapter 1  11 
 
Of the two my interest is in utility. Corley and Gioia (2011:18) further divide 
utility into two dimensions: scientific or practical.   
Scientific utility is perceived as an advance that improves conceptual 
rigor or the specificity of an idea and/or enhances its potential to be 
operationalized and tested… Theory can advance science by providing 
cohesion, efficiency, and structure to our research questions and 
design… In a very practical sense, good theory helps identify what 
factors should be studied and how and why they are related.  
Practical utility is seen as arising when theory can be directly applied to 
the problems practicing managers and other organizational practitioners 
face… through “the observation of real-life phenomena, not from 
‘scholars struggling to find holes in the literature’”… such a practical 
problem focus is a good way to develop theory per se. Thus, theory 
directed at practical importance would focus on prescriptions for 
structuring and organizing around a phenomenon and less on how 
science can further delineate or understand the phenomenon. 
The focus of this research is, as a scholarship of application, to examine the 
practical utility of the previous academic work relating to the subject under 
consideration, i.e. Risk Governance. 
Questions Not Answers 
The purpose of this research is to provide “good questions” that provoke 
animated risk discourse. While academics may wish to see the purpose of 
their work as being to describe, explain, predict and test (Yin, 2003), this may 
not have the greatest practical utility. After the fall of Singapore, Sir Winston 
Churchill is reported as having said: “I ought to have known… I ought to have 
asked” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007:84). Huff (2000) records the speech to the 
Academy of Management by their ‘Executive of the year, 1999’ John S. Reed, 
who stated:  
We (as managers) have to do two things: we decide what to do, and we 
try to make it happen. If you boil down all of the practice of business, it 
is the combination of those two things and the interaction between them 
that defines the world in which we live.   
He goes on to explain that  
All… research can do is inform us. It certainly does not give us 
answers. 
Weick (2004) sees utility in academic work that “provokes” discussion (it ‘gets 
us talking, digging, comparing, refining, and focusing on the right question’). 
Peng and Dess (2010:287) state, scholarship ‘can help managers frame 
issues, ask the right questions, and question their underlying assumptions’. In 
terms of the two key practitioner questions posed above by John Reed (‘what 
to do’ and ‘how to make it happen’), there is seen to be a need for researchers 
to broaden their scope in order to produce the pertinent questions which 
stimulate informed debate rather than deliver packaged answers. 
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Coherent Whole 
The Editor of AMR (2011) ‘urge(s) management scholars to take up this 
challenge’ of ‘exploring real-life problems… by taking down walls and building 
bridges between perspectives’. He goes on to suggest that ‘Combining 
multiple theoretical lenses to develop new explanations of management 
phenomena and solve managerial challenges will continue to be a critical 
aspect of how research is conducted in our field’ (2011:11). He says: 
This requires a deep discussion of how underlying assumptions can be 
combined… the clear articulation of the fit between theories becomes 
important because readers and reviewers cannot be expected to draw 
the links that authors may observe, as might be the case in situations 
where either the phenomena or the underlying assumptions provide 
such an anchor or starting point… new theory hinges on the ability of 
authors to explain how seemingly disparate or unrelated theories fit 
together to form a coherent whole. 
The purpose of this research is therefore focused on creating a coherent 
whole, through synthesis, out of the understanding, models and theories which 
are to be found in the literature relating to organisations’ disasters and failures.  
Cross-Understanding  
According to Huber and Lewis (2010:7)  
Cross-understanding refers to the extent to which group members have 
an accurate understanding of one another’s mental models. Such 
understanding can evolve through intermember communications… 
members’ factual knowledge, cause-effect beliefs, sensitivity to the 
relevance of particular issues, or preferences. Cross-understanding is a 
group-level, compositional construct. 
Therefore the first step in successful cross communication must be for an 
individual to be clear about what they think. For those concerned with risk 
governance, they do not have the luxury of being able to reduce a problem to 
what is manageable, they have to deal with problems as they are. This point is 
illustrated by the risk terminology discussed in Paper 1 of Project 1; the 
question of what is risk? Within academic literature there are many competing 
definitions of risk, which are all derived for their own purpose. For those 
engaged in risk governance, it is not a matter of selection but of making sense 
of the whole. Therefore in order to be able to cross communicate, they must 
first make a coherent whole.  
Criteria for Validity 
The validity of this research takes two forms. The first is practical and the 
second is academic. 
To be coherent within the purpose of this research, the criteria for validity for 
this work need to be focused on the work’s practical utility. However, true 
practical utility can only be determined by individuals within a given set of 
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circumstances. The purpose of the devices created during this research was to 
“provoke” discussion (‘gets us talking, digging, comparing, refining, and 
focusing on the right question’ – Weick, 2004) as part of cross communication. 
In order to be able to generalise, the views of individual respondents were 
sought; these views were structured around the criteria of usability, utility and 
feasibility developed by Platts (1993).  
In order to achieve academic validity this research has focused on rigour in the 
methods used and relevance to its purpose. Each piece of work has been, in 
line with its purpose of application, a work of synthesis. While there has been 
much previous work on collation as part of synthesis (“systematic review” for 
example), the examples available are set under quite different circumstances. 
In general such collation processes have been used within very tight 
circumstances; to examine a tightly bounded subject rather than synthesis in 
an attempt to develop a coherent whole. As the first attempt at synthesising 
this whole area, gaps are inevitable. Therefore the validity of the synthesis 
needs to be judged by its outcome. While rigour was applied to each part of 
the work, in the end I would only claim that the work was conducted 
assiduously (defined as “showing great care and perseverance”). In judging 
the outcome of this research, the issue becomes whether the final frameworks 
are robust, i.e. do they stand up to use? This test is consistent with Boyer’s 
(1990) design for the scholarship of application. Therefore the validity of the 
thinking constructs is whether they are robust enough to embrace material not 
considered during their development. 
Risk Performance Relationship 
Often risk management is seen as being a separate management discipline, 
an adjunct to the main management process (see Reason 1990:200); in this 
work, however, I take a different view. I argue that (1) risk management needs 
to be an integral part of management and therefore should be encompassed 
within the performance management sphere and (2) that performance 
management requires the implicit to be made explicit if they are both to be 
managed effectively. I will start by discussing the place of risk within 
management. 
The relationship between risk and other aspects of management is not settled. 
The work of Prof James Reason (1990:200) provides an example of the 
thinking that risk is a separate functional area. Academic and practitioner 
literature also provides an ambiguous mix involving performance 
management, risk management, opportunity management and uncertainty 
management (Ward and Chapman, 2002:1); they are all used to cover the 
dialectics of risk-reward which is also articulated as either cost-benefit 
(Gigerenzer, 2003:76; Sheffi, 2005), upside-downside or opportunity-threat 
(Browning in Hillson, 2007:319). However, as Ramgopal (2003:22) 
acknowledges, ‘Strategies for managing project uncertainty cannot be 
divorced… from strategies for managing the project objectives and associated 
trade-offs’. The literature also gives examples, such as Bobker in Hillson 
(2007:68), who insists that risk should only refer to adverse events. The 
language is enriched (or maybe just complicated) further by such writers as 
 Chapter 1  14 
 
Ward (Hillson, 2007:212) who uses the term “uncertainty management” to 
embrace “risk management” and “opportunity management”. To others, all 
management is risk management. Shaw (2005:23) cites this as the view of the 
Canadian risk management pioneer Douglas Barlow. Charles Handy has said 
something very similar: ‘Risk management is not a separate activity from 
management, it is management… predicting and planning allow prevention ... 
Reaction is a symptom of poor management’ (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008:44). 
Hollnagel (2009:18) is even more succinct: ‘Instead of seeing success and 
failure as two separate categories of outcomes… they are but two sides of the 
same coin.’ This sees the “risk-reward” dialectic as being the most 
fundamental of all management dilemmas; that every benefit has associated 
jeopardy, some of which are obvious and others more difficult to identify. This 
research places the management of risk alongside performance management, 
making them “two sides of the same coin”, where performance management 
takes an optimistic benefits focused approach and risk management takes a 
complimentary but pessimistic jeopardy focused approach.  
It is a base assumption of this paper that all human activity requires a 
balancing of risk and reward. Adams (1995:181) asks the question as to 
whether the objective of Risk Management is to balance risk and reward or 
just to reduce risk; Adams is concerned that in Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society 'one 
is no longer concerned with attaining something good, but rather preventing 
something worse'. ‘Beck believes that undivided emphasis on the distribution 
of social goods is politically misguided, pronouncing that political energies 
should be redirected towards the elimination of social bads’ (Mythen, 2004:25). 
Yet it is a priori that for progress or advancement to occur, risks need to be 
taken.  
Given the risk-reward dialectic as a basic assumption, we need to consider 
how this risk performance might be monitored. Within the performance 
management field, Calandro and Lane (2006:38) recommended that ‘firms 
utilise two scorecards, one for performance and a separate one for risk’. Their 
arguments are based on (1) the complexity of combining the two, (2) that the 
people in departments that measure risk and performance are normally 
separated, (3) that the separate scorecards can balance managers’ time 
between performance and risk and (4) risk and performance can resemble one 
another therefore separate scorecards can delineate between the two 
subjects. They do, however, go on to say that ‘if separate scorecards are 
adopted, it is strongly recommended that each scorecard be constructed within 
a common framework.’ The question this leaves is whether, as benefit and 
jeopardy are intimately linked in practice, the management practice of 
separating them is dysfunctional? Their argument as to the complexity, 
however, is well made and, as Perrow (1999) warns, complexity, as an 
attribute, can lead to other risks. However, this is a classic risk-risk situation 
where the risk of complexity of combining the two factors must be weighed 
against the risk of failure in coordination if the two are separated. Therefore, 
for clarity, while I accept that risk and reward are indivisibly linked, in this 
thesis I associate the term “performance management” with the benefits 
derived from the system and associate the term “risk management” with any 
jeopardy inherent in the activity. The issue then becomes how they may be 
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monitored. As in performance management, which has Key Performance 
Indicators, risk management has Key Risk Indicators. This raised another 
fundamental question about the purpose and role of these Key Risk Indicators 
and whether they are geared toward the identification of emerging sources of 
jeopardy. The question was therefore formulated as: 
Question 1: What is the purpose and role of Key Risk Indicators? 
Question 1 was addressed as part of Project 1. 
Defining Risk 
As I reviewed the literature, using a structured approach based on the 
template suggested by Wallace and Wray (2006), it became clear that the term 
“risk” was used in many different ways. Therefore, before starting work on risk 
governance, I needed to make sense of the term. This deceptively simple task 
developed into a major piece of work. The research questions therefore 
became: 
Question 2: How might those involved in risk governance understand 
and use the term “risk”? 
Question 3: How might the apparently conflicting terms be seen as a 
“Coherent whole”? 
From the literature review required to answer these two questions, a further 
question emerged. While these issues were not debated, it became clear that 
writers on the subject of risk did not hold the same world view. They seemed 
to have different fundamental assumptions upon which they based their work; 
these assumptions had not been debated. Question 4 was therefore 
formulated as: 
Question 4: Was there a single consistent paradigm used in the 
examination of risk?  
Therefore, before I was able to finish my synthesis of the literature, I would 
need to resolve these questions. They became my Project 1. First I tackled 
questions 2 and 3, then I tackled question 4 and finally I examined question 1. 
Each piece of work was conducted as a concept paper. The results are 
reported in Chapters 2 to 4 respectively. 
Having completed Project 1, I was able to complete my synthesis of the 
relevant literature (see Chapter 5) and then conduct a piece of empirical 
research, based on semi-structured interviews, to assess the practical utility of 
the questions that were developed from the literature (see Chapter 6). 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
In this section I summarise the key findings from my research. The structure of 
the findings will be based on each of my three projects. The first to be 
discussed will be the three stand-alone studies that formed Project 1. Second I 
will summarise the findings of Project 2 where I used the concept of “failure of 
foresight” as a device to scope and synthesise the rich body of literature that is 
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relevant to governance failures. Finally, I will summarise the findings of Project 
3 which evaluated the practical utility of the 20 questions operationalised from 
the findings of Project 2 and which, as a “coherent whole”, provide a 
framework designed to provoke risk discourse at the governance level. I will 
start with the results of Project 1. 
Project 1: Three Papers  
Project 1 consists of three papers. The papers addressed the questions (1) 
“What is risk?” (Chapter 2), (2) “Is there only a single risk paradigm?” (Chapter 
3) and (3) “What is a risk indicator?” (Chapter 4). Their findings will be 
summarised in this order. 
Paper 1 – Seven Dimensions of Risk 
The first issue addressed how an organisation may conceptualise risk given 
the many different definitions of risk found in the literature (See Chapter 2 
Tables 1 & 2). By the very nature and function of a corporate board, individuals 
on those boards may well face and, according to the law of requisite variety, it 
is desirable that they do face, a wide variety of different perspectives. This is 
likely to include a variety of these constructs of risk. They will therefore need a 
way to see the definitions as a coherent whole in order to develop a cross-
understanding of risk within their group. 
The work shows that risk is seen to be a ubiquitous term that has many 
meanings for many different communities within society and that the term itself 
is ambiguous For example Mythen (2006:1) says ‘Despite its global 
omnipresence, Risk remains an opaque and disputed concept’ It has been 
given a multitude of meanings by its users. Leitch (2008:30-31) states that 
‘there is a big difference between ‘some Risks’ and ‘some Risk’. Cleden 
(2009:121) defines risk as ‘an expression’; (Holton (2004:22) defines it as 
‘exposure’; Chapman and Ward (1997:7) define it as ‘the implications’, and 
Dean in Lupton (1999:138), as a ‘form of rationality’.  
This ambiguity can cause problems and confusion for those trying to manage 
risk and attempting to forestall the next major failure. I looked to move on from 
the simpler differentiation described in Chapter 2, such as between risk and 
uncertainty, and accept that the term “risk” has multiple uses in multiple 
contexts. The issue therefore becomes: can and if so how, might these variety 
of uses be reconciled precisely enough to enable agreement of any further 
action to be taken.  
I came to think about risk as an “unwanted occurrence about which you care” 
and produced a framework (a coherent whole) that saw risk as having seven 
dimensions (see Chapter 2, Figure 5). Chapter 2 also shows that the term 
“risk” is linguistically flexible and is too ambiguous to be used on its own if 
clarity is required. An alternative may be to divide the term into specific 
subcategories such as those tentatively proposed in Table 3 of Chapter 2. The 
term “risk” therefore appears to need amplification or a context if its meaning is 
to be communicated accurately. In order to resolve these ambiguities and 
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apparent contradictions, the simple systems framework provides seven 
dimensions as a means of relating the various usages of the term. 
Paper 2 – Line, Circle and Dots 
In Chapter 3, I question whether there is a single, universal paradigm in use 
for the discussion of risk related subjects. I claim that this is not the case. The 
work suggests that I have potentially identified three (see Chapter 3, Table 1) 
and warrant this claim with examples; these I call “Line”, “Circle” and “Dot”. I 
do not, however, claim that there are only three or that this work proves the 
three on offer. What it does claim is that there is sufficient evidence to question 
the assumption that there is a single paradigm used. The significance of this 
finding is that it provides a warning to both practitioners and academics to 
question what paradigm(s) may be underlying a particular piece of research or 
practice and therefore be cautious when extrapolating or generalising one 
piece of work to another. This is not the practice in academia or with 
practitioners at present. 
As an example of the complexity of potential risk paradigms, in Chapter 3 I link 
Line, Circle and Dot to the work of Renn (2008a) in which he discussed three 
approaches to risk management (Precaution-based, Risk-based and 
Discursive-based). Table 2 of Chapter 3 combines these six elements in order 
to demonstrate the potential for there to be multiple perspectives at work within 
any discussion of risk and therefore the potential for there being multiple 
paradigms. This conclusion points to a potential factor that may lead to failures 
in cross-understanding between those discussing risk issues. 
This research would suggest that those engaged in the discussion of risk need 
to ensure that they determine the underlying paradigm in use by those taking 
part and by those otherwise contributing to the discussion (such as authors of 
articles or books, or consultants), if they are to fully appreciate the significance 
of the words being used. 
Paper 3 – What Are “Key Risk Indicators”? 
Finally, Chapter 4 provides details of the third paper that made up Project 1. In 
this research I examined the use of the term “risk indicator” and contrasted the 
current use of the term with the nature of the phenomena “risk”. I claim 
(warranted by examples of its use in academic literature) that the term, as 
currently used, has more in common with performance indicators than to 
indicate the emergence of unwanted issues. It is the emergent nature of risk 
that has been described by the likes of Slovic (2000). Risk Indicators are 
currently used to measure negative impacts or the performance of risk 
mitigation barriers rather than risk per se. The significance of this finding for 
practitioners is the potential for an organisation to be misled into believing that 
they are managing risk when, in fact, they are managing their attempts at risk 
mitigation thereby leaving the actual risks unmonitored and thus creating a gap 
through which risk may emerge unnoticed. For academics, the paper provides 
another warning over the necessity to define more clearly their use of this term 
and its place within their work. 
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In relation to the core of my research, this finding is significant for two reasons. 
The first is that it provides further justification for linking risk management to 
performance management and both indicators monitor performance in one 
form or another. The second issue of significance is that it would suggest there 
is a gap within the risk management discipline in ways (or lack of ways) of 
monitoring organisations for emerging risk. 
Summary of Project 1 
In summary, in Project 1 I took Wildavsky’s (1988) idea about questioning how 
one thinks about thinking about issues and applied this to three subjects that I 
see as being central to the governance of risk. The first is the idea of the 
concept of risk itself, the second is to question whether there is a single 
paradigm used when risk is discussed and thirdly, I examined what was meant 
by the term “Key Risk Indicator”. For the first subject I found that a coherent 
whole could be created from the wider range of definitions used within existing 
literature. The coherent whole was structured around seven dimensions based 
on the construct of risk as an “unwanted occurrence about which you care”. 
The second paper examined whether risk discourse is currently conducted 
within a single paradigm. I came to the conclusion that it is not. I identified 
three potential paradigms which I have labelled “Line”, “Circle” and “Dot” the 
significance of which is that if those involved in risk discourse do not recognise 
that they have different perspectives, this is likely to result in a failure in cross-
understanding. In the final paper, I examined the construct of a Key Risk 
Indicator and came to the conclusion that these are used for the performance 
management of risk mitigation barriers. This links risk management and 
performance management more closely and left the question as to what 
mechanisms may be available to organisations to monitor their emerging risks. 
The completion of Project 1 left me with a clear understanding of three issues 
which I considered to be essential in order to make sense of the body of 
existing knowledge. As a result of this work, I was therefore able to complete 
my synthesis of literature. 
Project 2: “Failure of Foresight” 
In this Section I shall summarise the key findings from Project 2 which are 
reported fully in Chapter 5. To this end I will firstly outline its purpose and 
design before summarising the findings. 
The purpose of Project 2 was to identify within the relevant body of academic 
literature the factors or phenomena which, having been associated with failure 
of foresight, may be used during the process of risk governance to help those 
involved to think about the risk issues they face. As well as looking at general 
risk management, the research has examined literature covering: (1) accident 
investigation, (2) crisis management, (3) business continuity management, (4) 
operational risk management, (5) process risk management, (6) project and 
programme risk management, (7) resilience engineering and (8) high 
reliability. In order to give structure to the synthesis, the phenomena identified 
were grouped under three headings. These headings were “failure to see”, 
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“failure to appreciate” and “failure to act”. The genesis of the first heading, 
“Failure to See” came from the idea of “seeing as a way of not seeing” (Van de 
Ven and Poole, 1995). The heading was used to capture any phenomena 
relating to the receiving of warning signals. The genesis of the second 
heading, “Failure to Appreciate” was Vaughan’s (1996) reference to the idea of 
“Seat of Understanding”. The heading was used to capture any phenomena 
relating to comprehending the value of warning signals. Finally the heading 
“Failure to Act” came from the repeated queries by authors as to why 
individuals, despite warnings, had failed to prevent a disaster. 
The findings of the paper were that a number of the phenomena identified in 
previous research can only be applied in hindsight as they have extremely 
ambiguous start rules. The use of these phenomena should therefore be 
restricted to post incident analysis as they have limited application as part of 
foresight. And those phenomena that could be used with foresight were also 
identified. The process of synthesis enabled a richer understanding to be 
developed on the factors that contribute to organisational failures. These 
factors were articulated in the form of statements set out in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 - Factors Identified during Project 2 
1.  To be clear about their rules for inclusion and exclusion of subject 
areas and the risk(s) associated with their delineation. 
2.  Of those issues that are labelled so improbable as to be 
“inconceivable”, which still have such potentially serious consequences 
(the unacceptable) that we must stay mindful of them. 
3.  To make themselves aware of the personal and organisational filters 
that might inhibit their seeing warnings available to them. 
4.  To assess whether their plans and policies, which are a product of 
their bureaucratic process, are likely to withstand “an abrupt and brutal 
audit”. 
5.  To establish what risks are “acceptable” to them and why, and then 
test their reasoning to ensure that it is robust and not a “fantasy”. 
6.  To be aware of the incoming data and need to be able to assess it 
against signal types in order to understand its relevance (either 
positive or negative) and be able to justify its inclusion or exclusion 
from the debate. 
7.  To question whether they are seeing all the lessons that are available 
to them and whether they understand, and therefore take into account, 
factors that might be working against them in this regard. 
8.  To question whether the right information is getting to the right people 
within the right timeframe and how they would know if it was not before 
it was too late. 
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9.  To question whether there is clear evidence that they do not fall into 
the category of an “error-inducing” organisation. 
10.  The question for the executive is therefore to judge whether they have 
enough relevant detail to enable them to appreciate the complexity of 
the mechanisms acting at the time. 
11.  To judge the most appropriate level within their organisation for 
decisions to fall, given the need for the appropriate seat of 
understanding, resource power and the need to act in a timely manner. 
12.  To question whether the messenger (source of any data) is having an 
effect on how the data is viewed and, if so, whether this can be judged 
to be “rational” and therefore “valid”. 
13.  To discuss what method of analysis would be most appropriate to the 
problem at hand and whether a formal system of analysis may help to 
reduce the effect of personal bias. 
14.  To discuss which factors might be acting on and affecting the 
perceptions that contribute to how they appreciate the signals available 
to them. 
15.  How to recognise “drift” as it occurs. 
16.  To question how well they understand their system, who will have to 
handle potential crises and whether they are mentally equipped to do 
so. 
17.  Define the group’s understanding of the terms “anticipation” and 
“resilience”. 
Define whether the action needed is to create a “plan B” or to generate 
buffer capacity. 
18.  Is the action required about process or outcome and is the jeopardy 
associated with each of them clear? 
19.  To be aware of the strengths and limitations of rule-based and 
knowledge-based approaches and be clear when each should be 
applied within their organisation. 
20.  To debate the appropriate use of the five mechanisms of action and 
coordination (standards, plans, mutual adjustment, rules and 
experience) and how to enhance each and safeguard the organisation 
against the weakness of each. 
21.  To be aware of the factors affecting the potential for inaction by 
themselves as individuals and of the group overall and what 
mechanisms they may put in place to guard against this issue. 
22.  To debate whether their group is taking any steps to guard against the 
threats created by group dynamics. 
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23.  To debate whether the criteria being used for making decisions may 
not be viewed by others, at some later stage, to be amoral. 
24.  What might occur (including the inconceivable): 
(1) what might cause it, (2) how might we prevent it, (3) is the 
necessary process in place, (4) are our people effectively trained, (5) 
do they have the necessary resources, (6) will they recognise the 
problem should it arise, (7) will they see the right action to take, (8) will 
they implement the necessary action appropriately, and (9) will we get 
the same answers if we ask these questions tomorrow? 
 
In summary, as a result of a synthesis of relevant academic work, Project 2 
produced two findings of significance. The first is a list of statements (Table 2) 
which were seen to encapsulate the concerns of those who have written 
previously on this subject. These statements provided the starting point for 
Project 3. The second is the construct of “failure to see, failure to appreciate 
and failure to act”. This structure, used within the paper, is seen to provide a 
useful tool for self-examination in relation to risk related data. 
Project 3: Empirical Evaluation 
The purpose of Project 3 (see Chapter 6) was to operationalise statements 
developed by Project 2, to articulate them as a coherent whole and to assess 
whether they had practical utility. The context for the work was the UK’s 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 2010a); this provided the 
standard to which those involved with risk governance within the UK work. In 
order to achieve its purpose, project three was constructed in three stages. 
The first stage was to operationalise the questions. Stage two was to pilot the 
questions and stage three tested the questions amongst the target community. 
The findings of Project 3 can be seen in two parts. The first part focuses on the 
final question set and the second concerns the key issues that arose as a 
result of the interviews conducted. I shall first look at the final question set. 
The research produced 20 questions under four main headings. These 
headings emerged during the operationalisation processes as being the most 
coherent. The headings were “The Problems” (these concerned the potential 
unwanted events), “The Group” (these concerned the interaction between 
those involved in the risk governance process), “The Process” (these 
concerned the processes used for risk governance) and finally, two 
“Summarising Questions”. As result of the interviews, a series of criteria 
emerged that shaped the final question set (see Table 3). Although 
respondents made some quite specific comments about the original questions, 
many of these had to do with the application of the questions to their specific 
circumstances. As these did not help the generalisability of the questions they 
were not used in every formulation of the question set. Having said that, the 
criteria which emerged that did affect the question reformulation were: 
• While questions have been derived from a rich source of ideas, for 
clarity each question should contain a single clear idea. Where 
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compound questions are required, each part of the question should be 
clearly separated. 
• The question should ask, or at least imply, that the evidence on which 
the judgement is made should be made explicit rather than those 
individuals involved relying on intuitive judgement. This is to ensure all 
underlying assumptions are aired and debated which, in turn, would 
enhance shared understanding within the group. 
• The use of the negative question was deliberately used in order to 
challenge the “positive perspective” often held by senior management 
(this has been referred to as “optimism bias”).  
• The way the terms “executive” and “the board” were used caused 
some confusion. The intent of this research was to focus on those with 
governance responsibilities whether this was as a “unitary board” or in 
organisations that have distinctive separate roles such as those of the 
executive or as a board member. Therefore the term “board/ 
executive” was adopted to capture both cases. 
 
Table 3 - Final Question Set 
The Problems 
1.  Where do we need to have clear and fully justifiable criteria for which 
events or scenarios are included in and excluded from our risk 
management process? 
2.  While we normally monitor “outcomes” (“end”), where do we need to 
monitor the “processes” (“means”) that might create unacceptable 
outcomes? 
3.  What risks are “acceptable” to us and why; how have we tested our 
reasoning for both core and non-core activity (against both internal and 
external yardsticks) to ensure that our reasoning is robust? 
4.  Of those issues that we judge to be so improbable as to be 
“inconceivable”, which of these still have such potentially serious 
consequences (unacceptable) that we must stay alert to them? 
5.  What evidence do we have that we have a shared understanding 
about: 
(1) when we will prepare an alternative plan (anticipation),  
(2) when we will set aside reserve capacity (resilience), 
(3) where we just react to situations (reactive)? 
6.  How might our approach to risk taking be stifling our organisation? 
The Group 
7.  Are we aware of what factors might:  
(1) inhibit us from taking note of warning signs,   
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(2) affect our perception of them, 
(3) restrain us from acting upon them? 
8.  a. How well do we understand our system’s operating modes 
(routine, high tempo, emergency and maintenance) and manage 
the transition between them? 
b. How well do we know those who will have to handle potential crises 
and are we sure they are equipped to do so? 
9.  How do we judge the most appropriate level within our organisation 
for decisions to be made and whether each decision maker has the 
appropriate intuitive understanding of the issues, the organisation and 
its resources, and the ability to act in a timely manner? 
10.  What proof is there that we are conscious of the dynamics and 
personal interactions that might cause our board and executive team 
to be dysfunctional (thereby generating risk) and what are we doing 
to ensure that we do not fall into these traps? 
The Process 
11.  How can we be sure that we have a culture that takes every key 
opportunity to learn from unwanted events experienced within the 
organisation (accidents and near-misses) and from the experience of 
other organisations? 
12.  How do we, as the board/ executive group and as an organisation, 
ensure that we are getting the appropriate and relevant data to feed 
into our risk discourse? How do we judge appropriate and relevant? 
13.  How do we judge whether the way we analyse risk is appropriate to 
the risks we face? 
14.  What might give us confidence that after an unwanted event our 
decision-making will stand up, in hindsight, to critical external 
scrutiny? 
15.  How do we ensure that all the members of the board/ executive have a 
shared view and understanding of the organisation, the way it works 
and its risks? 
16.  What evidence can be provided that our plans and policies are 
robust enough to withstand a disruptive event? 
17.  How might we notice where an emerging gap between our practice 
and our formal procedures becomes a potential source of risk? 
18.  When would we expect our people to use their experience and 
intuition rather than adhering strictly to written plans or standards; 
when might this cause problems? Where might our “rule-book” 
actually hamper the achievement of our organisational goals?  
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Summarising Questions 
19.  What “unwanted” occurrences (including those perceived as 
“inconceivable”) might affect our organisation? 
20.  What evidence exists to show that our organisation’s culture, structure 
or processes do NOT provoke errors or rule violations? 
 
As a result of the interviews the key issues identified were: 
 The questions were found to have practical utility. A clear link to the 
UK’s Combined Code was also established. 
 Each question could be used as a portal into the existing body of 
knowledge. 
 The question set could be seen as being a coherent whole. As a result 
of research, potential clashes within the process were identified. In 
particular the clash between the practice to manage legal liability and to 
manage potential sources of unwanted occurrences would seem, in 
some circumstances, to be at odds with each other. It would seem to be 
important that for successful risk governance these issues be identified 
and resolved. 
 A clear need emerged to categorise those within the risk governance/ 
management community in order for them to appreciate the level of 
knowledge and understanding that exists amongst those trying to 
communicate these issues. This is seen as important as it facilitates 
effective cross communications. 
 One of the most significant findings was the importance of the 
relationship between the potential user of the questions and the 
questions themselves. It became clear that without the required 
openness to new thinking, no formulation of questions would stimulate 
new ways of thinking. Therefore, the respondents’ attitude towards the 
questions seemed to be important. It determined whether they asked 
themselves particular questions, or whether they went on to the next 
steps which would be to ask themselves what were the questions they 
should be asking themselves. This can be seen to link directly back to 
the format of Project 2, which was structured around failure to ask, 
failure to appreciate and failure to act. 
 Linked to the respondents’ attitude towards the questions was their 
desire to learn. While some respondents exhibited a strong desire to 
learn, others showed none. Evidence from this research is that the 
existing body of literature has had little penetration into this potential 
community of users. Another important finding was that all the 
respondents were looking for a distillation of the existing work rather 
than exhibiting any interest in examining the original academic papers. 
This would suggest that if the work were to reach this audience then it 
must be synthesised into more condensed packages. 
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 The final issue identified was that “knowing” did not automatically lead 
to the appropriate action being taken. Within some literature the authors 
expressed surprise that when an organisation knew there was potential 
for certain unwanted occurrences to occur, that they had not taken the 
appropriate action to prevent them. This research confirmed that while 
knowledge may exist, this may not in itself lead to the appropriate action 
being taken. This research now needs to be linked to work that 
examines this issue. 
In summary, Project 3 operationalises the issues identified in Project 2 and 
these operationalised questions can be seen to have practical utility. In 
addition, the work has created a coherent whole that provides a portal through 
which the original research may be accessed. However, it is considered 
unlikely that practitioners, in general, would wish to access the original 
research in its academic format. Work therefore needs to be done to present 
the original academic work on risk governance issues, in a format that is more 
digestible to the practitioner community, who might benefit from knowing about 
it. 
Risk Governance v. Risk Management 
The research did identify how risk governance was, in practice, significantly 
different from risk management. It identified that those involved in governance 
are firstly distanced from the activity that generates the risk and secondly are 
unlikely to be experts in every potential type of risk. Therefore they need to 
consider themselves to be investigators rather than experts. This means that 
in their role of investigator they need to concentrate on asking challenging 
questions of those reporting to them. This suggests that the skills they should 
have are a clear understanding of the mechanism that may generate risks and 
the ability to ask penetrating questions and be open minded enough to probe 
all the organisations’ assumptions. 
CONTRIBUTION 
The main contributions that this research is seen to have made to the field of 
risk management are as follows: 
 It has formulated a coherent whole out the multiple definitions of risk, 
thereby contributing to that field of knowledge.  
 It has identified that there is a significant practical difference between 
the concept of risk management and risk governance.  
 In a critical evaluation of previous work, it has identified that research 
has failed to distinguish between the multiple paradigms used in areas 
of risk management. 
 In the risk literature there has been very little discussion of paradigms 
used when discussing risk. Renn (2008a) had previously identified three 
approaches (Precaution-based, Risk-based and Discursive-based) to 
risk management. This work has identified three dominant fields of risk 
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management (project, process and scenario) and suggests that a 
combination of these two dimensions generates nine different ways of 
seeing (paradigms) or examining the issues at hand (this is not to 
suggest that there are not others as well). The identification of these 
nine paradigms may offer one explanation as to why cross-
understanding within the field of risk management is difficult and goes 
further to suggest that, if they continue to go unacknowledged, this may 
lead to incorrect deductions being drawn. 
 It has identified that Key Risk Indicators are as much a performance 
management tool as they are a risk management tool, thereby 
establishing a closer link between the two fields. 
 It has, for the first time, synthesised a body of literature relating to risk 
governance. 
 It has, for the first time, looked to develop this field of knowledge into a 
coherent whole, thereby helping to make the existing body of 
knowledge more accessible to practitioners. It offers a structure, based 
on 20 questions generated by the operationalised themes derived from 
a synthesis of the literature. These questions have been shown to have 
practical utility amongst a sample of the target audience.  
 It suggests an approach that enables a way that the various disciplines 
related to risk management may be considered in an uniform way and 
the integrated with fields such as performance management. This is 
seen to be necessary if the subject are to have practical utility for those 
involved in organisational governance activity. In developing a coherent 
set of 20 questions (organized into 4 categories), this research has 
developed the first instrument for a coherent and meaningful approach 
to resolving the issue of “failure of foresight”. As such it provides the 
first step towards facilitating a more effective form of risk discourse 
appropriate to the needs of governance This approach helps to make 
the process of risk management more forward looking by its use of 
questions.  
 
In summary, this work contributes to both the body of knowledge and to 
practice. It has examined the knowledge that exists from the perspective of 
putting it into practice; by doing this we have developed further understanding 
of the existing knowledge and have learnt more about its limitations. This will 
enable those involved in the discussions of risk to relate each definition to one 
another and thereby enhance cross-understanding within the stakeholder 
group. 
Significance 
The genesis of this work is two of the phases (perceive and recognise) within 
Turner’s Disaster Incubation Theory (Turner, 1978). Failure at these phases 
has been labelled by Turner as Failure of Foresight (Turner, 1976b). It should 
be noted that within crisis management literature this is referred to as the 
“prodromes” period - from the Greek for “running before” (Fink, 2000). The 
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failures to be forestalled are disasters or crises which are likely to have been 
categorised as the highest level of concern but also the highest level of 
improbability and yet, while being perceived therefore as inconceivable, still 
happen. In hindsight, the build-up to these events can be clearly identified, yet 
in foresight they have been missed. Most of the work to date has looked 
backwards from the event (hindsight) in order to identify why they occurred. 
This research looks at the issue from the perspective of foresight in order to 
examine the process as it occurs. 
This work has significance for both academics and practitioners. 
For academics, the significance is that it should make them question, in 
a new way, the assumptions that they have about their work. In 
particular they first need to question the paradigm that they use in order 
to see its limitations. Secondly, they need to appreciate that what they 
see as foresight may differ considerably from what a practitioner sees 
as foresight. Therefore, when academics suggest that their proposition 
has value in foresight for practitioners, this assertion needs to be tested 
more rigorously. 
There is also a significant finding in the relationship between knowledge 
and practitioner. The assumption that knowing is enough in itself has 
repeatedly been shown to be false; academics theorising on risk 
management need to be more rigorous in the way they show their work 
to have a practical utility. 
For practitioners, the significance is that this work recognises that they 
have a different perspective, for example they do not expect “answers” 
(“proven truths”) for academic work to be useful to them. Therefore the 
significance of this work is that it concentrates on providing questions 
that have practical utility, rather than proven truths.  Of more direct 
significance to practitioners therefore are the “thinking tools” or 
frameworks that this research provides, which are designed to help 
them see the context of their actions in a new light. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
The final section of this chapter looks at the limitations of this research and 
discusses areas for further research. This research used qualitative research 
techniques in order to understand how a group of practitioners may derive 
practical utility from the body of existing knowledge. As with any research of 
this nature, there are limitations to the design, the methodology and the 
analysis. In order for others to judge the significance of this work, it is 
important to make these limitations clear so that the work can be judged in 
context. The limitations also offer potential areas for further research work. 
Limitations 
One of the main limitations of this research is that all the analysis is performed 
by a single individual and therefore does not have the requisite variety needed 
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to add the depth provided by alternative perspectives. This limitation is 
inherent in this type of research. Only through further testing over time will we 
see the robustness of this work. 
The research was based on English language publications and all discussions 
were limited by the use of the English language. Efforts were therefore made 
to ensure that the scope of work used was wider than that produced within the 
UK and US, despite their pre-eminence. Journal articles with authors from 
non-English speaking countries were always given close scrutiny for relevance 
rather than reliance on specific key words. 
The research is limited by its focus on practice determined by the UK’s 
Combined Code. While this might be seen as being geographically limited, as 
a “principles-based” code, it is likely that the results of this research are 
generalisable to other domains which also utilise a “principles-based” code. 
The empirical research was also limited by the sample population used. The 
respondents were self-selecting and therefore it cannot be ignored that they 
may have had their own agenda. While it is recognised that each individual will 
bring their own bias, it is considered that this will not have adversely affected 
the result overall. This statement is justified because the questions are not 
offered as being definitive but rather that some are seen to provoke discussion 
either internally, within an individual, or externally, between the individual and 
their group.  
Another limitation of the empirical research was seen to be the candour and 
openness shown by each respondent. It was clear that the subject of risk does 
cause a defensive reaction in many people. It was not therefore possible to 
take all the comments at face value; they often needed to be interpreted and 
therefore some bias introduced by the role of the researcher has to be 
considered. 
Finally, the process of coding and data analysis is, to a large degree, 
subjective. During the synthesis carried out during Project 2 and the 
operationalisation of the questions during Project 3, while each process 
involved multiple stages and consecutive criteria, the final judgements must be 
recognised as being subjective. However, as the evaluation of practical utility 
was based on the judgement of others, this limitation is not considered to 
damage the overall result. 
Areas for Further Research 
This research has opened up the scope for future research on this subject 
area. I have limited my comments here to the work that I have been prompted 
to consider. 
The first issue I regard as worth examining is to debate the advantages and 
disadvantages of the reliance on rule-based systems for risk governance/ risk 
management. The work would be designed for publication in a practitioner 
journal. The purpose of this work would be to clarify, in my own mind, the 
strengths and weaknesses inherent within a rule-based approach in order to 
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develop and enhance understanding of these issues across the community of 
interested practitioners and academics. 
The next task worth undertaking is to develop the idea of providing a portal 
into the existing research. Most of the work has been done; it is now a 
question of reviewing those texts already identified during Project 2 in order to 
précis each and present the information in such a way as to be accessible to 
general practitioners through business Masters programmes (as a potential 
target population). 
The idea would be to optimise the “message” for its intended target audience. 
As a practitioner, I would see this as being “communications”; as a scholar I 
now understand this to be, in Boyer’s (1990) terms, pedagogy. A useful piece 
of research may therefore be to explore pedagogy to see how this body of 
existing work may help in optimising how the data is presented to practitioners. 
As this research is focused at the board/executive level within organisations 
and looks to provide ways that may encourage ‘thinking about how to think 
about risk’, it may be worth reviewing the literature on executive behaviour. 
The aim of this work would be to understand what prompts and what prevents 
executives seeing, appreciating, acting and learning. 
The final area of research is the concept of “synthesis”. Implicit in the body of 
work that I examined was that organisations failed to synthesise effectively the 
data available to them. While academics offer criticism, they do not offer 
anything more constructive. The question therefore becomes, whether 
scholarly studies have anything to offer in devising a more effective 
methodology for synthesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 - SEVEN DIMENSIONS OF RISK 
 
Abstract 
Before decisions can be made, parties to any discussion need to be clear 
about the meaning of the terms that they are using. Discussions about risk 
would appear to be hampered by a combination of the ambiguous nature of 
the term itself and the hidden drivers of implicit assumptions and mix of 
perspectives brought to the discussion by each party. This paper identifies 
areas where the implicit should be made explicit and provides frameworks to 
facilitate any such exercise. The paper examines how the concept of risk might 
be conceptualised during risk discourse. The proposed framework is designed 
to enable general managers to explore the issue of risk in a more structured 
way. It provides the basis on which to debate the various risks that might affect 
their endeavours in order to facilitate the “Cross-Understanding” (Huber & 
Lewis, 2010). 
INTRODUCTION 
‘The most important part of the safety enterprise is thinking about 
how to think… about' risk (Wildavsky, 1988:2) 
 
The construct labelled “risk” receives extensive consideration across a wide 
range of academic literature. As well as the literature on the general area of 
risk management, the subject of risk is specifically contained within literature 
covering: (1) accident investigation, (2) crisis management, (3) business 
continuity management, (4) operational risk management, (5) process risk 
management, (6) project and programme risk management, (7) resilience and 
(8) high reliability. In addition, it may also appear within any area where 
unwanted, unintended or unanticipated inputs, occurrences or consequences 
that have negative connotations have a potential to emerge.  
The term “risk” would seem to embrace a large number of conflicting ideas. 
This ambiguity might be seen to go back to the origins of the term. Bernstein 
(1998:8) believes that ‘The word 'Risk' derives from the early Italian 'risicare' 
which means 'to dare'. In this sense, risk is a choice rather than a fate.’ This 
captures the idea of risk providing opportunities that may lead to reward as 
well as possible downsides. Mythen (2004:13) sees the word coming from the 
Arabic word “Rizq” meaning the ‘acquisition of wealth and good fortune’ 
Damodaran (2008:6) draws a link to the Chinese symbol for risk which is a 
combination of danger (crisis) and opportunity, representing the downside and 
upside of risk. Risk is often taken to be the jeopardy that is juxtaposed to the 
benefits associated with an activity. 
There is ambiguity over the very meaning of the term “risk” and, as this paper 
will show, there is still no consensus as to what the term “risk” embraces. 
Ramgopal (2003) agrees that the ‘use of the term risk is ambiguous.’ This 
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sentiment is further supported by a number of other authors, including: Milburn 
and Billings (1976:116), Adams (1995:7-9), Lupton (1999:1-7), Gigerenzer 
(2003:26), Ward and Chapman (2003:101) and Renn (2008a:2). There are 
several definitions of risk (detailed later in this paper) which, while superficially 
concurring, provide clear differences in emphasis. This ambiguity creates 
difficulties for managers who need to conceptualise and communicate these 
core ideas.  
Few authors disagree that a significant part of risk is a mental construct. Renn 
(1998:49) argues that ‘risks are always mental representations of threats that 
are capable of claiming real losses’. A question therefore comes, as to how 
these mental representations of the issues form part of any discussion of a 
subject necessary to generate the cross-understanding (Huber and Lewis, 
2010) needed to enable sufficient mutual understanding so that agreed action 
can take place. It is therefore important for any paper on risk to define clearly 
how the author perceives, and then intends to use, this key term.  
In order to facilitate greater cross-understanding within risk discourse (Renn, 
2008a:65-66), the purpose of this paper is to examine whether the many 
apparently contradictory definitions of risk, form part of a more complex overall 
picture, and are, in fact, consistent rather than contradictory. The paper claims 
that the existing definitions can all be embraced within a wider framework that 
provides seven dimensions to risk. The significance of this is that both 
academics and practitioners are able to take each definition (or construct) as 
being part of a wider overall picture. This has the advantage of being able to 
start to address the greater complexity of the issue rather than trying to reduce 
it to a simplification of this complex issue which may be labelled as a “pretence 
of knowledge” (Ghoshal, 2005:77). 
Wildavsky (1988:2) sets the tenor for this paper, the purpose of which is to 
help people think about how they think about risk. In this paper I examine a 
series of phenomena and paradigms associated with risk in order to identify 
areas where the implicit could be made explicit. By looking at the question 
“What is risk?” I identify coherence (around the construct of temporal 
complexity) in a seemingly disparate set of risk definitions. As risk is context 
dependent, the second section examines the key phenomena that frame any 
risk discourse and suggests that these need to be made explicit if a better 
cross-understanding is to be achieved.  
The paper starts by discussing the context for this paper and then links it to 
previous work in this subject area. Secondly, it describes the approach that I 
will take in order to make my methodology transparent. Thirdly, I look at the 
ways in which the word “risk” is used within academic and management 
literature in order to identify the ambiguity inherent in its current usage. 
Fourthly, I describe the method that I will use to construct an analytical 
framework to enable a pattern of use to be identified and then finally, I conduct 
the analysis in order to identify any distinct pattern of use. I shall, however, 
start by setting the context within which I shall be examining the concept of 
risk. 
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CONTEXT 
As with any other discussion of risk, this paper needs to establish the context 
within which it is set. Therefore, for this paper, it is necessary firstly to identify 
the ontological construct within which the discussion is taking place. Secondly, 
it is necessary to identify the perspective from within which the subject has 
been examined.  
Ontological Setting 
The word risk may be seen to be amongst the most widely used words, with 
the greatest number of meanings, in the English Language. In understanding 
the term, the first issue to be tackled is whether risk is a tangible “thing” or an 
intangible “mental construct”.  
At the more tangible end of the spectrum are the engineering sciences where, 
at a more general level, risk is defined using a succinct phrase or by using a 
simple tripartite format (e.g. Risk = Probability x Impact; using quantitative 
methods to resolve technical problems: see Table 5 for other examples). Each 
type of definition is used, in turn, in order to develop a clear understanding of 
the concept. However, as will be demonstrated, risk is more complex than 
these simple definitions might imply. 
In his contribution to the debate about risk, Renn (2008a:110) states that 
‘Perceptions have a reality of their own’. He goes on to characterise these 
perceptions of risk as a fatal threat/ stroke of fate/ personal thrill (test of 
strength)/ a gamble (game of chance) and an indicator of insidious danger 
(early warning indicator) (Renn, 2008a:110-117). Post-Modernist writers (such 
as Lupton 1999; Mythen, 2004) see risk as a device to maintain cultural 
boundaries (referred to as the “Cultural-Symbolic” debate), as a way to 
maintain order through self-discipline (referred to as the “Governmentality” 
debate) or whether the benefits of technology are worth the risks involved 
(referred to as the “Risk Society” debate). According to Mythen, (2006:13), 
Giddens sees risk as a political concept, as it is used to attribute blame. These 
are all seemingly legitimate uses of the terms which have their own detailed 
warrants. 
Renn (1998:49) states 'both extremes, the constructivist and the realist 
perspective, miss the point, as risks are always mental representations of 
threats that are capable of claiming real losses’. I argue that this requires an 
“ontological oscillation” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:266) between being a 
constructionist (in order to understand risk) and a positivist (in order to manage 
it effectively and efficiently). This approach was justified elsewhere by Snook 
(2000:76) in his award winning Harvard PhD dissertation. 
Risk Management as Part of Performance Management 
The next step is to articulate the perspective used to examine the issue of risk. 
There are two opposing views as to the relationship between risk and reward 
associated with risk management. Many practitioners in the risk management 
arena believe, as Ramgopal (2003:22) asserts, “Best practise regards risk as 
 Chapter 2   34 
 
encompassing both threat and opportunity”. Others couch risk management in 
terms of threat management and, in common usage, risk is associated with 
“threat” or “harm” which is seen by some to lead to a pessimistic threat 
orientated perspective.  
The literature provides a further ambiguous mix involving performance 
management, risk management, opportunity management and uncertainty 
management (Ward and Chapman, 2002:1); they are all used to cover the 
dialectics of risk-reward which is also articulated as either cost-benefit 
(Gigerenzer, 2003:76; Sheffi, 2005:14), upside-downside or opportunity-threat 
(Browning in Hillson, 2007:319). However, as Ramgopal (2003:22) 
acknowledges, ‘Strategies for managing project uncertainty cannot be 
divorced … from strategies for managing the project objectives and associated 
trade-offs’. The literature also gives examples, such as Bobker in Hillson 
(2007:68), who insists that risk should only refer to adverse events. The 
language is enriched (or maybe just complicated) further by such writers as 
Ward (Hillson, 2007:212) who uses the term “uncertainty management” to 
embrace “risk management” and “opportunity management”. This then leads 
to the question as to what differentiates “uncertainty management” from 
“performance management”.  
To others, all management is risk management. Shaw (2005:23) cites this as 
the view of the Canadian risk management pioneer Douglas Barlow, an 
executive with equipment manufacturer Massey Ferguson. Charles Handy has 
said something very similar: ‘Risk management is not a separate activity from 
management, it is management … predicting and planning allow prevention ... 
Reaction is a symptom of poor management’ (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008:44). 
Hollnagel (2009:18) is even more succinct: ‘Instead of seeing successes and 
failures as two separate categories of outcomes … they are but two sides of 
the same coin.’ This sees the “risk-reward” dialectic as being the most 
fundamental of all management dilemmas; that every benefit has associated 
jeopardy, some of which are obvious and others being more difficult to identify. 
This has been categorised by Adams (2007:38) as (1) perceived directly, (2) 
perceived through science (measurable) and (3) virtual risks (an act of faith). 
From this, I therefore have adopted the view that all benefits have associated 
jeopardy (or risks) where some of these risks are more obvious than others. 
Given the risk-reward dialectic as a basic assumption, we need to consider 
how this risk performance might be monitored. Within the performance 
management field, Calandro and Lane (2006:38) recommended that ‘firms 
utilise two scorecards, one for performance and a separate one for risk’. Their 
arguments are based on (1) the complexity of combining the two, (2) that the 
people in departments that measure risk and performance are normally 
separated, (3) that the separate scorecards can balance managers’ time 
between performance and risk, and (4) risk and performance can resemble 
one another therefore separate scorecards can delineate between the two 
subjects. They do, however, go on to say that “if separate scorecards are 
adopted, it is strongly recommended that each scorecard be constructed within 
a common framework.” The question this leaves is whether, as benefit and 
jeopardy are intimately linked in practice, the management practice of 
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separating them is dysfunctional? Their argument as to the complexity, 
however, is well made and, as Perrow (1999) warns, complexity, as an 
attribute, can lead to other risks. However, this is a classic risk-risk situation 
where the risk of complexity in combining the two factors must be weighed 
against the risk of failure in coordination if the two are separated. Therefore, 
for clarity, while I accept that risk and reward are indivisibly linked, in this 
paper I associate the term “performance management” with the benefits 
derived from the system and associate the term “risk management” with any 
jeopardy inherent in the activity. 
Therefore, in summary, the ontology to be used is to accept that while risk may 
be a mental construct, it does have real, tangible consequences and that it is 
from the perspective of managing these issues that the term “risk” has been 
examined. 
DESCRIPTION OF METHOD  
While this is a conceptual paper, as has already been said, it takes a 
performance management perspective, i.e. the purpose of the method is to 
provide a mechanism by which those engaged in risk discourse may develop a 
cross-understanding of the construct of the term “risk”. Given the wide range of 
meanings attributed to this term, the question then becomes how might these 
be reconciled? In this section I propose to use a systems framework as a 
means of relating the various usages of the term. 
The purpose of the proposed method was to identify any pattern in the use of 
the term “risk”. The aim was to distil the pattern into a framework which might 
be useful by bringing structure to risk discourse. The structure does not look to 
provide a “cause–and-effect” model but simply a framework for debate. Karl 
Weick (2004:27) has stated that: ‘By placing a meaningful frame around flows 
of events, (in his case) normal accident theory allows people to better grasp 
and analyse the complexities of technological organisations as they face the 
unexpected.’ I am looking to apply the same logic to the understanding of risk. 
Weick applauds Perrow's Normal Accident Theory for the fact that it frames, it 
links, and it provokes; while noting the warning from Henri Theil that ‘Models 
are to be used, not believed’ and from George Box that ‘All models are wrong: 
some models are useful’ (Hubbard, 2009:213), I have the same ambition as 
Weick for this risk framework. This is to ‘let people get their bearings when 
they observe complex organisations that face the unexpected’ (Weick, 
2004:27). Weick provides an example of how he used Perrow's 2 x 2 matrix 
(based on loose or tight coupling within linear or complex transformation 
systems) to help him ‘understand how and why the Centre for Disease Control 
misdiagnosed West Nile virus when it first appeared’. He says: ‘one way we 
get our bearings in this investigation is to assign the incident to a cell in 
Perrow’s matrix. In a way, it really does not matter where we assign it, 
because the act of assigning itself gets us talking, digging, comparing, refining, 
and focusing on the right question’ (Weick, 2004:27). The framework that I 
propose is designed to enable general managers to explore the issue of risk in 
a more structured way and provide them with the basis on which to debate 
how the various risks might affect their endeavours.  
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Hollnagel (in Hollnagel et al., 2006:9-17) provides a history of accident 
analysis. In his text he explains how initially accidents were seen as an “act of 
God”. This evolved into a hunt for “cause and effect” linkages which, in their 
turn, were considered to be too limited by the underlying assumption of a 
“closed system”. Hollnagel’s argument is based on the concept that “open 
systems” are subjected to the influence (both weak and strong) of everything 
within an environment; Hollnagel might be seen to be part of what is referred 
to as a Socio-technical design school of thought. In more recent work by 
Leveson and others (Leveson et al., 2009:227; Marais et al., 2004) they also 
reject the “cause-effect” model as being too simplistic and use a system 
methodology in order to capture the complexity of interactions. While Hollnagel 
and the others limit their theorising to the accident field and related subjects, I 
extend this logic to cover wider aspects of risk management. 
Established authorities on management of risk (Renn, 2008a; Slovic, 2000; 
Waring and Glendon, 1998) all use a systems type framework to provide ‘a 
structural tool to illustrate the … process, and not (as) an empirical model of 
how (in this case) communication is factually organised’ (Renn, 2008a:209). 
The literature on Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 1999:356-7) and High 
Reliability Organisations (Roberts, 1990) is also centred on a systems 
approach. I believe by adopting a similar approach, I will be better placed to 
communicate my ideas more effectively. 
In addition to those in the Socio-technical design school, a systems approach 
has been used elsewhere to provide structure for the discussion of risk (see 
Renn, 2008a:159-172; Haimes, 2009). Given that system models can become 
very complex, this analysis will use a simplified system model (see Figure 2 as 
the basic analytical framework). 
Inputs Transformation 
Process
Outputs
Controls
 
Figure 2 - System Framework 
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It is important that this analysis embraces as wide a range as possible of 
meanings attributed to the term “risk” in order to determine whether there is 
any consistency within their pattern of use. To this end, a non-probability 
sampling of definitions has been taken from the literature. Stake (1995) 
contends that it is often more beneficial ‘to learn a lot from an atypical case 
than a little from a magnificently typical case’. Consequently I am not 
concerned with any quantitative analysis looking at the frequency of use of any 
definition, but just at the fact that the term has been used in a certain way. The 
rationale for such a deliberative sampling method is that extreme and atypical 
cases tend to give more information and thus allow the phenomenon of 
intervening factors to become more ‘visible’ (Stake, 1995). 
The simplified system is consistent with using the metaphor of “Organisations 
as a machine” (Morgan, 2006:11-32). This approach uses different 
terminology; “before” becomes “inputs”, “events” become “transformation”, 
“after” becomes “outcomes”. The systems approach introduces the concept of 
“controls”, which is consistent with “objectives and targets” within the 
performance management paradigm. These basic categories therefore form 
the analytical framework that will be used to examine how the term “risk” is 
used (see Figure 2). This framework will provide a structure against which the 
usages of the term could be mapped. Aven et al. (2011:1077) use the 
metaphor of a rock and a victim to describe how the ontology of risk may also 
be interpreted in a similar way. An example of where such an approach has 
been used by practitioners is the ‘Operational Risk Modelling System Dynamic 
Approach‘ found in Hoffman (2002:298).  
This research uses the framework to map the various definitions of risk. The 
analysis starts with the simplest definitions and then, in an inductive process, 
adds in the more complex ones. Finally, the process adds into the framework 
those factors which provide the necessary context to the discourse. 
ANALYSIS 
Having established the method to be used, this section describes the inductive 
analysis process. It starts by establishing the range of terms used to define 
risk, it then maps the simpler definitions on to the framework, and finally it 
adds the more complex definitions. The section ends by describing the 
frameworks that evolved from the analytical process. 
Range of Definitions  
Risk appears in many forms in many literature fields. This paper will 
concentrate on only three fields perceived to be the most relevant to 
performance management. These include risk management, the management 
of uncertainty and organisational resilience. This paper will look to extract the 
common features of these three different fields in order to develop a 
framework for risk discourse.  
The term “risk” is ambiguous ‘Despite its global omnipresence, risk remains an 
opaque and disputed concept’ (Mythen, 2006:1). It has been given a multitude 
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of meanings by its users. Leitch (2008:30-31) states that ‘there is a big 
difference between ‘some risks’ and ‘some risk’. Leitch sees risks as countable 
entities’ and risk as being ‘exposed to uncertainty that we care about’: one is 
an entity and the other an abstract. Woolgar (1980:242) points to the 
‘limitations of language’; while inhabitants of the Arctic are said to have many 
words for snow, the English language provides only one. It is the same for the 
concept of risk; while the term has many meanings attributed to it, the English 
language has only one word to cover this complex idea. 
The three main usages of the term in literature are:  
1) Risk as “an event” - An uncertain event’ (OGC, 2007), (see also 
Dallas, 2006:371; Bartlett, 2002:131).   
2) Risk as “uncertainty” (also encapsulated as “likelihood” or 
“possibility”) - ‘uncertainty of outcome’, (HM Treasury, 2004:49), also 
see (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008:11) and Frank Knight (1921) cited by 
Damodaran (2008:5).  
3) Risk as “an effect”. This effect being ‘possible consequences’ 
(Holton, 2004:20), or as a ‘Business Impact’ (effect) (Richard Flynn in 
Hillson (2007:370)). 
However, there are examples of risk being given more abstract meanings. 
Four of these include: Cleden (2009:121) who defines risk as ‘an expression’, 
Holton (2004:22) who defines it as ‘exposure’, Chapman and Ward (1997:7) 
who define it as ‘the implications’ and Dean in Lupton (1999:138) as a ‘form of 
rationality’. These examples illustrate the diversities of constructs that have 
been given to this single term. 
Risk, as a term, is linguistically flexible. It therefore may be considered to be 
too ambiguous to be used on its own. Risk appears always to need to be 
amplified in order to resolve these ambiguities and apparent contradictions. 
However, Mythen (2004:14-15) gives three reasons why 'trying to define risk 
may prove to be something of a red herring: firstly risk will differ over time and 
place, secondly risks for some can be construed as opportunities for others, 
and thirdly catchall definitions of risk tend to concede concrete meaning. For 
these reasons I will not try to define risk. What I will do, however, is to identify 
a construct or the dimensions that embrace the many uses of the term “risk”. 
Simple Definition 
The definitions plotted (Table 4) were selected from both academic and 
practitioner literature. They were taken from the following references: 
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An Uncertainty: Frank Knight (1921) cited by (Damodaran, 2008:5) 
An event:  (Aven and Renn,  2009:1) 
Form of rationality: (Lupton, 1999:138) 
Questionable Assumption: (Baxter 1996) 
Uncertainty: (Holton, 2004:20) 
Failure: (Malik, 2008:88) 
An implication: (Chapman and Ward, 1997:7) 
An effect: (Hillson and Simon, 2007:224) 
Exposure: (Holton, 2004:22) 
Volatility:  (Hubbard, 2009:84) 
Table 4 - Quotes Used 
 
The purpose of the analysis is to identify whether all the definitions fall into one 
sector or are spread across the spectrum of the system. The analysis took 
each definition of risk and categorised them in terms of whether they may be 
perceived to be (1) an input concept, (2) a transformation concept, (3) an 
outcome concept or (4) part of the control mechanism. As the language used 
within risk management is still very immature (many of the words used have 
no generally accepted meanings), the rationale behind the placing of the 
various usages of the term “risk” was not considered to be as important as the 
result which indicates that meanings can be associated within each of the 
defined areas.  
Some usages were seen as being part of the concept of input; where risk is 
seen as an event or a “cause” of an effect. (It should be noted that risk as an 
uncertainty is also an event.) A “questionable assumption” is perceived as 
borderline between being an input or part of the transformation process. More 
clearly within the transformation process is risk as “uncertainty” (it is seen as 
being an uncertainty or a probability within the transformation process) and 
risk “as a form of rationality”. Those that were perceived as falling in the output 
category were risk as “an effect”, “an implication” and “failure”. Finally risk as 
“exposure” and “volatility” was deemed to fit into the control box. Risk as 
exposure was interpreted as the level of risk or the amount of risk to which the 
organisation is being or will be exposed; this was seen as a control total and 
therefore placed within the control area. Risk as exposure has been 
interpreted as being consistent with the many other terms (such as risk 
appetite (Marshall, 1995:47), risk tolerance (Shaw, 2007:41) and risk profile 
(BS31100:2008), which have been used to express the amount of risk that is 
expected or acceptable; these are all seen as being a control total. Risk as 
exposure is therefore also seen as being consistent within this proposed 
framework. 
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Milburn and Billings (1976:122) are even more explicit. They believe that ‘It is 
… worth pointing out that risk can enter in at any point in the process’ and that 
‘If we focus only on one phase, we miss important phenomena’. Although 
Milburn and Billings were talking about the decision-making process, this 
paper will extend this idea to all processes and will look to see whether the 
assertion remains valid. I therefore will look to base my analysis within a 
process setting.  
As stated earlier, the exact placing of each concept is not considered to be as 
important as the fact that definitions of risk can be seen to fall within all four 
areas of the system boxes and therefore risk should not be seen as a single 
concept relevant to a specific part of any transformation system. Risks can be 
seen to be present in any and every part of the system. What this exercise 
does confirm is Mythen’s (2004:14-15) contention that ‘Risk will differ over 
time’, that there is a temporal dimension to the complexity of risk. The 
importance of the time dimension is supported by Hollnagel (2009:14 & 17); he 
points out that “error” may be incurred if an action is untimely. Risks exist from 
the beginning of a process through to its conclusion, irrespective of whether 
the temporal dimension is short, as for example within electronic systems, or 
long, as seen in the environmental debate. The analysis produced the layout 
shown in Figure 3 
Inputs Transformation 
Process
Outputs
Controls
Risk as “an 
effect” 
Risk as “an 
event” 
Risk as 
“uncertainty” 
Risk as “an 
uncertainty” 
Risk as 
“Exposure” 
Risk as 
“questionable 
assumptions” 
Risk as “form 
of rationality” 
Risk as “an 
implication” 
Risk as 
“failure” 
Risk as 
“Volatility” 
 
Figure 3 - Defined Risks 
 
As a result of Figure 2, it is therefore proposed to consider risk as an input, risk 
during the transformation process, risk as an output and risk as control totals.  
Figure 4 shows the basic temporal construct. 
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Figure 4 - Temporal Complexity 
Up to this point, it has been shown that the term “risk” has been used to mean 
phenomena in all four boxes taken from a basic systems approach. This 
confirms that the term has too wide a utility to be used meaningfully on its own. 
Therefore, in order to avoid confusion, participants in risk discourse should be 
encouraged to articulate whether the risk that concerns them is in fact an 
input, output, control total or within the transformation process itself.  
Tripartite Definitions 
The next step in the analysis of risk is to examine a series of tripartite risk 
definitions (i.e. those articulated as “Risk = A (x) B”). The selection in Table 5  
demonstrates further complexity.  
 
 Risk = Probability x Magnitude. (Slovic, 2000:232) 
 Risk = Probability (of Occurrence of Loss) x Magnitude (of Possible Loss). 
(Malik, 2008:48) 
 Risk = Probability x Impact. (APRA, 2008) 
 Risk = Probability x S (damage scale). (Stankiewicz, 2009:112) 
 Risk = Threat + Vulnerability. (Kovacich and Halibozek 2003:26) 
 Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence. (Cox, 2008:1749) 
 Risk = Probability x Consequence. (Van Well-Stam et al., 2004:45, 
Damodaran, 2007:6) 
 Risk = Expected consequences + Uncertainties. (Aven, 2007:433) 
 Risk = Exposure + Uncertainty (which you care about). (Holton, 
2004:22) 
 Risk is the possibility and quantum of loss. [March and Shapira (1987) 
cited by Coleman, 2006:255)]  
 Risk is the probability of a material hazard circumstance occurring. 
(Tullock in Lupton, 1999:36) 
Table 5 - Examples of Complex Risk Definitions 
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These articulations of risk combine aspects from all four system boxes. 
However they predominantly concentrate on the outputs (Impact, 
Consequence or Magnitude) and control boxes (examples of such words might 
be probability, frequency, magnitude or severity (see Haimes 2009 for 
example). These therefore need further analysis.  
Such definitions of risk often suggest limits or control totals. This reinforces the 
place for a control box within the proposed framework. These scales articulate 
potential or limits of what might be expected to happen, or what might be 
deemed to be acceptable should it happen. All these scales are features of 
management control. They therefore fit into the control box within the 
framework. The numbers these scales represent at this stage are only 
hypothetical and are therefore not an actual social bad. They are 
encompassed in the term “risk exposure”. It should be noted, however, that if 
the term has represented the manifestation of an actual social bad, this would 
require them to be placed in the output box. 
This leaves only the construct of the outputs requiring further examination. 
The term “output” covers a more complicated construct. The term “result” 
(BASEL 2 in Hoffman, 2002:29; Hillson, 2007:230; Kates, 1985 cited in Renn, 
2008a:98), “effect” (Hillson, 2007:230; Renn, 2008a:Glossary) and ‘impact” 
(Renn, 2008a:2; Anderson in Hillson, 2007:19) are used to denote an 
immediate output. Then there is “consequence” (see Table 5 for examples) 
and finally, there is one further term that needs to be added to this risk lexicon; 
that term is “subsequence”. These five terms (“an effect”, “result”, ‘impact”, 
“consequence” and “subsequence”) seem to be used interchangeably to cover 
risk as an output. This raises the question as to whether these terms are the 
same or should each be given a different connotation. An example of one such 
temporal representation from practitioner literature is provided by Sheffi 
(2005). 
Sheffi (2005:65) presents a structure which he calls a “disruption profile”. It has 
eight stages: (1) Preparation, (2) Disruptive event, (3) First response, (4) 
Delayed impact, (5) Full impact, (6) Recovery preparation, (7) Recovery and 
(8) Long-term impact. These stages combine events and reactions. Sheffi 
describes but does not define each stage. By extracting the stages which 
describe the event (Disruptive event, Delayed Impact, Full impact, Long-term 
impact) a synergy can be identified between the two approaches. Sheffi’s 
profile supports the assertion that the concept of output does require greater 
sub-categorisation. 
The terms used by Sheffi do, however, give a sense of a temporal dimension, 
which is felt to be misleading because the words used lead to the impression 
that the timeframe in question is hours, weeks or even years. However, as 
some scenarios may play out the whole sequence in seconds or micro-
seconds, the terms used by Sheffi may mislead or result in misinterpretation of 
the available data. I am therefore taking the idea of sequencing but replacing 
the terms used by Sheffi with the original terms of Result, Effect, Consequence 
and Subsequence. For these terms to be useful in differentiating component 
parts of output risks, they need to be given greater delineation. I now define 
these terms as follows:  
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 Results. The result is an initial outcome of the mechanism at play on an 
entity in creating the negative outcome. For example, if the mechanism at 
play is the continual flexing of a structure due to natural phenomena such 
as wind, the result of this may be that the structure becomes stressed. 
 Effect. The effect is the end product of the result on the entity causing 
the negative outcome. Taking the stress structure example from above, 
the effect of the stress may be that it induces part of a structure to fail. 
 Consequence. A consequence is the automatic effect (cascade effect 
(Leveson, 2004:244)) that will occur as the end product of the effect 
unless an intervention is made. Continuing the example from above, the 
consequence of part of the structure failing may be the total collapse of 
the structure. 
 Subsequence.  Malik (2008:55) talks of “subsequence” as ‘the overall 
impact on the stakeholders over the long term’. However, this use does 
not give a clear differentiation between “subsequence” and 
“consequence”. Gigerenzer (2003:31), on the other hand, talks of 
‘subsequent decisions’; this is where a decision is made following an 
event. An example of such a decision would be to ground an aircraft type 
following an accident with all the knock-on or ripple effects that this might 
have. Haddon-Cave (2009:377) in his description of a sequence of 
decisions that he identified as leading up to the loss of Nimrod XV230 
said that: ‘it is not surprising that something subsequently gave way.’ 
This latter use of “subsequence” does provide a clear differentiation. For 
the purpose of this work the term “subsequence” is therefore defined as 
“the consequence of a decision that follows an unwanted occurrence 
rather than being part of any cascade of events”. 
 Impact. The term “impact” is reserved for an overarching term that 
embraces all negative outputs relevant to the matter in hand. 
The basic sequencing from Input Risk through to Subsequence can be seen 
as having a temporal construct. The timescale in question for a particular risk 
will be context dependent. It may range from micro-seconds to millennia 
depending on the problem and the perspective of the viewer. An organisation’s 
capacity to manage such risk will depend on their ability and desire to 
intervene between any of the dimensions.  
The question still remains, however, how, within this construct, might the term 
“risk” be conceptualised. While Hubbard (2009:8) defines risk as ‘the 
probability and magnitude of a loss, disaster or other undesirable event’, he 
then shortens his definition to ‘something bad could happen’. A descriptive 
representation of risk may now be “all that you are trying to avoid while 
pursuing desired outcomes” or, in short, “that which is unwanted”. This 
construct is already in use (see Gephart (2004:22), Toft and Reynolds 
(2005:15 & 21), Cooke and Rohleder (2006:213-216) and Sgourou et al., 
(2010:1020) who cite an additional three authors). An equally descriptive 
phrase would be ‘unwanted events that I care about’ (as risk is a personal 
construct, the “I” representing the person speaking at that moment.). This idea 
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of risk as the unwanted may also be phrased, within this construct, more 
descriptively as “the nightmare that you want to prevent”. 
Basic Framework 
Using a basic systems structure, the seven dimensions of risk may be seen 
as: input risks (R1), transformation risks (R2), (unwanted) results (R3), 
(unwanted) effects (R4), (unwanted) consequences (R5), (unwanted) 
subsequence (R6), and as an expression of what is acceptable exposure (R7). 
This provides the basic structure seen in Figure 5, thus illustrating the 
multiplicity of meanings that have been given to the term “risk”.  
Transformation 
(R2)
Input Risk 
(R1)
Result (R3)/ 
Effect (R4)
Consequence (R5)
Exposure 
(R7)
“Impact”
Objective
(Social Good)
Downside
(Social Bad)
Subsequence (R6)
“Coupling”
 
Figure 5 - Seven Dimensions of Risks 
Connecting the dimensions of risk are both pathways towards positive 
outcomes (social good), as represented by the dotted line, negative outcomes 
(social bad) as represented by the solid line and the concept of coupling 
(Perrow, 1999:89-93) between the two. 
This now provides a framework around which the discussion of risk can take 
place. Discourse as to whether a particular phenomenon is an input, output, 
control or part of the transformation process should start the debate. However, 
there are still some further factors, which frame any discourse, that need to be 
considered. 
FRAMING RISK DISCOURSE 
Having shown in the previous section, that risk cannot be considered to be a 
single entity, that there is risk in all things at once within a series of interactions 
that move a person or organisation from one state in the present, taking in 
what has happened previously, to another emergent state in the future, there 
are other factors that need to be included when framing risk discourse. These 
are considered next.  
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From reviewing the literature, factors have emerged that other authors have 
considered to be important when discussing risk. These factors, which arose 
sufficiently often that they could not be excluded from further consideration, 
were: 
 Key Risk Issues: during the synthesis conducted as part of the previous 
section, a series of fundamental questions emerged which should be 
familiar to those versed in the literature or in business practice. 
 Inclusions and exclusions:  this subject is seen to be akin to “start” and 
“stop” rules (Simon, 1955 cited by Todd and Gigerenzer, 2003:149) in 
decision making theory. The ideas are also used by, amongst others, 
Snook (2000:189) and Vaughan (1996:391). 
 Perceptional Construct. See Slovic (2000), Snook, (2000:80) and 
Vaughan, (1996:405). 
 Boundaries: see Renn (2008a:135) and writers such as Hollnagel et al. 
(2006) and others who take a systems approach to the subject. 
 Context: see Renn (2008a:105-118), Slovic (2000:190), and Waring 
and Glendon (1998:55). 
 Stakeholders: see Perrow (1999:67) categorisation of victims and Boin 
and Schulmann (2008) for how changing public values can affect what 
is “acceptable”. 
 Reward and Jeopardy: see Weick (2004:28), (Gigerenzer, 2003:20) 
Renn's (2008a:161) “violation of equity” or the term “moral hazard” used 
in economics. 
Now I will discuss each factor in turn. 
Key Risk Issues 
For practitioners these might be grouped under seven headings. The first is 
the risk of “failing to deliver” some required or desired benefits; here benefits 
might include the classic four: (1) increased profit, (2) reduced costs, (3) 
regulatory conformity or (4) a strategic objective. The risks here are built into 
what Vaughan (1996) calls “production pressure” or the pressure to deliver. 
The second is the risk presented by obstacles to benefits delivery. These are 
typified as “barriers to delivery” which may range from a lack of resources to 
the active interference by other parties. The third grouping is those undesirable 
inputs (such as mistakes in specification, design or materials) which should be 
avoided. The fourth is the unexpected interactions that occur within normal 
systems. The fifth is the foreseen unwanted by-products of delivering original 
benefits. These risks are typified by the toxic by-products of industry where the 
risk is labelled as pollution. The sixth category is related to the fifth, it involves 
the unintended consequences of delivering the intended consequence. An 
example of this may be a phenomenon where children have been so protected 
from risks that they are unable to assess risk for themselves and are therefore, 
in the longer run, at greater risk of harm (sometimes called “cotton-wool kids”). 
The final grouping is the risks which are perceived to exist because something 
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is unknown or uncertain. It is suggested that this grouping may be a suitable 
starting point for any discussion of risk. This grouping may be labelled: 
benefits, barriers, to be avoided, the unexpected, the unwanted, the 
unintended and the unknown.  
Inclusions and Exclusions 
The purpose of the risk discourse is to prepare the parties involved for the 
decisions ahead; to ensure that their mental frame and the information 
available to them are appropriate for the decisions that they will need to make. 
Decision theory gives us an understanding of how individuals may establish 
such points of reference. It has been said that no matter what conversation 
you join, you will always join it in the middle. It is therefore important to 
establish what running conversation is being joined, define at what point you 
pick it up and the point at which you will exit. The concept used in decisions 
theory is that of the start and stop rule. It is thought appropriate to take this 
concept from decisions theory at this point because, while this paper does not 
look at the decision process, the purpose of developing a clear construct of 
risk is to enable more informed decisions to be taken at some point in the 
future. Therefore, in simple terms, this is the point from which information is 
thought irrelevant to the point that no more information is required in order to 
make a judgement (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2003:149). Snook (2000:219) 
describes how, in the context of determining the cause of the problem, a 
person’s perspective affects the point at which they stop collecting data: 
'Trainers stop when they find a weak skill that they can train. Lawyers stop 
when they find a responsible individual that they can prosecute. Political 
leaders stop when their constituents stop. Scientists stop when they learn 
something new' and how this stopping point is an ‘artificiality’ (Snook, 
2000:189). Vaughan (1996:391) from her experience examining the 
antecedents to the Challenger accident warns that NASA’s 'decision rule had 
become disassociated from its creators and the engineering process behind its 
creation'. This disassociation led to dysfunctional decision making which was 
at the heart of the accident. Therefore, my proposition is that, in order to make 
more informed judgements on risk, those involved need to understand what 
factors may affect their formulation of start and stop rules appropriate to the 
issue that they face. As these start and stop rules will exist tacitly, the 
proposition is that making them explicit would be helpful.  
Next, I will therefore examine the types of issues that are likely to affect how 
the start and stop rules may be generated. 
Perceptional Construct 
Slovic (2000) argues that risk is a mental construct. If risk is to have meaning, 
it has to be set in actual circumstances; if the temporal complexity of risk is to 
have meaning it needs to be set in a context. I will now examine the 
phenomena that frame discussions of risk. This starts with the concept of (1) 
framing and then looks at (2) boundaries, (3) context, (4) stakeholders and 
finishes with the place of (5) perceived rewards and jeopardy. In this paper I 
cannot hope to explore the detail on each; all I am attempting to do is to justify 
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its inclusion. I will explain each element and then show how it is linked to what 
I have already done. 
Snook (2000:80), cited Bruner as saying 'The more expected an event, the 
more easily it is seen or heard'. Vaughan, (1996:405), adds ‘how taken-for-
granted assumptions, predispositions, scripts, conventions, and classification 
systems figure into goal orientated behaviour in a pre-rational, pre-conscious 
manner that precedes and prefigures strategic choice.’ Nævestad (2009:157) 
goes a step further and defines frames of reference as ‘The context, viewpoint, 
or set of presuppositions or evaluative criteria within which a person’s 
perception and thinking seem always to occur, and which constrains 
selectively the course and outcome of these activities.’ He goes on to say 
(Nævestad, 2009:158) that ‘This definition emphasizes that our perception and 
thinking always occur within frames of reference and that these structure our 
perception and thinking. … Our interpretations and judgments are based on 
frames of reference.’ Haddon-Cave (2009:162) provides a clear example of 
why an understanding of this issue is important. When asking a witness why 
due notice had not been taken of a previous incident, the witness replied: ‘We 
were responding to the fire that we had. There was nothing to arouse our 
suspicion that we had a particular problem in those areas with fuel leaks.’ They 
were not looking; they did not see. Those using this proposed framework need to 
explore the frame of reference that they are using and therefore need to 
identify their potential “blind spots”. 
Boundaries 
The next issue to be addressed is that of boundaries. In an interview (Bourrier, 
2005) Karlene Roberts (an authority on High Reliability Organisations) stated 
‘We think research efforts should be focused on the places where parts of 
organizations come together because we think many errors occur at these 
‘‘interstices’’ (or “boundaries”). An interstice can be any place where parts 
must work together. These include shift changes, relationships between 
hospital pharmacies and wards, the relationship of organizations with their 
contractors, the relationships among  geographically separate parts of 
organizations, etc.’ Holt (2004:259) believed that there is a need for ‘investing 
time and effort’ in ‘"boundary drawing processes" as modern risks transgress 
sectoral, social, national and cultural boundaries. They may originate in one 
country or one sector, but will then proliferate into other areas and other 
sectors’ (Renn, 2008a:135). Due to the lack of clear boundaries in the 
complex, global consequences of taking risk, instruments and tools of 
calculating risk are inadequate and inaccurate (Renn, 2008a:135). However, 
risk studies tend to be 'bounded by time and activity' (Valerio, 2006:26) and so, 
as Roberts suggests, are not well understood. Seen from a decisions theory 
perspective, this may come at the extremes, as the clear articulation of start 
and stop rules, to ensure that there is a clear understanding of what is 
included and what is excluded so that all assumptions and issues “taken-for-
granted” are surfaced. Those using the proposed framework need to make 
clear the boundaries (both internal and external) that they assume or use for 
their relevance and criticality. 
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Context 
Many writers make clear the importance of context to any form of discourse. 
Reason (1990:44) says that, from a psychological perspective, human mental 
processes depend ‘upon situation-specific as opposed to context-free 
information’. All risks should therefore also be seen in context (Renn, 
2008a:105-118; Slovic, 2000:190; Waring and Glendon, 1998:55). Rather, 
‘what is perceived as risk and how that risk is perceived will vary according to 
the context in which, and from which, it is regarded’ (Henwood et al., 
2008:422). In his preface Snook (2000) states that 'A fundamental assumption 
of this study is that context and perspective are important'.  He later adds 
'people act in context' (Snook, 2000:26). Leveson illustrates that even 
apparently definitive terms, such as “reliable” are context dependent; she says 
‘Reliable, whatever that might mean in the context’ (Leveson et al., 2009:235). 
Weick (1993) (cited March, 1989) by saying: 'decision-making is a highly 
contextual, sacred activity, surrounded by myth and ritual, and as much 
concerned with the interpretive order as with the specifics of particular choices' 
reinforces this idea. For Waring and Glendon (1998:7) 'Context ... sets the 
scene'. They divide context into external and internal. The external context 
includes aspects such as: (1) economies and markets, (2) public policy, (3) 
regulation and standards, (4) social, historical and political climate, (5) physical 
conditions on climate and (6) technology. For them internal context includes: 
(1) organisational structure, (2) culture, (3) power relationships, (4) resources, 
(5) risk cognition (perceptions), (6) strategy, and (7) motivations and meanings 
of success (Waring and Glendon, 1998:8)). Figlock (2002:26) cites work by 
Koys and Decotiis who developed the concept of ‘“dimension-saliency” … 
(where) choosing a subset did not dispute the existence of a larger set of 
dimensions, but just that some dimensions were more pertinent than others 
within a given context’.  
Within the risk management process other writers make clear that context is 
not static – context changes. Leveson talks of the ‘emergent safety properties’ 
Leveson (2009:242) adds ‘the context in which they (the systems) are being 
built have been changing’ (Leveson et al., 2009:238). Weick (2004:30) also 
talks of ‘actions that become wrong rather than start wrong ... emergent 
outcomes that are unknowable and unpredictable ... and transient constructs 
that necessitate updating’. This changing context leads to the necessity for 
what Weick and Sutcliffe call “mindfulness”. They explain that  
[M]indfulness is different from situational awareness in the sense that it 
involves the combination of ongoing scrutiny of existing expectations, 
continuous refinement, and differentiation of expectations based on newer 
experiences, willingness and capability to invent new expectations that 
make sense of unprecedented events, a more nuanced appreciation of 
context [my emphasis] and ways to deal with it, and identification of new 
dimensions of context that improve foresight and current functioning 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007:32). 
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Therefore those using the proposed framework to evaluate risk management 
issues, need to be fully aware of (make explicit) the context in which they are 
working if they are to have any chance of making appropriate judgement.  
Stakeholders 
The adverse impacts associated with risk that are most keenly felt, are those 
that, in some way, affect people (commonly referred to as stakeholders). 
Perrow (1999:67) includes four categories of victims in his list of stakeholders: 
his first-party victims are those who operate the system, his second-party 
victims are non-operating personnel (such as passengers), his third-party 
victims are innocent bystanders and his fourth-party victims are ‘foetuses and 
future generations’ (I would use this last group to cover friends and family of 
victims or those otherwise affected by the event). What includes or excludes 
such stakeholders from consideration is whether they care, or how much they 
care about the issue at hand. Leitch (2008:31) speaks of risk as being 
‘exposure to uncertainty that we care about’. Holton (2004:24) says the 'litmus 
test for exposure is not do we care? It is would we care?' (the connotation is 
whether we would care enough to take action); that is not if the group or 
individual is vocal about the issue now but are they likely to become vocal in 
the event that the unwanted impact manifests itself (referred to by Renn 
(2008a:161) as ‘potential for mobilization’). This alerts risk managers to look 
not only directly at what might happen but what might be the consequences 
and subsequence of it happening, and identifying which stakeholder groups 
may be galvanised into action.  
Boin and Schulmann (2008) document such a shift and attributed NASA's 
perceived failings that led to the loss of the shuttles Challenger and Columbia, 
as much to a changing public attitude towards space flight accidents, as to any 
change or diminution in NASA's processes for dealing with such risks. The 
authors detail the changing perceptions of NASA going from the early days of 
the Apollo missions to the time of the loss of the shuttle Columbia. He explains 
that there was a shift both within the organisation and within the public from 
post-World War II/Cold War warrior type endeavour to perceiving the NASA 
missions as a routine logistical exercise. At first, the perception was of brave 
men taking great risks to achieve great goals (and this inevitably led to some 
losses). This changed over time to the perception that shuttle flights were 
routine and the astronauts should be no more at risk than a truck driver. This 
change in attitude meant that the high visibility deaths of the Challenger and 
Columbia crews precipitated public outrage, which had its inevitable 
consequences for the political leaders, resulting in subsequent decisions 
curtailing NASA's future activities. This shift can also be seen elsewhere. In 
the UK, a series of accidents involving military aircraft have led to outrage 
amongst the families (who suffered severe consequence from the losses) 
whereas, in the past, this might have just been seen as inherent to the military 
lifestyle. This trend, which may be characterised as a rise in the social 
responsibility agenda for corporations, may lead to other unforeseen 
consequences; those involved in risk management at this level may like to 
take note of this trend and start to think of the adverse effects that this might 
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have on the way that they go about their business. The proposed framework 
should encourage those involved in the risk discourse to examine potential 
stakeholder interest across a wider temporal plain. 
Reward & Jeopardy 
Tied closely to the stakeholder issue is the perception of reward and jeopardy 
associated with risk-taking activity. Amongst the stakeholders there is the 
question of how they perceive the allocation of rewards and jeopardy, 
associated with taking risks. This leads to the questions ‘'who benefits .... 
(and) who pays the price?' (Weick, 2004:28). Harding (2005) cites the question 
posed by Shapiro and Stevenson (2005) when they ask ‘who between the 
quarterback and a consultant has a higher predictive intelligence in their 
respective fields; their answer is the quarterback because he must live with the 
consequences of his decisions’. Gigerenzer (2003) describes how the price 
paid is not necessarily financial; the price may be paid in terms of pain, 
anguish or loss of opportunity. There may be a tendency for those involved in 
decision-making within risk management to focus solely on their own interests 
or those of the corporation in whose interests they are supposed to be acting. 
However, as the preceding discussion would suggest, wider consideration of 
other stakeholders may be of value; this issue is encompassed by the debate 
on “moral hazard” or as Renn refers to it, ‘violation of equity’. He describes this 
as ‘the discrepancy between those who enjoy the benefits and those who bear 
the risks’ (Renn, 2008a:161). This consideration has several implications for 
practice: (1) It should prompt those involved in risk management discussions 
to map where the benefits accrue and where the jeopardy is placed to ensure 
that any issues of inequity are understood if not resolved at the earliest stages. 
The benefit for the decision maker would be that in the future there would be 
less likelihood of an iniquitous decision coming back and causing them 
jeopardy. (2) The issue of reward and jeopardy is not only relevant to the 
outcomes of the risk management decision making process. As with all 
decisions, risk management decisions rely on accurate and timely data. 
Enquiries into Columbia, Challenger, Piper Alpha and Nimrod XV230, to name 
but a few, all stress the importance of analysing near-miss data as a way of 
gaining forewarning of future mishaps. However, if efforts to enhance safety 
place those people reporting such near misses in jeopardy, they are unlikely to 
provide management with the essential available data. ‘Management can 
(therefore) show their commitment to safety by creating a climate in which 
incident reporting is rewarded instead of punished’, (Cooke and Rohleder, 
2006:218-219).  (3) Work on Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability 
Organisations has led to the conclusion that “By and large, safety has to be 
organised by those who are directly affected by the implications of failure”, 
(Haddon-Cave, 2009:493). This is based on the premise that those who face 
the jeopardy associated with an event are more likely to manage it more 
diligently than those who only benefit from the reward. 'There is research that 
indicates that betting money significantly improves a person's ability to assess 
odds, but even pretending to bet money improves calibration significantly’ 
(Hubbard, 2009:4-5). In general, risk management systems do not require the 
tracking of reward and jeopardy as a management control. I feel that this is an 
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oversight. This should therefore be part of the process when using the 
proposed framework. 
Only once the issues of reward and jeopardy have been identified and related 
to the various stakeholders can discussions of risk start to consider what 
exposure to risk might be acceptable to each party. These discussions would 
then look to determine how reward and jeopardy may manifest themselves, 
the equity of distribution (Renn, 2008a) and the potential for mobilisation 
(Renn, 2008a) that create the political imperative for those risks to be 
addressed (Clarke and Short, 1993). This now raises the question about how 
such discussions might be structured. 
Resulting Conceptual Construct 
The final construct combines the factors discussed in the previous section with 
Figure 4; they build the framework to that found in Figure 6. The “Boundary” is 
placed around the issue under consideration This “embraces” that which is to 
be included and excluded from discussions. Next is the “Context”, delineated 
into “outer” and “inner”, which sets the perceptional construct that frames the 
discussion. The perceptional construct includes both the philosophy that is 
driving the organisation’s approach to risk management and any delineation 
by stakeholders of what they perceive to be reward and jeopardy.  
Transformation 
(R2)
Input Risk 
(R1)
Result (R3)/ 
Effect (R4)
Consequence (R5)
Exposure 
(R7)
“Impact”
Objective
(Social Good)
Context
Downside
(Social Bad)
Subsequence (R6)
“Coupling”
“Outer”
“Inner”
External 
Stakeholders
Internal 
Stakeholders
Decision 
Maker
Benefit /  Jeopardy
RM 
Philosophy
Boundaries
 
Figure 6 - Seven Dimensions of Risk - Full Framework 
 Chapter 2   52 
 
The depiction of stakeholders used within the framework has simplified 
Perrow’s (1999) groups into internal and external stakeholders, and decision 
makers. Internal and external stakeholders have been placed within the impact 
circle as it is most likely that it is the impact that will concern them. The 
Decision Maker is placed outside the impact circle to point to the potential for 
their decision to cause the impact. However, the exact placing of the 
phenomena is not considered to be important because, once again, the 
phenomena are designed to provoke discussion rather than provide a 
prescriptive model. 
At this stage, as the model has not been tested, it should be considered more 
as a visualisation of related phenomena rather than anything more definitive. 
Figure 6 shows that there is a temporal complexity (risk changes with time) 
deduced from the plethora of definitions used to define risk. The framework 
proposed is designed to enable general managers to explore the issue of risk 
in a more structured way and provide them with the basis on which to debate 
how the various risks might affect their endeavours in order to facilitate the 
necessary “Cross-Understanding” which ‘depends on the extent and accuracy 
of each member’s understanding of each other member’s mental model’ 
(Huber and Lewis, 2010:7). The purpose has been to provide a construct that 
is generalisable in that it offers a framework on which a common 
understanding of alternative mental models might be formulated.  
The question remains as to whether the framework may be useful in most 
circumstances. To describe how it may be used, I will use two examples. The 
first looks at a management issue and the second addresses the post-modern  
conceptualisation of risk. 
Aven (2010:93-95) argues that the term “risk” should not be limited to matters 
of jeopardy because, while an event may be a disaster in the short-term, in the 
longer term, it may be beneficial to the organisation. I would look to place this 
argument between R5 and R6. In the short-term, the events cascade to have 
detrimental consequences (R5). Then through management decisions, or 
some other positive action such as organisational learning, the organisation 
may turn the disaster to their advantage (Subsequence, R6). 
The concerns of the post-modern writers on risk, cited earlier, are, in the main, 
about the power to allocate reward and jeopardy amongst stakeholders and 
the use of the concept of risk to exert social control (by either internalised or 
externalised mechanisms). Within the framework, I would see this discourse 
starting in the areas of decision makers, reward/jeopardy and stakeholders. 
For those discussing the Risk Society, I would see the discussions starting in 
the area of the stakeholders and consequences (both beneficial and 
detrimental). 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The issue addressed by this paper is how general managers might think about 
the concept of risk. There are currently numerous ways to define risk, each 
seen as being suitable for their own context. However, the general manager is 
required to look across the various (academic) disciplines and to make sense 
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of each one within his or her own situation. The implicit assumption of many 
papers is that all alternative definitions of risk must be wrong. I refute this 
implicit position and offer an alternative view. This paper contributes a 
framework that enables all the current definitions of risk to be set in context 
with each other. I have looked for the synergy and coherence between what 
has been said and offer a different way of looking at this issue. If, however, we 
pick up on Woolgar’s (1980) comments on the limitations of language; there is 
also a case for the development of a richer technical language for risk studies 
and practice. An illustration of some potential delineations is provided in Table 
6. 
 
• Input risk – “irisk” 
• Transformation risk – “trisk” 
– Risk (uncertainty) – “risku” 
– Risk (questionable assumption) – “qarisk” 
– Risk (volatility) – “vrisk” 
• Result Risk – “rerisk” 
– Risk (implication) – “riskim” 
– Risk (as failure) – “riskure” 
– Risk (as financial expected loss) – “riskfel” 
– Risk (of harm or death) – “riskdem” 
• Effect Risk – “erisk” 
• Consequential Risk – “corisk” 
• Subsequential Risk – “surisk” 
• Exposure Risk –  “riskex” 
Table 6 - A Delineation of Risk Terms 
 
The framework created (see Figure 6) gives risk seven dimensions. This 
construct is based on the premise that all activities potentially have  associated 
reward and jeopardy. It therefore provides a way of relating the different 
definitions of risk and helps to show that they may not be as contradictory as 
might have been previously surmised. In management terms therefore, risk 
should not be seen as a separate “box” but as part of everything that happens. 
The framework also reminds users that any such discussions affect a variety 
of stakeholder and they are also affected by the context and boundaries within 
which they are being viewed. These too need to be brought to the surface. 
While this framework has potential utility for both academics and practitioners, 
the key limitation of this paper is that it has yet to be tested in practice. Further 
work is required to provide empirical validation of the framework’s utility. 
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CHAPTER 3 - LINES, CIRCLES AND DOTS: MULTIPLE 
RISK PARADIGMS 
 
Abstract 
This paper shows that there is more than one risk paradigm being used within 
the related literature. The paper examines how risk might be conceptualised 
during risk discourse. The proposed framework is designed to enable general 
managers to explore the issue of risk in a more structured way with a particular 
emphasis on their ability to generalise between different circumstances. The 
framework provides a basis for risk discourse and to facilitate shared 
understanding through awareness of “Cross-Understanding” and by avoiding 
any potential incommensurability. Formulated on the general construction of 
project, process and scenarios based risk management, I have identified 
paradigms that have been labelled Line, Circle and Dot. Each has been 
characterised. By combining these with Renn’s (2008a) three risk 
management approaches, nine potential paradigms emerge. As the paper 
acknowledges, even these nine are a simplification of the number of potential 
options. The paper concludes that any assumption that all discussions of risk 
are set in the same paradigm needs to be approached with great caution. A 
number of potential implications for the way we think about risk and the 
conduct of risk management have been identified. The implication for 
academic and other writers is that they should, in the future, be more aware of 
and articulate the basic assumptions behind their work and be more specific 
about the potential boundaries of their work’s generalisability. The implication 
for practitioners is that they need to be more aware of the limitation of any 
piece of research and the context within which it may, or may not, be applied.  
INTRODUCTION 
The construct labelled “risk” has received consideration across a wide range of 
academic literature. The label is used to cover unwanted, unintended or 
unanticipated inputs, occurrences or consequences that have potentially 
negative connotations. Risk is often taken to be the jeopardy that is juxtaposed 
to the benefits associated with an activity. As well as examining the general 
area of risk management, this review looked at the subject of risk as contained 
within literature covering: (1) accident investigation, (2) crisis management, (3) 
business continuity management, (4) operational risk management, (5) 
process risk management, (6) project and programme risk management, (7) 
resilience and (8) high reliability, in order to identify whether the same 
paradigm has been used consistently within them all. 
So let me start by explaining what I mean by a paradigm. Basing their work on 
Kuhn (1970), Field and Hole (2003:27) say ‘A paradigm is really just a 
framework within which scientists work”. They add that “Whatever you mean 
by a paradigm, the word implies agreement between scientists on … (1) the 
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problems …(2) the method … and (3) theoretical frameworks”. Saunders et al 
(2007:205) define paradigm as ‘A way of examining social phenomena from 
which particular understanding of these phenomena can be gained and 
explanations attempted’. The idea of paradigm is closely linked to the idea of 
“world view” or “a way of seeing”. However, as Van de Ven and Poole 
(1995:510), remind us ‘A way of seeing is a way of not seeing’; i.e. an 
individual’s world view affects both what they see and what they do not see. It 
therefore follows that understanding the world view and paradigm from which a 
researcher sees their subject has a significant effect on the results and 
recommendations produced. In the case of risk studies, it is important to 
identify whether all previous research on risk has adopted a single paradigm or 
whether a number of different paradigms have been used. 
So as paradigms are so fundamental to the way we conceptualise an issue, I 
have two concerns:  
The first is that discussions of risk issues may not be fruitful as parties 
to a discussion may be talking at cross purposes. 
Second, proposed methods of risk mitigation may be unsuccessful as 
the parties may unwittingly be trying to use a solution from one context 
that is not generalisable to the new context. 
Placed within the scholarship of application, this work is set within the context 
of (adapting Wildavsky, 1988) “thinking about how to think about” risk. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine whether there are multiple paradigms 
being used within the academic literature covering the subject of risk rather 
than a single paradigm in universal use. The claim is that three risk paradigms 
have been identified by this paper. While there may be others, this paper looks 
to warrant only the claim that refutes the implicit propositions of the current 
literature, i.e. that there is a single unified paradigm that covers the subject of 
risk. This proposition is seen to be implicit within the current work because 
there has been no previous discussion of the potential for there being more 
than one paradigm in use. The significance of this claim is that it suggests that 
all assumptions and claims made need to be seen within a particular clearly 
defined paradigm; this also has implications for the data that are required and 
available to decision makers and the generalisability of the recommendations 
from one paradigm to another. 
In this paper, I first position the research in order to provide context. Secondly, 
I describe the methodology by which I identified the three paradigms using five 
key characteristics. In the third section I describe each of these paradigms and 
provide evidence of where they have been used. Finally, I discuss the 
implications of there being more than one paradigm in use. 
POSITIONING THE RESEARCH 
This research is positioned within the scholarship of application; i.e. it looks to 
answer the question “How can knowledge be responsibly applied to 
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consequential problems?” (Boyer, 1990:21). Boyer goes on (1990:23) to assert 
that ‘New intellectual understanding can arise out of the very act of application 
…theory and practice vitally interact, and one renews the other’. Therefore, in 
positioning this research, I first need to explain that it is set within a 
performance management context, secondly I look at the role of “world view” 
and its link to “seat of understanding”, and thirdly explain my purpose of 
enabling cross-understanding within risk discourse. 
Firstly, writing from a performance management perspective, I take the 
position that all activities provide potential benefits and jeopardy and that 
management decisions are about maximising the former and minimising the 
latter. I am not, therefore, in disagreement with those, such as Chapman and 
Ward (1997:9), who argue that risk has an upside and a downside. However, 
where I deviate is that those who hold the view, as articulated by Chapman 
and Ward, see the “Upside and Downside” as being part of risk management. 
I, however, see the upsides and downsides as being two sides of the same 
coin (Hollnagel, 2009:18). I therefore relate the “upside” to the concept of 
business benefits1 and see it as part of performance management. I use the 
term “risk management” as looking at the associated downside (jeopardy/ 
risks). 
Secondly, in examining the subject, I also accept that an individual is only able 
to understand the phenomena according to the mental models created by their 
education, experience and world view. Vaughan (1996:261) refers to this as a 
person’s “seat of understanding”. I see the process of management discourse 
(as described and utilised by Renn, 2008a in his work on Risk Governance) as 
enabling the parties to any discussion to develop enough shared 
understanding so that they are able to treat the phenomena of concern as a 
concrete enough entity in order to take action. For this to occur, parties to the 
discourse need to be able to confirm that they are using the same language to 
mean the same things. Therefore, when involved in risk discourse, the parties 
also need to be aware of where those involved in the discussion may be 
employing fundamentally different paradigms. 
The multiplicity of ways that risk has been defined complicates any possible 
shared understanding as to the causes, mechanisms or consequences of risk. 
Shared understanding is considered to be essential for effective 
communications and to avoid the potential to talk at cross purposes. In order 
to develop the necessary shared view, Huber and Lewis (2010) advocate 
“Cross-Understanding”. They state that cross-understanding ‘depends on the 
extent and accuracy of each member’s understanding of each other member’s 
mental model’ (2010:7). Cross-understanding needs to be contrasted with 
“common understanding”. Sutcliffe (2005:421) warns that an issue with 
“common understanding” is that ‘groups sometimes focus only on those 
perceptions that are held in common’ and thereby limit the discussion to areas 
with which they are all comfortable. Central to any debate is the issue of where 
                                            
1
 Benefits management tends to define business benefits as being 1) make money, 2) save 
money, 3) comply with the law and 4) achieve the business’ strategic goal.  
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different authors use different paradigms and therefore they fail to 
communicate accurately. This might explain why seemingly sound 
recommendations fail when applied in different circumstances. Therefore, if in 
the subject area of risk there was more than one paradigm in use, there would 
be implications for both academics and practitioners. For academics these 
would involve the boundaries that define their work. For practitioners these 
would involve the application of risk theories to their circumstances. 
Renn (2008a:159-172) presents the first challenge to cross-understanding 
within debates about risk. He suggests that there are three management 
approaches to risk: precautionary-based risk management, risk-based risk 
management and discourse-based risk management. Each of these can be 
seen in themselves to provide different paradigms as each invokes different 
models, theories methodologies and world view. Renn’s work therefore 
provides an initial warning that discussions of risk may be complicated by 
those involved unwittingly in adopting contrary paradigms. This therefore 
raises the question as to whether there may also be other unrecognised 
paradigms at play during discussions of risk. 
The aim of this work is to develop ‘an overarching conceptual framework ... to 
explain how seemingly disparate or unrelated theories fit together to form a 
coherent whole’ (Editor AMR, 2011:10). I recognise that such frameworks 
have limitations. Henri Theil stated that ‘Models are to be used, not believed’ 
and from George Box ’All models are wrong: some models are useful’ (cited in 
Hubbard, 2009:213), Weick sets my ambition for this risk framework; that it is 
to ‘let people get their bearings when they observe complex organisations that 
face the unexpected’ (Weick, 2004:27). He goes on: ‘one way we get our 
bearings in this investigation is to assign the incident to a cell … in a way, it 
really does not matter where we assign it, because the act of assigning itself 
gets us talking, digging, comparing, refining, and focusing on the right 
question’ The framework that I propose is designed to enable academics and 
general managers to explore the issue of risk paradigms in a more structured 
way and provide them with the basis on which to debate how the various 
aspects might affect their endeavours. 
It should also follow that, to be consistent with the concept of cross-
understanding, this paper needs to be written in the first person in order to 
reflect that it articulates the understanding of the author and is an opening 
statement in a debate about whether there is a single paradigm or multiple 
paradigms being used within discussions of risk. The ensuing debate should 
hopefully establish what the paradigms are, their implications and lead to their 
adoption as a key part of the risk debate. It is accepted, therefore, that this 
debate will be enhanced and enriched by the contribution of others. 
Therefore, in summary, the purpose is to establish a framework to enable a 
preliminary analysis of the paradigms in use during discussions about risk. The 
validity of this research should be judged by whether it provides enough 
evidence to establish that more than one paradigm is currently in use and that 
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the framework provided enables others to develop a clear understanding of 
their own position. 
METHODOLOGY 
By placing this work within the scholarship of application, the method is based 
on taking existing knowledge and trying to apply it. An interactive process is 
then generated by which we first look at existing knowledge, try to apply it, see 
what we might learn from that knowledge and then reflect on what we might 
learn about that knowledge. In the case of the literature reviewed, one of the 
first questions asked was about each phenomenon’s generalisability, i.e. 
whether ‘findings may be equally applicable to other research settings’ 
(Saunders et al., 2007:151). For this to be established, the setting of each had 
to be determined and the paradigm in use identified. 
Specifically, the phenomena discussed in this paper emerged from the 
inductive research of risk governance. Literature from a wide range of 
disciplines associated with risk was reviewed. The disciplines reviewed were 
project management, operational risk management, accident investigation and 
prevention, crisis management, resilience engineering, High Reliability 
Organisations, and their relationship with Normal Accident Theory. This 
literature was selected because it all alluded to potential management failure. 
As articles were reviewed, their characteristics (including assumptions and 
contexts) were collated, contrasted and then evaluated for consistency in the 
dimensions used. This was to ensure that the various authors were comparing 
like with like.  
As the results of an iterative process of deliberations, five key characteristics 
were identified. Each characteristic was binary in nature. Grouping the 
characteristics produced three potential risk paradigms. Next I will present the 
key characteristics before synthesising these into three paradigms. 
KEY CHARACTERISTICS 
From this analysis, a number of characteristics emerged as the analytical 
criteria.  
The first characteristic was whether the user was looking forward to an 
occurrence in order to mitigate any unwanted event, or whether they 
were looking backwards from an occurrence to determine why an 
unwanted event had occurred. 
A second characteristic was whether the end result is the desired end 
goal or whether it was an undesirable outcome to be avoided. 
The third characteristic was whether those managing the situation chose 
the outcome (such as a successful project outcome) or whether it would 
be imposed (such as an accident). 
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The fourth characteristic involved the degree of invariance in the way the 
occurrence manifested itself; i.e. whether there were multiple routes or a 
single route to the occurrence. 
The final characteristic focused on whether the process was managing a 
unique or a recurring event. (During the analysis two groups emerged: 
(1) unique events which had enough similarities for them to be usefully 
grouped for analytical purposes and (2) an outcome constructed through 
a unique combination of repeated modular activity.) For the purpose of 
this paper, I shall however, for the sake of clarity, use only the two 
extreme positions of unique and recurring. 
The results of these iterative deliberations are described below and examples 
of each are used to warrant the claim of there being more than one paradigm 
in use. 
RISK PARADIGMS 
In this section I first describe the paradigms identified. Secondly, I provide the 
evidence of their use. Third is a description of how the paradigms have been 
mixed and finally I produce a framework which combines Renn’s (2008a) three 
approaches to risk management and my three basic paradigms giving nine 
potential combinations in which debates about risk may take place.  
Description of Paradigms 
The writings on risk can be grouped into one of at least three main areas. 
These are temporally linear processes (characterised by Project Risk 
Management), cyclic production (processes characterised by manufacturing), 
and finally, a scenario based process (characterised by events such as natural 
disasters or discussion of accidents). While it may be tempting to label these 
as “project”, “process”, and “scenario”, these terms already have, as I will 
show, multiple meanings and therefore there is potential for such labelling to 
add confusion rather than clarity to this issue. For clarity, I have labelled these 
as “Line”, “Circle”, and “Dot” respectively. I shall describe the characteristics of 
each. 
Line encompasses temporally linear processes characterised by Project Risk 
Management and strategic planning. The key characteristics that identify Lines 
are that they are (1) looking forward to a future event, (2) the final outcome is 
desired as being positive, (3) the stakeholders choose the desired outcome, 
(4) there may be choices of pathways between the present and the outcome, 
these processes have less invariance as stakeholders may be free to choose 
one of several routes to the same end, and (5) while parts of the project may 
involve modular repetitions, the combination is likely to be unique.   
Circle encompasses cyclic processes characterised by manufacturing 
production and business processes. The key characteristics that identify 
Circles are that they are (1) looking forward to a future event, (2) the final 
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outcome is desired as being positive, (3) the stakeholders choose the desired 
outcome, (4) the process, however, may define a single fixed pathway, the 
process, therefore demands greater invariance, and (5) the essence of the 
process is its repetitive nature which enables continual monitoring and 
refinement. 
Finally, Dots are scenario based processes characterised by (1) looking 
backwards from a specific future event in order to prevent it or understand why 
it occurred, (2) the final outcome is unwanted as it is seen as being negative, 
(3) the stakeholders do not choose whether it occurs, (4) there may be choices 
of pathway between the event and the present, pathways may be numerous 
and so might be seen as having less invariance, and (5) while the event may 
be able to be cast under a generic title (such as “crash”, “fire”, or “flood”) it is 
unique in time, place and consequences.   
A summary of these characteristics is set out, for comparison, in Table 7. 
Table 7 - Summary of Characteristics 
 Forward or 
Backward 
Looking  
Desired or 
Unwanted 
Outcome  
Chosen or 
Imposed 
Outcome  
Variance or 
Invariance of  
Process  
Unique or 
Recurring  
Line  Forward  Desired  Chosen  Variance  Unique  
Circle  Forward  Desired  Chosen  Invariance  Recurring  
Dot  Backward  Unwanted  Imposed  Variance  Unique  
Evidence of Use 
Having identified three potential risk paradigms, now I will describe how each 
is used. I will again examine them in the order of Line, Circle and Dot. 
Line 
In general, writing that uses Line processes is more easily identified and often 
has phrases such as “Project Risk Management” in its title. The British Library 
catalogue (as at 28 Sep 10) has, for example, 35 books that include this 
phrase in their titles. A ProQuest search (also done on 28 Sep 10), using the 
same search string, identified 247 documents with these words in the title. As 
well as project management, Line leads directly to programme risk 
management. The Line paradigm is, however, not necessarily restricted to 
project or programme management. Strategic and other literature on planning 
might also, more obviously, be seen to fit this paradigm. Less obviously, I 
might include Perrow (1999) within this category; unlike many writers on 
accidents, he does not start his description with the accident. He uses a 
temporally based narrative to show how each step on the pathway to the 
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accident was a logical next step when seen from the eyes of those involved; 
he shows how those involved unwittingly chose their own path to destruction. 
Circle 
Circle is the process within (relatively) static organisational structures 
conducting (relatively) invariant repetitive actions with outputs but no final 
outcome; as the process becomes more mature (and efficient) it may become 
more closely coupled. This provides maximum opportunity to learn from 
experience after each process cycle. Potential unwanted outcomes can be 
identified, the process adjusted and the unwanted reassessed. The most 
obvious literature in this area covers business processes whether they are 
production, administrative or managerial.  
More easily missed is the literature on Operational Risk Management and 
Enterprise Risk Management. King (2001:5-6) states that ‘operational risk 'is 
not related to the way a firm finances its business, but rather to the way a firm 
operates its business…The essential ingredients here are the process 
definition ... performance measures ..., the risk  factors ..., and the control 
systems'. Hoffman (2002) describes ways of managing operational risk based 
on the Basel definition, which focuses on 'inadequate or failed internal 
processes'; again there is no mention of projects, and “scenarios” are just 
numbers (data sets) to be modelled and mapped. 
In his book on Enterprise Risk Management subtitled “Tools and Techniques”, 
Chapman (2006) also places emphasis on ensuring that the process works 
correctly. While Chapman does make reference to project, this again is done 
in the context of the associated processes. In his book on Enterprise Risk 
Management, Monahan (2008) places heavy emphasis on “Cause & Effect” 
diagrams, causal-loop diagrams and process flow charts; this might all be 
characterised by Circle. He includes “What-if?” (scenarios) where ‘we are 
considering what might happen along the path to an outcome’. This may 
suggest “Line” as it looks forward but, in fact, just covers deviations in process 
due to changes in inputs. Some other authors who adopt the Circle paradigm 
are: (1) Damodaran (2008) looks at Strategic Risk Taking; his work is based 
on quantitative methods and uses statistical scenarios (data sets): (2) Hubbard 
(2009), again uses quantitative methods (such as Bayesian theory) which 
requires repetition. This implies a repetitive process in order to generate the 
necessary data. Dickstein and Flast (2009) focus on the business process in 
their approach to managing risk. They looked at the processes in (repetitive) 
business and emphasise the use of quality control as a way of delivering what 
was wanted rather than getting the unwanted. 
Other areas that may be characterised by Circle are the Literature on 
resilience (such as Hollnagel et al., 2006) and High Reliability (such as 
Roberts, 1993). They both emphasise the repetitive nature of the task in hand, 
where learning by “trial & error” is possible (if not always desirable) and issues 
of invariance are critical.  
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Again there is cross-over within disciplines. As I will show, accident based 
literature mainly comes within the Dot paradigm. However, Toft and Reynolds, 
(2005) see learning based on repetitive action either within an organisation or 
from similar organisations; they cite the System Failure & Cultural 
Readjustment Model and Turner Models (2005:30-33). With this, they adopt a 
Circle paradigm; this raises the concern about how the two paradigms (Circle 
and Dot) interact. 
Dot 
For examples of Dot thinking I would look to Crisis Management literature, as 
an offshoot of Business Continuity management, and Accident Investigation 
literature. And finally, I shall also look at scenarios that are Circles. 
The general difference between the Crisis Literature and Accident Literature is 
that Crisis Literature is seeking to identify a future unwanted event (a scenario) 
in order to see how it may be avoided or how the organisation may recover 
from it. Examples of such work are Fink (2000), Lagadec (1993), and Smith 
and Elliot (2006).  
From what I would characterise as accident literature, I would first cite Reason 
(1990). I would argue that as Reason starts with an incident and works 
backwards, his approach is generally scenario based. As with others who 
specialise in accident investigation, Reason’s job is made easier because, 
rather than having “40,000 options” to consider, he is only tracing events back 
to “one true cause”. (Reason (1997:93) provides the example of a bolt with 
eight nuts labelled “A” to “H”; Reason points out that there is one way to 
assemble them correctly and over 40,000 ways (factor 8) to get it wrong.) This 
task is, however, still not a simple one. Leveson (2004:242) points out that in 
the investigation into the loss of an American Airlines B-757 near Cali, 
Colombia in 1995, there were seven potential pathways between two key 
events within the investigated scenario. By their very nature, most writers 
looking to learn lessons from accidents often come at the subject on a 
scenario basis. There are also writers who identify an unwanted scenario with 
the aim of prevention. Two examples are Sagan (1993), who took as his 
precept the scenario of accidental nuclear war, and Renn (2008a), who took 
scenarios surrounding environmental risk as his precept. In these cases the 
requirement is to identify all the potential paths to the unwanted event and to 
mitigate each one as it is deemed necessary, plausible or cost effective.  
Besides being used as a description of an unwanted outcome (such as a 
crash, fire or another accident), the term “scenario” has at least two other 
uses. King (2001:246) points to the use of the term as a data set for use with a 
predictive or analytic model. Monahan (2008:63) uses the term “scenario” as 
another way of describing “What-if” analysis; his use is consistent with King in 
that what he is talking about are variable inputs. This use of the term 
“scenario” by both King and Monahan can be seen to be part of the risk 
management process and therefore might come into the Circle paradigm. 
There is, however, a second use of “What-if” analysis and that is where the 
 Chapter 3   64 
 
variable is an output or outcome. In this case, this is consistent with the 
scenario concept used within the Dot paradigm.  
 
Summary 
In summary, Table 6 provides a diagrammatic representation of the construct. 
The diagram provides a simplified picture of the non-linear relationships, the 
purpose of which is to emphasise the complexities involved; for example, as 
explained above, the term “scenario” has different meanings within different 
contexts. It is accepted that this diagram represents a single perception of the 
construct, which others may see differently; however, that is not important. As 
stated in the aim, this paper is not claiming the discovery of an absolute truth. 
Nor is the suggestion that writers in any one area should be, or are, restricted 
to a particular paradigm. What is important is the fact that these different 
paradigms exist; even the constructs, as described, are not important, it is that 
they may potentially exist that is. It is that this may result in poor risk 
communication and may result in talking at cross purposes due to the use of 
different paradigms.. 
 
Lines, Circles & Dots
Line
Dot
Circle
Process Risk Management
Operational Risk Management
Crisis Management
Accident Investigation
Business Continuity Management
Scenario (as a data set)
“What-if” Scenario Analysis
“What-if (2)” (Variable Inputs)
“What-if (1)” (Unwanted Outputs)
Project / Programme Risk Management
[Circular ] process governing 
a [linear ] function 
Strategic Management
Resilience / High Reliability
 
Figure 7 - Diagrammatic Representation 
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As stated previously, the purpose is ‘to (attempt to) explain how seemingly 
disparate or unrelated theories fit together to form a coherent whole’ (Editor 
AMR, 2011:10) and to enable, through debate, the discovery of any 
“incommensurabilities” within a debate. “Incommensurabilities” is described by 
Narayanan and Fahey (2004:51-55) as the compatibility of language between 
subject areas, where the same terms ‘may have distinctly different meanings’. 
An example is the term “scenario”; the term may refer to a data set, a variable 
input or an unwanted output depending on its context. Parties to such 
discussion should recognise the need for cross-understanding and then work 
to achieve it 
Overlapping of Paradigms 
It is acknowledged that there are likely to be overlaps between Lines, Circles 
and Dots within any particular system. This is caused by both the unit and 
level of analysis employed. Taking the example, used by authors of work in 
High Reliability Organisations, of naval aircraft carrier operations, it can be 
seen how the construct may change between Lines, Circles and Dots. If as a 
first example we take, as a unit of analysis, a specific carrier mission, the 
phenomena may be seen in context as a line: the carrier gets its mission, 
prepares, deploys, operates, returns and recovers. The sequence is seen as 
unique for this particular deployment and has a temporal linear context. If the 
example used flight deck operations as its unit of analysis, then this might be 
envisaged as a Circle. Here we would see planes being prepared, launched, 
conducting their mission recovered, maintained and then readied for the next 
cycle. An alternative unit of analysis may be a pilot's mission: this might again 
be seen as a line. This would involve a unique briefing, aircraft preparation, 
aircraft launch, conduct of mission, recovery and debrief. Each would be 
unique for this particular mission, again based on a temporal sequence. If, 
however, the discussion looks at accident prevention, then the paradigms may 
be Dot. An example may be prevention of accidents during the arming of 
aircraft. This examination would work back from the arming process and 
identify all the potential causes of an accident. Even when looking at the same 
phenomenon, take for example aircraft operation, the unit of analysis can have 
a significant effect. If the unit of analysis is the mission planning cycle, while 
unique inputs may be considered, the focus would be on those aspects of the 
aircraft mission that are repeated;  the paradigm would be Circle. If the unit of 
analysis was on a specific mission then, while some repetitive sub-routines 
may be included, the focus would be on those aspects which were “one-offs” 
and therefore unique to that mission; the paradigm would therefore be Line. It 
is therefore possible to see how the selection of the unit of analysis may alter 
the paradigms used between Line, Circle and Dot. Morgan (1997:281) points 
out that all conversations are partial and selective in the evidence employed 
and the use to which it is put. This selection can be seen also to determine the 
paradigm used to examine the subject in question.  
If we look at granularity, we also see the same patterns emerge. Taking as an 
example a unit of analysis as being a pilot’s mission, we see that this mission 
can be broken down into discrete components. In the example given above its 
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components were briefing, aircraft preparation, aircraft launch, conduct of 
mission, recovery and debrief. Therefore within an analysis of the pilot’s 
mission, we may take it down a level of granularity to aircraft launch. Here the 
linear paradigms may be seen as part of a circular paradigm involving the 
launch teams of the flight deck. In this case the pilot and his mission are an 
input to the cycle process involved in launching aircraft. As part of the pilot’s 
unique mission, he may also have been warned against causing civilian 
casualties while conducting his mission. This particular aspect of his mission 
therefore may have assumed the paradigms of Dot, where the scenario was 
discussed, analysed and it was determined how such an eventuality might be 
avoided. 
From a risk management perspective, this changing of paradigms may also be 
seen as a change between risk managing the outcome and risk managing the 
process by which the outcome is achieved. Potential exists for there to be 
jeopardy associated with both and therefore there is a need to risk manage the 
process by which the risk issue is being managed. This might lead potentially 
to confuse the process by which risk is being managed and the characteristics 
of the risk issue itself.  
Evidence of changing paradigms in use can be found in the literature. Looking 
at the Shuttle programme at the political level, (Vaughan, 1996), the process 
can be characterised as a Circle, a repetition of launch and recovery. Vaughan 
(1996) looked at the project/ programme level where a project management 
process underlines the NASA management system; at this level it can be seen 
as a Line. Vaughan (1996) also provides testimony that some of those 
involved argue that each launch is a unique event. However, in some parts 
where the unit of analysis changes to the solid booster rockets, the paradigm 
can be seen as a circular production process where the boosters are made, 
filled, used, recovered, refilled and reused giving a clear opportunity to learn 
from previous experience. Snook (2000) uses all three paradigms: the Dot was 
the shooting down of the helicopters, the Line was the mission planning 
process and the Circle was the repetitive routines he identified. Snook’s 
perspective (his lens) was accident prevention, where the “shoot down” was 
the scenario that he was examining. If his lens had been risk management, the 
Line, Circle and Dot may have revealed an alternative understanding of the 
issues. However, by not appreciating the different Risk Management issues 
surrounding Lines, Circles and Dots, some key assumptions may be 
overlooked and learning points could be missed. This opportunity for new 
learning can also be seen when examining Perrow’s (1999) work from a Risk 
Management perspective. Unlike other writings on accident prevention, Perrow 
characterises each step as a logical small routine decision that leads to an 
unwanted outcome. I would suggest that each process type (Circle, Line or 
Dot) has a distinct character and provides distinct data for risk analysis and 
response options. The potential for misunderstanding and misinterpretation is 
increased if different parties to a discussion adopt different mental mindsets. 
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Paradigm Framework 
As stated in the introduction, Renn opened the debate on multiple paradigms 
when he proposed a triad of Risk Management approaches (Precaution-
based, Risk-based and Discourse Based). When Renn’s ideas are now 
combined with Line, Circle and Dot, nine potential combinations emerge. 
These are shown in Table 8. It is accepted that even this is a simplification. 
For example, while in general use the term “precautionary” is associated with 
the idea “first do no harm,” Renn (2008a) provides us with a range of 
meanings. Aven (2010:215-225) takes this argument a step further. After 
describing the historical development of the precautionary principle, he 
proposes that the cautionary principle be applied in the case of risk and 
uncertainty, and that the precautionary principle is applied in the case of 
scientific uncertainties. This demonstrates how the debate is still active and 
therefore, while the table provides nine options, these should be viewed only 
as the starting point for any discussion. 
Table 8 - Discourse Paradigms 
 Line  
(Project) 
Linear 
Circle  
(Process) 
Repetition 
Dot  
(Scenario) 
One-off  
Precaution-
Based 
PB-Line  PB-Circle  PB-Dot  
Risk-Based RB-Line  RB-Circle  RB-Dot  
Discursive-
Based  
DB-Line  DB-Circle  DB-Dot  
 
However, if a shared understanding is to be developed and 
incommensurabilities are to be avoided, parties to any discussion about risk 
would be advised to take time to establish the paradigms within which they are 
working. They need to ask, is their approach Precautionary-based, Risk-Based 
or Discourse-based risk management? In addition, does the problem involve 
Lines, Circles or Dots? For, as Weick (2004:27) says, ‘it really does not matter 
where we assign it, because the act of assigning itself gets us talking, digging, 
comparing, refining, and focusing on the right question’. An assumption that 
risk is discussed in the same way, based on the same assumption and world 
views, is likely to jeopardise the success of any process designed to manage 
it. 
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IMPLICATIONS 
The implications of there being at least nine different paradigms, as identified 
in this paper, can be grouped under two headings. The first is how we might 
think about risk and the second involves how we might act.  
Thinking about Risk 
Multiple paradigms have three implications for the way we think about risk. 
Specifically these involve 1) the academic segregation of disciplines, 2) 
generalisability of risk lessons, and 3) our ability to assess. 
There are a number of strong academic disciplinary groupings covering the 
literature under discussion. As has been seen, this includes risk management, 
crisis management, resilience, high reliability and accident investigations, to 
name but a few. However, for a generalist practitioner (such as members of a 
corporate board), the differentiations can be confusing. Where does one stop 
and the next start; or what are the overlaps? Much of the material, cases and 
authors cross disciplines; the way ideas are used, however, is different. These 
fields are a healthy maelstrom of competing and complementary ideas. The 
current segregations may be useful for reductionist research purposes 
(important as it is to understand the details of the mechanism involved), 
however, they do not help the synthesis of ideas required by practitioners if 
they are to be able to develop a full understanding of the competing claims. To 
this end, Line, Circle and Dot provides a simpler framework for practitioners 
against which to place the more detailed parts of the picture provided by 
academia. 
Writers working in one context seem to make little acknowledgement of the 
others and therefore there is little discussion as to whether findings set in one 
paradigm are generalisable to the others. Acknowledging the paradigms used 
may alert academics and practitioners to examine whether ideas developed 
under one paradigm may be generalisable to the others and to review how this 
may affect our developing understanding. Further research is required to 
understand the particular issues pertaining to the generalisability of 
recommendations between a Line, Circle or Dot. 
Our ability to assess risks may also be affected by whether they are Line, 
Circle or Dot. For Line, while parts of a project may be repetitions, the 
combinations are likely to be unique. Risk assessment data may therefore 
need to be based on comparisons, benchmarking and subjective comparison, 
whether this is analysed using qualitative or quantitative tools. Lines, by their 
very nature, will entail the “liability of newness” (Vaughan, 1996:140). Circle 
provides the maximum opportunity to learn from the experience of each 
process cycle, where inputs are refined and adjusted as appropriate. Here, risk 
assessment may focus on deviation from norms and focus on the inherent 
problems that this may bring. Finally, Dots, by their nature, are the result of 
speculation and imagination. This brings with it questions as to which 
scenarios are worth investigation and, “as it probably will not happen”, whether 
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it is worth the short-term investment needed to understand a long(er)-term risk. 
The problem for those trying to risk manage these issues is that there are so 
many potential pathways by which the unwanted end may transpire. Due to 
the many pathways needing to be countered, relevant data is likely to be 
harder to identify. Mitigating the probability is therefore problematic (for has the 
key pathway been identified?) and so mitigating the impact may become the 
priority. Even if these obstacles are surmounted then, due to the many 
potential pathways that may need to be countered, the poor availability of data 
and conflicting priorities, may make full risk assessments impossible to 
achieve. 
By their very nature, Lines, Circles and Dots each present different challenges 
for those tasked with conducting risk assessment. However, by identifying 
which paradigm is in play, then those conducting the assessment are more 
easily able to focus on and resolve their particular issues. Further research is 
required to understand the particular issues pertaining to the risk assessment 
of a Line, Circle or Dot. 
Response Options 
As with other issues created by differing paradigms, there are questions as to 
whether they start to define the available response options as well. Here I 
consider two issues. The first is whether each of these is amenable to skill-
based, rule-based and knowledge-based intervention as described by Reason 
(1997). The second is whether understanding of a problem is tantamount to 
resolving it. Again, I look at Line, Circle and Dot, each in turn but only in the 
most general terms. 
Line has been previously described as a mix of routine-ised processes and 
new combinations of actions. These might be seen to lend themselves to a mix 
of rule-based and experiential (knowledge-based) judgements. The 
management of these issues therefore requires the use of a balanced mix of 
rule-based and experiential (knowledge-based) judgement in order to handle 
the repetitive and the novel aspects respectively. Due to their instinctive 
character, skills-based interventions are less likely to be so important. 
For Circle, the key characteristic of a repetitive process is the requirement for 
stability of the systems. This stability enables rules to be created, tested and 
optimised. By such testing, unwanted outcomes can be identified, the process 
adjusted and the unwanted reassessed. Under such conditions rule-based 
actions can be generated, the staff trained in the specifics and monitored. In 
such circumstances, organisations may appear not to be compelled to rely on 
the tacit knowledge and skills of their staff. 
When any scenarios envisaged under Dot occur, the responses may be 
characterised as an accident, disaster or crisis. A key feature of these 
circumstances is the attendant stress, compressed timescales and 
incomprehensible interactions. In such circumstances, rules-based options 
have only a limited utility, which depends on how accurately the scenario had 
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been predicted. As the sequence is not established, a rules-based solution is 
less likely to be appropriate. Knowledge-based judgement therefore becomes 
key. However, in order to make best use of their knowledge, those involved 
also need to have the skills to operate under such stress. In his comparison of 
crises at Three Mile Island and Apollo 13, Stein (2004:1254) addressed the 
role of anxiety but he did not posit the possibility that the previous experience 
of those on the Apollo 13 team had given them the skills needed to operate 
effectively under such conditions, whereas this was not the case with those 
involved at Three Mile Island. While this variable is rarely considered, it is a 
key component of the training within the emergency services. 
This would seem to indicate that Line, Circle and Dot do require a different 
balance between the most appropriate mix: skills-based, knowledge-based 
and rule-based options, that needs to be investigated. Further research is 
required to examine this issue in more detail. 
A second issue emerges from this work. This is the differing perspective in the 
gap between understanding and resolution. In their discussion of 
organisational learning, Ramanujam and Goodman (2011:85) state that ‘As an 
outcome, learning represents the acquisition of new repertoires, representing a 
change in a group’s potential behaviors.’ Yet Carroll and Fahlbruch (2011:3) 
acknowledge in the same volume that ‘The gap between analysis and 
implementation is considerable and poorly understood’. The impression given 
by many Dot based writers is that, in Pareto’s construct, finding the cause of 
an accident, for example, means that an organisation is 80% of the way 
towards preventing the next one (writers often express the sentiment that if an 
organisation had understood the cause and potential for an accident, why did 
they not prevent it?) Hopkins (2009a:510) says ‘NASA had already been told 
very clearly in the Stephenson report that it was dangerously close to the 
boundary. In my view the problem was that NASA’s organisational structure 
prevented it from acting on this knowledge.’ His assumption is that as they 
knew they were “close to the boundary”, they knew where they needed to draw 
back and how to go about it; this assumption should be questioned. For other 
examples see Toft and Reynolds (2005). Line based writers appear to be at 
the opposite end of the spectrum. In their writings they see that understanding 
an issue is barely a start (20%) in trying to resolve it and hence the emphasis 
on project risk management. In Circle, as error or variance is seen as being 
ever present, this might be seen as placing them at 50/50. The issue here is 
therefore the potential tension between those who feel that once the cause is 
found the job of prevention is near complete and those at the other end of the 
spectrum who feel that the real work has just begun. Such issues are more 
easily managed if they are understood. Further research is required to 
examine this issue in more detail. 
In summary, there are implications of there being more than a single paradigm 
in use for the academic segregation of disciplines, generalisability of risk 
lessons, our ability to assess risk and the way we are able to respond to risks. 
Further research is required to understand the particular issues pertaining to 
the variation in responses available under a Line, Circle or Dot. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Risk Management is complicated and multi-faceted and the issues, from a 
general manager’s perspective, are covered under a wide range of academic 
disciplines. Reason’s (1997) simple and elegant demonstration of the many 
major things that can go wrong is neatly balanced by what Perrow (1999:398) 
calls his ‘optimistic…Union Carbide factor’. To balance the seeming futility of 
attempting Risk Management, due to the sheer number of ways things can go 
wrong, Perrow says ‘it takes just the right combination of circumstances to 
produce a catastrophe’ (1999:356) or, more colourfully, ‘accidents are 
commonplace, but disasters are hard to arrange’ (1999:398). Therefore, in 
order to make it hard to arrange disaster, management needs to understand 
the nature of what they face and need to be able to discuss it in compatible 
terms. Risk is a multifaceted and complex subject. This paper has shown that 
the assumption that all authors on risk are using a single paradigm should be 
treated with great caution: the situation is much more complex. 
When thinking about thinking about risk, combining this work with that of Renn 
(2008a) nine potential combinations are provided which present different 
paradigms within which to debate risk; see Table 8. This research has 
provided a framework as a catalyst to enable more effective communication of 
ideas and therefore may lead to a better cross-understanding, helping those 
engaged in the discussion of risk to benefit from being clear about whether 
they are working on the same basis. 
The limitations of this research are recognised, which is why the claim is 
limited to suggesting that more than one paradigm has been used within the 
academic literature. Further research is required to establish whether the three 
paradigms identified here provide the complete set or whether there are 
others. Research is also required to refine each paradigm and to explore 
whether they also embrace fundamental different ontological or 
epistemological positions or whether they only differ in the way described in 
Table 7. 
A number of potential implications for risk management have also been 
identified for the way people might think or how they act. These include the 
academic segregation of disciplines, generalisability of risk lessons between 
disciplines, our ability to assess risk under each paradigm and the way we are 
able to respond to those risks. All these areas require further research. 
In summary, this paper therefore provides a different way of looking at and 
thinking about the fuller range of literature which discusses risk related issues 
that might be of concern to corporate management. This might forestall issues 
of blind spots where institutionalised paradigms create “seeing is a way of not 
seeing”. An understanding and use of these different risk paradigms should 
enable more effective risk discourse and cross-understanding between the 
parties involved.  
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CHAPTER 4 – EXAMINING THE PURPOSE OF RISK 
INDICATORS  
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the idea of “risk indicators”, looking 
at the way they are currently used and asking whether the term warrants a 
significantly different formulation. The chapter is based on a synthesis of 
examples of how the term “risk indicator” is used within the academic 
literature. I have extracted from performance management literature those 
characteristics that have been seen to be key to the formulation of 
performance indicators. These were then compared to the findings of literature 
examining how people perceive and react to a negative proposition. I propose 
that a fundamental difference should be recognised between the construct of a 
performance indicator (for the monitoring and reporting of both benefits and 
jeopardy) and that of a risk indicator. I propose that risk indicators should be 
used to focus on “inconceivable” events that have the potential to produce 
significant damage or harm. The results of the research are limited to a 
theoretical construct. The practical implications of the research, however, 
suggest that, in order to forestall failures of foresight, managers need to 
remain open to the “inconceivable”. This paper is useful for both researchers 
and practitioners in that it gives a new perspective on the use of different 
categories of indicators as part of performance management systems. 
INTRODUCTION 
Conventionally, performance management has focused on the delivery of 
benefits (Neely et al., 1997), while the management of potential jeopardy has 
been sidelined to risk management. This may be considered as a focus with 
an “optimism bias”. Vaughan (1999) argues that the “dark side” (risk/ jeopardy) 
is inextricably linked to the pursuit of organisational benefit, the “bright side”, 
unlike Calandro and Lane, (2006:38) who argue for separate scorecards.  
This paper looks to introduce the concept of the performance management of 
risk, i.e. the integration of the dark side and the bright side within a universal 
performance management system. The context for this paper is the 
phenomenon labelled by Turner (1976b:378) as “failure of foresight”; the 
failure to foresee and prevent some unwanted occurrence such as an accident 
or other organisational crisis. Part of this debate is about ‘what will be seen as 
clear warnings after the facts were discounted before the fact’ (Woods, 
2009:498). The key factor within failure of foresight is, however, that not only 
are the probability and consequence unknown but also, and more importantly, 
management is uncertain of how the crisis or accident which they need to 
prevent or mitigate may manifest itself. For this task, the indicators may be 
seen to be required to provide a forewarning of unpredicted manifestations of 
unwanted occurrences. From this evolves the question as to whether the basic 
paradigm in which the question is asked affects a person’s ability to recognise 
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or acknowledge potential problems and/or whether the question being set in a 
positive or negative way might affect one’s abilities to see, or whether ‘seeing 
is a way of not seeing’ (Perrow, 2007:74). 
Einstein is reputed to have said: “Insanity is doing the same thing over again   
and expecting different results”. This idea can be seen within the work of High 
Reliability theorists who warn against “closed ways of seeing” and recommend 
being open minded and seeking fresh perspectives (Mindfulness: Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007). In her analysis of the Challenger disaster, Vaughan provides 
an example of how changing from a positive to a negative paradigm can have 
a significant effect on the outcome of a discussion. She describes (1996:249) 
the moment when the paradigm of discourse flipped; the paradigm changed 
from one where the question was “prove the Shuttle is safe to fly” to one of 
“prove the Shuttle is unsafe to fly”. This can be seen as a change from proving 
a positive proposition, to proving a negative one. While the effect of this 
change (the accident) has been discussed at length, the significance of the flip 
on the course of the debate has received far less attention. 
This paper will examine the change from a positive to a negative proposition 
and the implications for the formulation of performance management metrics. 
The paper will be framed by the context of benefits v. jeopardy or, to put it 
another way, reward and risk. This paper claims that a more appropriate use 
of the term “risk indicator” would be as a device to scan for emerging threats 
which, while considered to be highly improbable, have the potential to cause 
significant (“catastrophic”) harm to the wider community, external to 
organisational boundaries. The significance of this is that it suggests a radical 
change from current practice. 
This is a conceptual paper which forms part of a wider body of work 
developing the strands of ‘thinking about how to think about’ risk (Wildavsky, 
1988:2). The central focus of this work is the performance management of risk. 
The work is seen to be most relevant to the construction of mental 
models/schema (Rumelhart, 1981) which takes place in the early stages of risk 
discourse (Renn, 2008a:159-172). Here we are looking to facilitate “Cross-
Understanding” between stakeholders rather than a “common understanding”. 
Huber and Lewis (2010:7) state that cross-understanding ‘depends on the 
extent and accuracy of each member’s understanding of each other member’s 
mental model’. Here the important issues are to understand how others see 
these issues at hand in order to reach the point where the cross-
understanding is clear enough to enable the group to take action. A danger of 
seeking “common understanding” is highlighted by Sutcliffe (2005:421) where 
she says that ‘groups sometimes focus only on those perceptions that are held 
in common’ and thereby limit the discussion to areas with which they are all 
comfortable. However, as Sutcliffe (2005:421) goes on to say, ‘it is the 
divergence in information and perceptions, not the commonalities, that hold 
the key to detecting anomalies’ and this explains my preference for a cross-
understanding approach. As with the overarching body of work, the research 
on which this report is based looks at the issue of risk management at the 
corporate board level and is focused on enabling individuals, at that level, to 
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develop the cross-understanding necessary before they start to formulate their 
risk management strategies as part of risk governance. 
Specifically, in this paper I examine the concept of risk indicators and their use 
in the performance management of risk. After outlining the methodology used, 
I examine how the term has been used within the academic literature and then 
contrast this with the formulation of a performance indicator. Next I examine 
how positive (reward) and negative (risk) propositions manifestly affect an 
individual’s perception in different ways. Finally I propose a new formulation for 
risk indicators that contrasts them with performance indicators and look at the 
implications of, and uses for, the new proposed format. 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to identify the widest possible use of the term “risk indicator”, literature 
from a range of risk management disciplines was reviewed. As well as general 
risk management, this review looked at: (1) accident investigation, (2) crisis 
management, (3) business continuity management, (4) operational risk 
management, (5) process risk management, (6) project and programme risk 
management, (7) resilience engineering and (8) high reliability. While some 
authors, such as Smith and Elliot (2006:7-9), see ‘risk management being part 
of crisis management’, I take the opposite position. For the sake of the 
overarching package of work, I use the term “risk management” to encompass 
all the disciplines (including those listed above), which look to guide 
management to forestall or recover from that which places stakeholders in 
jeopardy. In this paper, potential jeopardy and associated reward are seen as 
being ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Hollnagel, 2009:18) and therefore 
inextricably linked to the potential benefits sought by every organisation or 
enterprise; I agree that ‘the same characteristics of a system that produce the 
bright side will regularly provoke the dark side.’ (Vaughan, 1999:274). 
After the literature review revealed the differing usages of the term “risk 
indicator”, the question raised was what constituted a “risk indicator” and how 
and why it may differ from a performance indicator. I synthesised the literature, 
comparing and contrasting work on the position of performance indicators 
within risk management. This work was enriched by consideration of work on 
risk perception as exemplified by Slovic (2000): this examines the ways 
individuals perceive detrimental outcomes against those with beneficial 
outcomes. Other authors are cited where appropriate. This paper provides a 
summary of the outputs derived from this synthesis and the implications for 
how executives might think about risk and the way they use a range of 
indicators to forestall failure of foresight. 
CURRENT USAGE OF THE TERM RISK INDICATOR 
In order to establish how the term “risk indicator” has been used within 
academic writing, I started with a literature search. ProQuest (19 Oct 10) 
provided 3966 documents which contained the term “risk indicator” within their 
text and of these, 1152 were in “scholarly journals”; this demonstrated that the 
term is widely used. As the aim was to determine how the term had been 
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defined, the search was further restricted to those documents that used the 
term in the title as it was perceived that these documents would be more likely 
to have defined their use of the term. This reduced the number to 7. These 
articles came from the medical, financial, environmental and safety sectors. 
However, none of these papers defined how they used the term “risk indicator” 
and so I needed to look more closely at the texts in order to determine how 
they conceptualised this issue within their field. I consider that it is important 
for executives to take the broadest perspective as they may be forced into 
conflicting debate on many of these issues in respect of their workforce’s 
health or the environment, as much as about the profit and loss account. 
Therefore the examples provided in this paper seek to encompass this broader 
spectrum. 
Providing work from the financial sector, Consigli et al. (2009) do not define 
their use of the term “risk indicator”. They do say, however, that ‘the bond–
stock yield differential is a risk indicator for reversion in stock prices’ (2009:4). 
For the majority of their paper they use the term “risk factor” and the term “risk 
indicator” only appears once more in the conclusions where they say ‘The 
bond–stock yield differential is a significant factor in the dynamics of the risk 
process. That is, the differential is a risk indicator for investment decisions’ 
(2009:22). In their paper we see clearly identified factors, an explicit process 
and risk indicators which demonstrate a potentially negative performance. 
Scandizzo (2005) described ‘a methodology for the mapping of operational risk 
with the objective of identifying the risks inherent in the different steps of a 
business process, selecting the key risk indicators (KRIs)… and designing the 
most appropriate control activities’. To others, this might be a clear description 
of performance management (see Dickstein and Flast, 2009). 
In the safety field, the term “risk indicator” is, in general, shorthand for “the 
performance management of risk management barriers designed to prevent or 
mitigate unwanted occurrences”. In this context, it is clear to see why the 
abbreviated term, risk indicator is preferred. Vinnem (2010:770) looks to 
‘recommend how risk indicators may be used by individual companies and 
installations in an efficient manner’ He emphasised that the overall risk 
indicator is not a prediction of the future risk values, but an indicator which 
presents precursor events in the past weighted by their fatality risk potential’ 
(2010:774) and so are designed to provide forewarning. However, as his 
argument develops, the way of providing this forewarning was by the 
performance management of the barrier put in place to forestall any problems 
(2010:774, 775 and 777) as part of the designed safety process. Vinnem 
proposes ‘10 criteria (that) should be addressed when reviewing current use of 
indicators or new proposals’. Hopkins (2011) and Hayes (2009) advocate that 
risk indicators should relate to the performance of risk mitigation barriers. 
These criteria are compared with my proposals for performance indicators in 
the next section. 
Anderson et al. (1998) only used the term in their title but not in their text. Their 
discussion was of indicators of health within a community. Cochran et al. 
(2001), also from the medical field, look at the ‘risk of’ maladies and the 
prevalence of risk factors within different social groupings’. What they were 
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examining were the factors that contributed to a clearly defined hazard, 
namely cancer, an outcome with negative connotations. Hemmingsson and 
Lundberg (2005) ask whether ‘social mobility is related to health and/or risk 
indicators for ill-health’ (2005:518). They used the term “risk indicator” as a 
shorthand for “indicators of ill-health”. Here it can be seen that the risk implied 
is a negative outcome (i.e. ill-health) and therefore the term may be seen as 
being used as a performance indicator of health as much as a forewarning of 
ill-health. They state that ‘Nine previously detected risk indicators for mortality 
in this study were used’ (2005:518) raising the question about whether the 
term “risk factor” may have been more appropriate in many instances. 
Travisi et al. (2004) looked at the “usefulness of pesticide risk indicators”. They 
elaborate “Indicators… are expected to help national regulatory institutions to 
estimate general trends in pesticide risk reduction and to judge the 
effectiveness of their programmes.” They also state that “For each risk 
indicator, a bandwidth of critical threshold values (CTVs) is defined, which is 
used to set our reference system for judging the environmental impacts of 
alternatives.” This would suggest that these indicators are being used as 
control totals within the associated performance model; again, risk indices 
used as performance indices. 
While Moon and Augenbroe (2004) title their paper ‘Towards a practical mould 
growth risk indicator’, the abstract states that their paper dealt ‘with the first 
stage of research that focuses on the construction of a ‘performance indicator’ 
that expresses the mould growth risk…’. Here it can be clearly seen that the 
performance indicator of an adverse outcome (labelled a risk) has been given 
the shorthand label of “risk indicator”. 
Not only authors but reviewers can add to the mix of terms. Johnson 
(2008:1515) starts his paper with the statement ‘Standards, emissions limits, 
and other regulatory benchmarks are often used in communications to the 
public as risk indicators.’ This statement is supplemented by a note which says 
‘The contrast of observed and benchmark levels is one type of “risk 
comparison”; … A reviewer … preferred “risk indicator” to label the standard’s 
role’. However, the label chosen by the reviewer can be seen to create its own 
ambiguities. As a “standard”, these would fall into the category of a 
performance indicator for negative consequences. 
The crossover between risk and performance is recognised in Wein et al. in 
Oxley and Kulasiri (2007:1690) where they state that in the ‘problem 
formulation stage… Deliberative dialogue is used to … determine key risk 
decisions and performance measures (risk indicators and acceptable risk 
targets) that will be used to evaluate risk reduction strategies and policy 
alternatives’. Johanson (2008:372) also links the issues of risk and 
performance indicators; he says ‘The extent to which more information from 
the management accounting system can provide the board with better risk 
indicators and early warning signals of decreasing organizational performance 
is an important issue for future research.’ The question then becomes whether 
there might there be a clearer differentiation between a risk and a performance 
indicator. 
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As can be seen above, another area of ambiguity is in the differentiation 
between a “risk indicator” and a “risk factor”; again these terms are used 
seemingly interchangeably. ‘Risk indicators or factor models are derived from 
various types of data input that serve to dimension the evolution of a risk 
profile’ (sic) (Hoffman, 2002:289). Where the academic language used is still 
immature, as it appears to be within this discipline, each author still needs to 
define precisely their use of such labels. The way I differentiated these terms 
is that the “factor” is the fact (what is to be measured) whereas the “indicators” 
are the data used to evaluate the factor in order to indicate any beneficial or 
detrimental implications. In this context, many of the uses of the term “risk 
indicator” would, to me, be termed “risk factors”. 
I conclude that the way the term “risk indicator” has been used is as a 
shorthand for the performance management of risk management barriers or 
factors designed to predict, prevent or mitigate unwanted occurrences. Unlike 
circumstances where the failure of foresight is the concern, here the unwanted 
outcome has been clearly identified and the issues of concern are determining 
the mechanisms (risk factors) and the probabilities. As this concerns 
performance with negative connotations, these could be thought of as 
indicators of jeopardy or, as the term I adopt, “jeopardy indicators”. 
FORMULATION OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Having identified in the previous section the use of risk indicators as a 
shorthand for performance with potentially negative connotations, this section 
looks at the issue through a second lens. I examine the characteristics 
attributed to performance indicators and then compare these with the 
characteristics attributed to risk indicators to examine any overlap. 
Neely et al. (1997) produced an analysis of the literature on performance 
indicators. They produced a summary of 22 characteristics which are listed in 
Table 9 (1997:1137). 
 
Table 9 - Neely et al. (1997) Measure Characteristics 
1.  Performance measures should be derived from strategy 
2.  Performance measures should be simple to understand 
3.  Performance measures should provide timely and accurate feedback 
4.  Performance measures should be based on quantities that can be influenced, or 
controlled, by the user alone or in co-operation with others 
5.  Performance measures should reflect the “business process” – i.e. both the supplier and 
customer should be involved in the definition of the measure 
6.  Performance measures should relate to specific goals (targets) 
7.  Performance measures should be relevant 
8.  Performance measures should be part of a closed management loop 
9.  Performance measures should be clearly defined 
10.  Performance measures should have visual impact 
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11.  Performance measures should focus on improvement 
12.  Performance measures should be consistent (in that they maintain their significance as 
time goes by) 
13.  Performance measures should provide fast feedback 
14.  Performance measures should have an explicit purpose 
15.  Performance measures should be based on an explicitly defined formula and source of 
data 
16.  Performance measures should employ ratios rather than absolute numbers 
17.  Performance measures should use data which are automatically collected as part of a 
process whenever possible  
18.  Performance measures should be reported in a simple consistent format 
19.  Performance measures should be based on trends rather than snapshots 
20.  Performance measures should provide information (rather than opinion) 
21.  Performance measures should be precise – be exact about what is being measured 
22.  Performance measures should be objective – not based on opinion 
  
Using these criteria, they evaluated a framework that they had developed. In 
the end they placed a caveat on five criteria (10, 11, 16, 19 and 22) which they 
said, at that time, were only supported by anecdotal evidence and commented 
on four others which concerned the processes (the process of designing 
measures, i.e. prescribing who should be involved; the process of reviewing 
measures, i.e. ensuring that the measures are modified as circumstances 
change; the process of capturing data; and the process of reporting 
performance) (Neely et al, 1997:1148).  
In their later work on the process of formulating performance indicators, 
Franco and Bourne provided a ‘full list of critical characteristics of performance 
measure’ (2003:706). These are listed in Table 10 (they are numbered 
sequentially following table 9 in order to identify each at a later stage).  
 
Table 10 - Franco & Bourne (2003) Measure Characteristics 
23.  Relevant - measures should be relevant to the business and to the people 
being accountable for them 
24.  Clear and simple - clarity of definition and calculation, unambiguous, and simple to 
understand 
25.  Balanced - balanced between non-financial and financial measures 
26.  Precise and 
accurate 
- accurate calculations, concise and precise measures to increase 
credibility 
27.  A few measures - as few measures as possible (4 to 6 per manager) 
28.  Measurable - measures that you can “count”. Objective versus subjective 
measures. Observable. 
29.  Actionable - applicable and usable in practice (clear view of action) 
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30.  Dimensional and 
sufficient 
- measures should capture what matters with no overlap 
31.  Focus - measures focused on strategic objectives 
32.  Timeliness - real-time measures (weekly, monthly,) as opposed to annual 
measures 
33.  Cost effective - balanced between cost and benefits of the measures 
34.  Predictable - measures for predicting future outcomes 
35.  Individual - individual measures versus team measures 
36.  Related - relative measures versus absolute measures 
 
These characteristics can be summarised by their immediacy [3, 13, 31, 32], 
clarity [2, 9, 10, 18, 24], operability [1, 4, 5, 11, 19, 27, 29, 30, 33, 34, 36], 
measurability [12, 14, 16, 17, 26, 28], credibility (based on evidence) [7, 8, 15, 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 34] and relevance to the goals of the organisation [5, this is 
also based on Neely et al.’s exclusions of 10, 11, 16, 19 and 22 as being 
process orientated]. This leads to the question as to whether in the way many 
risk indicators are currently constructed, they are, in fact, just performance 
indicators that have negative connotations. 
Some authors have used performance indicators as their mechanism for 
managing potential jeopardy. Havold (2007) looked to develop ‘a tool to 
measure safety in shipping’ in order to “measure safety orientation” (2007:VII). 
He used six criteria taken from Kjellén (2000) in shaping good performance 
indicators: (1) Observable and quantifiable, (2) Valid indicator of the risk of 
loss, (3) Sensitive to change, (4) Compatible, (5) Transparent and easily 
understood and (6) Robust against manipulation (Havold, 2007:50). Havold 
adds two further criteria: (7) Simple to use and (8) Easy to communicate 
(2007:83). In this example we see how Havold uses performance indicators to 
measure an outcome with negative connotations. 
Scandizzo (2005:239), working in the financial sector, states that key risk 
indicators should ‘be identified on the basis of the information gathered in the 
previous steps, namely the drivers, the factors and the potential losses, and 
ranked according to their predictive ability’ a similar process to that used for 
performance indicators. He goes on to say ‘KRIs should be: (1) Relevant, 
strongly related to the frequency of operational failure and/or severity of 
impact, (2) Non-redundant: If two indicators are strongly correlated, only one 
should be considered, (3) Measurable: As much as possible, indicators should 
be objectively (and independently) quantifiable and verifiable, (4) Easy to 
monitor: Indicator tracking should not be too cumbersome and expensive, and 
(5) Auditable: Indicators and their sources should be properly documented’. 
These characteristics of a so-called risk indicator would seem to have a 
significant correlation with the characteristics previously identified for 
performance indicators. 
While the criteria produced by Vinnem (2010:778) can generally be seen to 
conform to those for performance indicators, they do also show a divergence. 
Vinnem’s criteria are ‘(1) combination of lagging and leading indicators, (2) 
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easily observable performance, (3) intuitive indicators, (4) not require complex 
calculations, (5) not be influenced by campaigns that give conflicting signals, 
(6) reflect hazard mechanisms, (7) sensitive to change, (8) show trends, (9) 
robust to manipulation and (10) validity for major hazard risk.’ The main 
difference is his use of “intuitive indicators” which, by their very nature are not 
so easily auditable and therefore may be seen, by some, to lack credibility as a 
performance indicator. 
Hale (2009:480), in a debate about safety performance indicators sets the 
standard for such indicators as ‘the standard generic list of requirements for 
measuring instruments in science’. This would seem to privilege the scientific 
method over intuition and personal judgement. Such privileging may, however, 
be seen as contributing to the accident of the space shuttle Challenger 
(Vaughan, 1996). Zwetsloot (2009:498) points out that ‘These facts (near-miss 
data) were known in the company, and by hindsight they are easy to 
understand as indicators that process safety was seriously at risk. 
Nevertheless, this was not leading to appropriate action. Clearly the meaning 
of these events was not fully understood by many company people, especially 
the higher managers who have the primary responsibility for safety’. He goes 
on to question ‘Do we have any scientific evidence of such an impact?’ and 
answers ‘I am afraid not’. While those who privilege a scientific approach 
would tend to seek more data, there are those (Stanton et al., 2006:682; 
Schneier, 2008:23) who would question the relentless collection of data as it 
may just add to the ‘cognitive workload’ rather than add clarity or may just be 
used as an excuse to vacillate. They suggest that an alternative mental 
approach is required to see the data from a fresh perspective. 
It is clear to see why the term “risk indicator” has been used as a shorthand in 
order to refer to performance indicators with negative values or negative 
connotations. However, as I have shown, the formulation of these indicators is 
substantially the same as those used for performance indicators. Therefore we 
can now begin to appreciate the benefit of having indicators that provide 
foresight as to whether a defined process or mechanism is likely to deliver 
benefits or jeopardy. For those looking for the benefits these may be referred 
to as performance indicators, for those looking at potential jeopardy, these 
may be referred to as jeopardy indicators. A question, however, remains as to 
whether, in the context of failure of foresight, there may be a more 
fundamental differentiation between performance/ jeopardy indicators and risk 
indicators. 
CONCEPTUALISING ISSUES OF JEOPARDY 
In this section I examine the question of whether individuals perceive issues of 
jeopardy differently from the way that they perceive benefits and if they do, 
how this might relate to risk and performance indicators in the context of 
“failure of foresight”. Recognising how crises induce stress and how stress 
puts a strain on rational processes, Smart and Vertinsky (1977:324) listed five 
‘crises-specific pathologies’ that affect decision formulation under stress: (1) 
the narrowing of cognitive processes, (2) information distortion, (3) group 
pathologies, (4) rigidities in programming and (5) a lack of decision readiness. 
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The synthesis of the literature led to the identification of eight key issues for 
the conceptualisation of jeopardy related phenomena: perception bias, denial, 
missed signals of danger, ambiguity, timeframe, blind spots, outcome versus 
process focused and seat of understanding. I will address each of these in 
turn.  
The first issue is that of perception bias. Bolt et al. (2010) provide a concise 
summary of the detailed work previously done on this subject. They outline 
(2010:19-21) 25 factors where people habitually exaggerate or downplay risk. 
How anxieties ‘cause uncertainty to be denied, risks to be misjudged 
(sometimes overestimated and sometimes underestimated) and judgements of 
facts to be held with unwarranted confidence … these disagreements about 
risk should not be expected to evaporate in the presence of evidence’ (Slovic, 
2000:222). The work summarised provides the evidence that a perception of 
jeopardy does change people’s perspective and analysis. 
The second issue is one where potential jeopardy produces denial as a 
psychological defence mechanism as part of ‘Anxiety-avoidance … techniques 
for reducing its collective anxiety’ (Reason, 1997:193). This feature is 
recognised by many writers. For key examples see: (1) Toft and Reynolds 
(2005:135) who point to the work of Wolfenstein, who suggests that one of the 
reasons for such behaviour is: ‘... a sense of personal invulnerability which is 
essential for most individuals to maintain if they are to go about their daily 
business without constantly worrying about all the potential dangers that could 
threaten them’; (2) Øvretveit (2009:585) who says ‘Psychodynamic theory 
provides understanding of how people protect themselves from feelings of pain 
through a number of psychological mechanisms. Defensive mechanisms such 
as projection, splitting and denial would be expected.’ In this context “pain” is 
taken to mean the distress caused by the anxiety over “something bad 
happening”; (3) Slovic (2000) states that ‘The denial resulting from this 
anxiety-reducing search for certainty thus represents an additional source of 
overconfidence’. If denial is to be countered, risk indicators therefore need to 
be based on the falsification of a proposition rather than its confirmation, i.e. a 
concern should not be excluded until there is strong evidence that it does not 
pose a concern. 
The third issue is the misreading of available data (warning signals); what 
Slovic (2000:190) calls ‘the informativeness of ‘signal potential’ of a mishap’. 
This is linked to the question about what constitutes, if not “valid proof”, 
enough evidence on which to act. Vaughan (1996:413-415), Weick (1997:397-
400) and Slovic (2000) all refer to this general issue from a physiological point 
of view while Turner (1976a) and Grint (2008) take a more practically based 
stance. Together they describe the many mechanisms by which relevant 
information may be missed in foresight but is very obvious in hindsight. This 
work suggests that there is likely to be forewarning of a crisis or a disaster and 
therefore those involved with risk indicators need to keep an open mind (being 
“mindful” according to Weick and Sutcliffe (2007)). Again, this would suggest 
that evidence or clues should not be discounted until there is confirmation that 
they are not relevant, rather than being excluded until they are proved to be 
relevant. 
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Linked to this is the issue of silent evidence, where subordinates or other 
stakeholders withhold evidence for reasons of loss of face, careers or politics 
(see ‘fallacy of complete reporting’ Westrum (1982:391)). Kutsch and Hall 
(2010:250) state that “Some interviewees described risk as a taboo. Because 
it would entail the disclosure of inconvenient information to project 
stakeholders, some risks were ignored.” After the fall of Singapore during 
World War 2, Churchill is said to have mused ‘Why didn't I know? Why didn't 
my advisers know? Why wasn't I told? Why didn't I ask?’ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007:84). This would suggest that all those parties involved should actively 
seek new information and perspective in order to unearth clues to the 
unexpected and the unpalatable. 
The fourth issue is ambiguity. Gigerenzer, (2002:244) offers that ‘In Western 
culture, people want to live in a world of certain knowledge, not in a world that 
is hard to understand and predict and where accidents and errors reign.’ Slovic 
endorses this idea (2000:110-111) and believes that humans seek certainty. 
Adams (2007) provides a taxonomy which groups risks as ranging from the 
tangible, through those visible through science, to the virtual; Reason 
(1990:12-13) categorises errors as ranging from behavioural, through the 
contextual to the conceptual. Both of these categorisations can be seen to 
range from the tangible to the abstract (the more ambiguous).  
Weick (1987:118) described reliability as a ‘dynamic non-event… dynamic in 
the sense that it is an ongoing condition’ and a “non-event” because nothing 
adverse happens. Others (Reason, 1998:294, Gauthereau and Hollnagel, 
2005:129 and Hovden et al., 2010:954) have extended the definition to safety. 
In the context of failure of foresight, I extend the definition to unwanted 
circumstances with adverse consequences (or risk). There are two important 
implications. The first is that, being dynamic, the problem is constantly 
changing and therefore is unlikely to be identified through static indicators, i.e. 
they are likely to need dynamic indicators which provide a constantly changing 
perspective in order to spot an emerging issue. As a non-event, success 
cannot be judged by absence of problems for the right circumstance or set of 
circumstances that may not yet have presented themselves – Perrow’s Union 
Carbide Factor (1999:356 and 398). Coupled with the “problem of induction”, is 
the use of data to imply an inference that is false, such as the sight of only 
white swans to infer falsely that all swans are white. This idea was popularised 
by Taleb (2007). Therefore, those seeking indicators of risk need to be more 
open to counterintuitive possibility and ambiguous causal links. For, 'In an 
uncertain world, certainty can be a dangerous ideal' (Gigerenzer, 2002:90). 
The fifth issue is the elongation of timeframes for risk. The unexpected can 
often only be perceived over the longer timescale; this makes it more abstract 
and the outcome less easily measured. Reason, (1997:227) talks of the 
‘Insidious accumulation of latent conditions’. Turner (1976b:395) gave 
examples of incubation periods of over 100 years. In more recent work (Aini 
and Fakhrul-Razi, 2010:1290) the periods of: 3 to 30 years and 1 to 19 years 
were also identified. This is in direct contrast to the opinion of Hudson 
(2009:484) who says that ‘To shape managers’ behaviour most organisations 
will require indicators that can show significant variation on a quarterly or 
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annual basis’. Neely et al. (1997) go further and suggest that indicators need 
to be sensitive to change on a monthly or even weekly basis. The significance 
of this difference in timescale is highlighted by Perrow (2007) in what he calls 
“executive failure” where decisions based on short-term criteria increased the 
exposure of their organisations to unwanted occurrences over a longer 
timeframe. Risk indicators therefore need to be geared to the long-term 
consequences of short-term activity. 
The sixth issue is the barriers to recognising what one sees. These barriers 
are both cultural and managerial. Vaughan (1996:394) points out that ‘Aspects 
of organisational life … created a way of seeing that was simultaneously a way 
of not seeing hazards.’ The idea that 'seeing is a way of not seeing' is used by 
Perrow (2007:74), Van de Ven and Poole (1995:510) cites Poggie, Blockley 
(1998:78) cites Turner, Manning (1999:285) attributes the idea to Burke, and 
both Cox et al (2006:1125) and Nævestad (2008) cite Vaughan’s work. Woods 
in Starbuck and Farjoun (2005:294) states ‘This pattern of seeing the details 
but being unable to recognise the big picture is commonplace in accidents.’ 
Slovic (2000:190) asserts ‘that people, acting within social organisations, 
downplay certain risks and emphasise others as a means of maintaining the 
viability of the organisation’. Smith (2004:357) puts the point slightly differently 
when he talks of ‘experience as an inhibitor’; Klein et al (2005:22) agree that 
‘Experience can sometimes interfere with problem detection’. The final 
example I use is Pidgeon (1998:100) who explains how cultures may 
desensitise our perceptions and thus create ‘blind  spots’. Managerial blind 
spots are created by phenomena such as the “fallacy of centrality” (Westrum, 
1982:393) and “structure secrecy” (Vaughan, 1996:242). Anomalous events, 
warning signals and other issues that fall outside the normal cultural lens are 
therefore readily neglected. While a number of mechanisms may create a 
cultural blindness to risk, the important issue is that this blindness exists. It is 
therefore suggested that risk indicators should be formulated to avoid this 
pitfall and signals, including intuition, should not be excluded until they are 
known to be false. 
Seventh is the issue of focusing on the outcome or the process. Reason, 
(1997:107) points to the debate about whether to focus on process or 
outcome. A special edition of Safety Science (2009, Vol.47) debates the use of 
leading and lagging indicators and their utility. Hopkins (2009a:508) refers to 
the views of what he described as the “relativists” who advocate lead and lag 
relative to a specific point. At no point did these debates introduce the idea of 
“unit of analysis”. I advocate lead and lag relative to the unit of analysis being 
employed. In this context lag indicators are the outcomes, which in the case of 
failure of foresight are unacceptable and the lead indicators monitor inputs and 
processes involved. The Dickstein and Flast (2009) contribution can be seen 
as a summary for this debate. They argue that by the time an adverse 
outcome has occurred then it is too late and therefore the prime focus should 
be on monitoring the process in order to stop anything going seriously wrong. 
Those writing from a crisis management perspective would be likely to 
emphasise the importance of effective and efficient recovery to an acceptable 
steady state. However, writers on High Reliability Organisations would point 
out that in some circumstances the error (as in Trial and Error), or adverse 
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occurrence, may just be unacceptable (such as the meltdown of a nuclear 
power station). In line with this argument, where the potential outcome is 
unacceptable (the focus of failure of foresight), the risk management activity 
needs to concentrate on what I term the “lead indicators” based on the inputs 
and the processes.  
The final issue, one that I label “seat of understanding” is a phrase borrowed 
from Vaughan (1996:261 and 363) who makes no attempt to define it. This 
expression provides a useful label to debate the importance of experience 
(presupposed knowledge and skills and the ability to use them (see Reason, 
1990)) in the identification of problems. A key piece of work here is that done 
by Klein et al. (2005). Klein et al. see the recognition of ‘violations of 
expectancies’ (2005:22) as being important to problem detection, how 
experience is needed to ‘generate expectancies’ (2005:21) and how ‘A skilled 
operator is likely to know the conditions under which the system can generate 
misleading readings and the causes of those readings’ (2005:22). I take this 
statement to be equally valid, whether the system is a mechanical/electrical 
device or a socio-technical system such as a corporation. Klein et al. (2005:14) 
state that (a) ‘cues to problems may be subtle and context-dependent, and (b) 
what counts as a discrepancy depends on the problem-solver’s experience 
and the stance taken in interpreting the situation.’ Fink (2000:37) points out 
that ‘it takes courage to make assumptions’ and that such courage will take the 
confidence that comes with experience. 
I conclude, therefore, that there are good reasons to take the view that a 
different perspective would be created by adopting a negative perspective of 
potential jeopardy. The way mental models are constructed when a person 
considers the doubts, ambiguities and uncertainty that are at the heart of 
managing risk, require a reformulation of the indicators to ensure that they are 
more applicable to the task. Therefore, while jeopardy indicators have their 
place within an overall performance management system, there is also a place 
for a reformulation of, what are to us, risk indicators. 
THE FORMULATION OF RISK INDICATORS 
Having established that writers who use the term “risk indicators” are often 
using these as performance indicators (I have shown that the formulation used 
has a distinct correlation with the format proposed by those writing about 
performance indicators), I have also shown that the concept of jeopardy has a 
distinctive influence on the mental schema used to conceptualise the 
management of risk issues. I therefore now look to formulate risk indicators to 
assist in management’s efforts to forestall “failure of foresight”. The aim of the 
proposed risk indicator is to so change the paradigm that it will enable 
organisations to inwardly scrutinise themselves from a markedly different 
perspective. In reformulating these indicators, I consider three additional 
issues (uncertain causality, categorisation of issues and constant evolution) 
that have emerged from the literature and address them in turn. 
What appears to be central to performance indicators is the assumption of 
causality within the process (Hale, 2009:480, Hopkins, 2009a&b). Risk 
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indicators are more a diaspora of ideas. Reason (1997:93) provides the 
example of a bolt with eight nuts labelled “A” to “H”; Reason points out that 
there is one way to assemble them correctly and over 40,000 ways (factor 8) 
to get it wrong. This points to the fact that while a performance indicator (such 
as “profit”) may be able to be relatively static, the significant unwanted 
occurrence may, in this example, be one of 40,000 issues; when NASA lost 
the Shuttle Columbia, it was not that they were unaware of the problem with 
the heat resistant tiles but that it was but one of 4,222 issues at that time 
classified as critical (Dunbar and Garud, 2005:209). Therefore rather than 
relying on a single static indicator, those involved in risk management need to 
be alert to emerging warnings signs. Risk indicators need initially to be far 
broader and need to evolve as threats emerge. Hopkins (2009a) provides two 
examples. The first is ‘Esso experienced a cold temperature incident … which 
was a clear warning of what was to come’ (Esso did not react to it and Hopkins 
rejected it as a Safety Indicator, for, in his view, there needed to be a ‘number 
of such weak signals to be reported as an indicator.’) I would argue that such 
warnings (reminiscent of the Challenger accident where ambient temperature 
was also an issue) should be used as an alert that the task was entering 
unknown territory (also see “liability of newness” Vaughan, 1996:123). As 
Hopkins (2009a:508) had pointed out, this idea of picking up warning signals 
from small events is central to the ideas posted by writers on High Reliability 
Organisations.  
The second is generalised signals such as the concepts of safety culture 
Hopkins (2009a:510). A link between culture and safety climate is starting to 
be understood (Mearns, 2009:492); however, as the causal links have not yet 
been established, the warning signs of a poor safety culture can only be used 
to alert management to potential problems and therefore start to search for 
other signs and issues. As such, measures of safety climate could well be 
used as part of a risk indicator system. Therefore, a risk indicator cannot be 
expected to be associated with a specific cause but may only offer a signal 
indicating that a deeper examination of a particular phenomenon is warranted. 
Writers on High Reliability Organisations use the logic of Heinrich’s triangle (a 
correlation between minor and major occurrences) to suggest that minor 
accidents provide a warning of major ones to follow. Supporters of this stance 
use evidence such as BP’s higher rate of minor accidents (Baker, 2007:187) 
as a forewarning of the accident at their Texas City refinery in 2005 and their 
drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Hopkins (2009a:460) however, posits 
that personal safety is no indicator of process safety. Havold (2007:37-38) 
believes that while ‘Heinrich’s …“iceberg theory” has been much criticised; …, 
much of the criticism might be based on the misunderstanding that the causes 
of the different accident categories in the model were the same. Heinrich made 
no such claims; on the contrary, he warned about such misunderstandings.’ 
Kjellén (2000:487) expresses his concern over the labelling of accident as 
personal and process for being ‘too simplistic’. Rasmussen (1997:197-198) 
separates out frequent small-scale accidents from major accidents (plane, 
train or ferry accidents, hotel fires or plant accidents with localised damage), 
from large-scale accidents (nuclear melt-downs or plant accidents with 
consequences for the wider environment). A recent example of this last 
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category might include the banking crisis of 2008. I label these different levels 
as chronic, acute and extraordinary and suggest that each is scanned both 
separately and jointly for clues as to where any ambiguous relationships might 
just provide an early warning rather than a correlation or any causal links. 
Therefore, risk indicators should be used to develop propositions about how 
data from chronic minor events may provide forewarning of acute or 
extraordinary events to come, rather than being seen to have direct causal 
links. 
Zwetsloot (2009:495) contends that ‘what gets measured is important, what 
does not get measured, is insignificant’ While this may be apposite for 
performance indicators, this notion should be of concern within risk 
management. For risk indicators the concern should not be so much with what 
is being measured but should be centred more on an endless re-examining of 
the original question, as well as the quality and reliability of data sources. This 
is different from the criteria for performance indicators. For risk indicators the 
emphasis should be more on the constant analysis of the quality (and  
reliability) of the data rather than just the content of the data. Where the data 
quality is high, even weak signals should attract greater attention. Therefore 
risk indicators should not be seen as static items but should be expected to 
evolve constantly as events and  environments change. Smart and Vertinsky 
(1977:337) talk of ‘Constant scanning of the environment for possible threats’. 
From the concerns listed above, a proposition emerges for risk indicators to 
have a different format. Rather than the need for the immediacy, clarity, 
operability, measurability, credibility (based on evidence) and relevance to the 
goals of the organisation required for performance indicators, risk indicators 
would appear to require something different. For risk indicators a longer 
perspective is required including an acceptance of ambiguity, a need for the 
recognition and inclusion of cues, the courage to act on intuition, and a focus 
on processes in order to intercept problems before they happen. Table 11 
provides referencing to the text which provide the origins of characteristics for 
risk indicators. 
Table 11 - Characteristics of Risk Indicators 
Risk Indicators Derived From: 
Alternative perspective Perception bias, denial, blind spots 
Emergent indicators Constant evolution 
Long-term view Timeframe 
Acceptance of ambiguity Uncertain causality 
Conceivable – “open minded” Categorisation of issues 
Intermittent, non-definitive cues Ambiguity 
Intuitive or Statistical relationships Seat of understanding 
Falsification of intuition concerns Missed signals of danger 
Processes focus Outcome versus process focused  
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Table 12 provides a comparison between the characteristics of performance 
and risk indicators. 
Table 12 - Performance v. Risk Indicators 
Performance or Jeopardy Indicators Risk Indicators 
Standard perspective 
Static indicator based on core concerns 
Immediacy (short-term) 
Clarity  
Operability (actionable) 
Measurability 
Causal Relationships 
Confirmation by credible evidence  
Outcomes focus 
Alternative perspective 
Emergent indicators 
Long-term view 
Acceptance of ambiguity 
Conceivable – “open minded” 
Intermittent, non-definitive cues 
Intuitive or Statistical relationships 
Falsification of  intuition concerns 
Processes focus 
IMPLICATIONS 
Having suggested the reformulation of risk indicators, I would reiterate that 
these are not meant to replace performance indicators such as; ‘data that 
indicates there may be something wrong with the system’ (Mearns, 2009:491). 
I would re-label these as jeopardy indicators, as they have a performance 
management function. Hollnagel et al. (2006) and Vaughan (1999) remind us 
that unwanted occurrences do not need malevolent intent or even mistakes 
but, due to the interactive complexity of organisations, can occur when caused 
by good people doing normal things. Where there is a clear system that 
provides observable data, performance indicators, as described across the 
rich literature base, should continue to be used to identify and forestall 
unwanted occurrences. I advocate the use of risk indicators in order to 
address some of the inbuilt and inherent resistance to addressing adverse 
occurrences when senior management is faced by the ambiguous and 
complex ‘wicked messy problems’ (Grint, 2008; Hancock, 2004;, Hancock and 
Holt, 2003) that is their natural domain. In a simplified differentiation, when 
there is a relatively well defined system and it is possible to see what is likely 
to go wrong, then safety or jeopardy performance indicators may be most 
suited to the task. However, when the system is ill-defined, such as complex 
mechanisms and interactions existing within a corporate body, where the 
unwanted may appear from many unforeseen directions, then a risk indicators 
system may be a more suitable option. 
The criteria described in Table 11 provides a further test against which the use 
of the term “risk indicator” may be judged. Looking at the work of Travisi et al. 
(2006) in risk indicators for pesticides within an ecosystem, the delineation 
developed in this paper would now enable a reader to see that the Travisi 
paper is talking about performance indicators where the output is harm to the 
environment. While the term “risk indicator” is likely to continue to be used as 
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convenient shorthand, I would advocate the use of the term “jeopardy 
indicator” in these circumstances. 
Failure of foresight is encapsulated in the Höffding problem: ‘How can you 
recognize something before you know what it is that you are recognizing?’ 
(Klein et al., 2005:23-24). Using the terminology provided by Smith (1989), the 
concern addressed by the proposed risk indicator process is problem 
identification (‘perception of stimuli, interpreted as evidence of a problem’s 
existence’ (1989:965). Smith exhorts us to ‘Specify the existing state - desired 
state gap, state all evidence, challenge the problem’s existence’ (1989:973) 
where the triggers spotted are the key problems themselves or just some of 
the symptoms. Once the existence of a potential problem has been identified 
and recognised, then work can begin on defining it and securing potential 
solutions. However, without that initial identification and recognition, the 
subsequent steps are unlikely to be invoked. Smith (1989:968) suggests that 
one of the first requirements when problem solving is the need to suspend 
judgement until a problem’s nature has been determined; to resist the natural 
desire to tame a wicked/messy problem. Klein et al. (2005:23) suggest that 
those involved need to change their “stance” in order to raise the ‘level of 
suspicion’ necessary to detect unforeseen problems. The idea of “level of 
suspicion” links to Reason’s (1998:299) warning; not, over time, to ‘have 
forgotten to be afraid’. As ‘a person can detect a discrepancy only if that 
person is prepared to re-conceptualize the situation, the critical symptoms may 
be invisible to someone who is not, at some level, already looking for them’ 
(Klein et al., 2005:26). This re-conceptualising would be stimulated by the use 
of the reformatted risk indicators. Seeing within a negative mindset, rather than 
the more positive one associated with “success”, risk indicators provide a fresh 
perspective from which to view and question both the data available and the 
assumptions underlying them. It is suggested that the use of risk indicators 
should be focused on envisaging the “inconceivable”; the necessity to be 
ready for the inconceivable at the organisational level (Farjoun, 2010:210), at 
the operational level (Weick, 2010:540), and at the individual level (Cullen, 
2001:70). The inconceivable can and does still occur; organisations would 
therefore be advised to heed Perrow’s (1999) warning (Normal Accident 
Theory) and consider those situations with potential to produce significant 
harm. The aim is positive, in the same way as Perrow’s “Union Carbide Factor” 
is positive, in that it seeks to promote positive action to remedy any freshly 
exposed problems. I call this approach “constructive pessimism”. 
Reason (1997:177) uses the Robens report to warn; ‘Good intentions at the 
board level are useless if managers further down the chain…remain 
preoccupied exclusively with production problems,’ This links to the “fallacy of 
centrality” and may be part of the reason for the gap between expectation and 
practice which, in Turner’s Disaster Incubation Theory (1978), provides a 
space for problems to develop. Therefore, unlike the search for the ‘predictive 
validity’ (Hudson, 2009:483) of performance indicators, risk indicators should 
be developed to provide forewarning of the unexpected. Fink (2000) suggests 
that in a ‘worst case / scenario model… the imagination of man can be infinite’ 
(2000:36). Weick (2005:425) however, citing the 9/11 commission report, 
warns that ‘Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies’. 
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Fink goes on to suggest a different approach which ‘involves presenting a 
range of bracketed possibilities… (with) certain signposts… checked along the 
way’ (2000:37). For Klein et al (2005:14), ‘in many cases, detecting a problem 
is equivalent to reconceptualizing the situation’. They warn such effort is not 
easy. Reason (1997:193) talks of ‘Learned helplessness … (where) the energy 
and will to resolve problems and attain goals drains away’. Woods (2009:498) 
states that ‘When one starts from the position that organizational failures of 
foresight are commonplace…, a few patterns emerge: (a) establishing 
foresight encompasses extremely difficult forms of cognitive work and is an 
unstable process, … (b) the difficulties arise from basic dynamic and cyclic 
patterns in how adaptive systems behave, (c) emerging measures of how and 
where a system is brittle’. However, not only are systems fragile but so is 
foresight. Woods (2009:499) questions ‘can an organization step outside itself 
and examine its own adaptive capacity in order to recognize … brittleness.’ 
Remedying failure of foresight is unlikely to be a simple, effort-free task. 
However, reformatted risk indicators which take into account these issues may 
provide a new starting point for those involved. 
A major limitation for practice is that bringing about such a mental adjustment 
will not be easy. In addition to the issues described above, such difficulties 
have been recognised by other authors. Jaques (2010:477) points out that 
lessons are ‘not hard to see, though much harder to implement’. Chapman 
(2005:344), when discussing risk assessment comments, ‘Certainly, 
developing insight into such complex arrangements is a difficult undertaking. 
But is it impossible?’ The answer given was ‘No’. Finally, Latham and Locke 
(2006:336), warn that those taking this approach may be seen as "Nay sayers" 
and advise that 'People are rotated in and out of this role. If the same people 
are perceived as the nay sayers again and again, they will lose their credibility 
within the group.' Remedies for failure of foresight are likely therefore to be 
long-term, and hard fought. Future research needs to focus on how such 
changes may be brought about. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper I have proposed that there should be at least three 
interconnected indicators required at the executive level of management. The 
first, “performance indicators”, used to monitor the delivery of benefits from 
clearly bounded and defined systems. The second, “jeopardy indicators”, used 
to monitor the potential jeopardy identified within the clearly bounded and 
defined systems designed to deliver the desired benefits. The third and 
perhaps the most problematic are the “risk indicators” which are used to scan 
for emerging problems whether the causes are exogenous or endogenous.  
The paper shows that there is a clear difference in function between the 
indicators required to support performance management and those required to 
support risk management. It can be seen that the current use of the term “risk 
indicator” is, in general, shorthand for “the performance management of risk 
management barriers designed to prevent or mitigate unwanted occurrences”. 
It is also clear to see why an abbreviated term is needed; I therefore suggest 
an alternative, that of “jeopardy indicator”.  
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I offer a reformulation of the term “risk indicator” to support the risk 
management task of preventing the failure of foresight. Here the task of the 
indicator is to overcome the potential for denial and other such behaviours by 
setting a different paradigm for the evaluation of potential jeopardy to those 
used to evaluate potential benefits. As such and in direct contrast to 
performance indicators, those which should be designed to emphasise the 
need for the immediacy, clarity, operability, measurability, credibility (based on 
evidence) and relevance to the goals of the organisation, risk indicators would 
appear to require something different. Risk indicators should focus on the 
inconceivable with the potential for significant harm; they should be used to 
emphasise the longer perspective, promote an acceptance of ambiguity, 
underwrite the courage to act on intuition, need to be inclusive of any and all 
data until it is falsified and focus on processes and interrelationships in order 
to intercept problems before they happen.  
I believe that this conceptualisation will assist managers in their endeavours to 
forestall failure of foresight. There is, however, still a need for this 
reformulation to be tested in practice by examining how far executives 
consider and prosecute the “inconceivable” for, while these may be excluded 
within current risk management practices, as experience shows, the 
inconceivable can and does still happen. 
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CHAPTER 5 – EXAMINING FAILURE OF FORESIGHT 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors (derived from previous 
research reported in academic literature) associated with failure of foresight in 
order to develop questions to enable executives to generate a clearer personal 
mental model. 
The paper uses a wide range of academic literature. Based on Turner (1976b, 
1978), the paper groups the phenomena identified in previous research under 
three headings; “failure to see”, “failure to appreciate” and a “failure to act” (in 
the latter case, consideration within this paper stops at the generation of the 
desire to act). The construct is centred on the development of cross-
understanding (Huber and Lewis, 2010) within an executive team as part of 
their risk discourse (Renn, 2008a). Using the concept of foresight, the paper 
examines what questions might be used to recognize previously identified 
phenomena before they manifest themselves.  
The paper finds that a number of the phenomena identified in previous 
research can only be applied in hindsight as they have extremely ambiguous 
start rules. The use of these phenomena should therefore be restricted to post 
incident analysis as they have limited application as part of foresight. Those 
phenomena that lend themselves to foresight were used to develop a set of 
prototype questions that now need to be tested empirically. 
The results of the research are limited to a theoretical construct and are based 
on a limited synthesis of the available literature; the research demonstrates the 
requirement for a further detailed synthesis of the available literature to be 
conducted. The practical implications of this research are that the findings offer 
an initial set of questions that link practitioners to the body of academic work 
related to this area of management.  
This paper is useful for both researchers and practitioners in that it gives a 
clear foresight perspective and therefore starts the process of filtering related 
constructs into those that may be applied in foresight and those that can only 
be applied in hindsight. 
 
  
 Chapter 5   94 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Investigations of organisational failure have often laid the blame on “failure of 
foresight”. Toft and Reynolds (2005:49) list one general type of 
recommendation from public enquiries into accidents as ‘foresight 
recommendations (that are made)…in an attempt to forestall problems which 
could arise in the future’. One such recent example from the UK is Haddon-
Cave (2009). Haddon-Cave evoked failure of foresight, both directly 
(2009:331) and indirectly, saying ‘if he had given careful thought’ (2009:375), 
as a contributory cause of the crash of Royal Air Force aircraft, Nimrod XV230. 
Similarly, the Challenger Accident Inquiry Board (CAIB) report (2003:195) said 
‘both accidents (Shuttles Challenger and Columbia) were “failures of foresight” 
in which history played a prominent role’. The CAIB (2003:204) cite Turner 
(1978:51) where “failure of foresight” is defined as ‘a long incubation period in 
which hazards and warning signs prior to the accident were either ignored or 
misinterpreted’ as also do academics such as Vaughan (1996:411) and Barton 
and Sutcliffe (2010:72). 
The need for foresight is espoused across a wide range of academic literature. 
Foresight is a commonly used concept which has its own dedicated academic 
journal. However, to quote Pidgeon and O’Leary (2000:21) ‘Few would 
probably disagree that foresight is limited and as such the identification of 
warning in advance of a major failure is problematic’; they also warn that ‘the 
identification of system vulnerability in foresight sets an epistemologically 
impossible task’. Stockholm (2011:46), believes that by ‘Understanding the 
underlying causes of our current performance and our part in that performance 
provides us the insight necessary to resolve existing problems and the 
foresight necessary to prevent developing problems.’ This sentiment “that 
organisations fail to learn” is also held by others such as Schobel and Manzey, 
(2011:47), Elliott et al (2000), Weir (2002) and Qureshi (2007). Those familiar 
with organisational learning literature will understand that, within that literature, 
learning consists of two distinct parts: understanding and implementation 
(adoption of organisations’ routines), but this distinction is not always clear. 
The foresight provided by understanding, however, does not necessarily lead 
to successful prevention although it is the assumption of some commentators 
that the first should “automatically” lead to the other. The issue for this paper is 
set within the context of moving from understanding of an issue to successful 
mitigation action and looking at what is to be learned from the current body of 
knowledge.  
A US DOE Handbook (2009) and Reason (2007) offer tests of foresight. These 
are questions in a form that may be added to the risk assessment process. 
The DOE’s question is “Did the individual involved in the incident engage in 
behaviour that others (when asked individually) recognize as being likely to 
increase the probability of making a safety critical error?” (US DOE, 2009:96). 
This test is clearly set in the context of hindsight as are the questions posed by 
Reason. This is indicative of the majority of the debate to date. The main focus 
of academia has been to examine the mechanisms that are at the heart of 
crises and accidents. This work has the benefit of hindsight in the quest to 
develop understanding. Unfortunately for managers, this facility is not open to 
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them as they manage their organisation. This paper therefore will concentrate 
on foresight, looking at what questions might be asked and how the emerging 
context may aid or hinder the conceptualisation of potentially unwanted and 
damaging occurrences. 
The aim of this research is to extract and describe the key concepts from 
relevant literature and to examine the range of meanings and interpretations 
given to each in order to provide a rich framework to form the basis of future 
risk discourse. 
This paper adds to Turner’s construct by collating and examining a range of 
the phenomena discussed within existing academic literature that might be 
part of a mental model of risk within an organisation. The significance of this 
work is that it looks to differentiate between that which can only be used in 
hindsight and that which may be applied in foresight. 
Following a section that set the context for the chapter, there are four sections. 
The first will describe the methodology used to conduct the research. The 
second will review the term “failure of foresight” in order to establish what the 
construct involves. The third section will examine the mechanisms reported to 
affect failure of foresight findings. The final section will discuss the implications 
of the findings for future research and practice. 
CONTEXT 
The subject of risk receives wide coverage within academic literature from 
many perspectives. This wide ranging literature examines the concept of risk 
and uncertainty, models for managing risk and many statistical methods for 
managing risks and uncertainty. The issue of how risk may be conceptualised 
has been covered in Chapter 2. In the context of cross-understanding within 
risk discourse, the concept of risk has been reduced to the “unwanted” in order 
to open up the discussion. For the purpose of this paper, the label “unwanted” 
will be retained; it should be assumed to include the unwanted at any part of a 
transformation process. The literature that most closely relates to this 
conception of risk (“the unwanted nightmare”) is the literature about accidents. 
This is because the accident literature espoused its purpose as being twofold; 
(1) to determine the cause and (2) to prevent future accidents. This second 
purpose is the one that most closely relates to the purpose of risk 
management (“action taken now to limit the impact of the unwanted in the 
future”) and is the focus of this paper.  
In common with the other papers in this series, this is a conceptual paper 
which is developing the idea of “thinking about how to think about” risk 
(Wildavsky, 1988:2) or providing “support for thinking about a present 
situation” (Lagadec, 1993:xiii) in order to provide a “means of sharpening the 
decision maker’s judgement” (Lagadec, 1993:xi). The central focus of this work 
is on the early stages of the performance management of risk when those 
involved are trying to conceptualise their concerns. The work is seen to be 
most relevant to the construction of mental models/schema (Rumelhart, 1981) 
which takes place in the early stages of risk discourse (Renn, 2008a:159-172). 
Here we are looking to facilitate “Cross-Understanding” between stakeholders 
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rather than creating a shared understanding. Huber and Lewis (2010:7) state 
that cross-understanding “depends on the extent and accuracy of each 
member’s understanding of each other member’s mental model”. Here the 
important issues are to understand how others see the issues at hand in order 
to reach the point where the cross-understanding is clear enough to enable 
the group to take action. A danger of seeking “common understanding” is 
highlighted by Sutcliffe (2005:421) where she says that “groups sometimes 
focus only on those perceptions that are held in common” and thereby limit  
the discussion to areas with which they are all comfortable. However, as 
Sutcliffe (2005:421) goes on to say, “it is the divergence in information and 
perceptions, not the commonalities, that hold the key to detecting anomalies” 
and this explains a preference for a cross-understanding approach. As with the 
overarching body of work, the research on which this report is based looks at 
the issue of risk management at the corporate board level and is focused on 
enabling individuals, at that level, to develop the cross-understanding 
necessary in order to formulate their risk management strategies.  
The level of analysis will be defined using a premise provided by Vaughan 
(1996:94) and Grint (2008). This is that there is a point in any hierarchy of 
large organisations, where managers move from being “Expert” to being 
“Investigator”; from dealing not with the “Routine” to dealing with the “Novel”, 
not dealing with the “Specifics” but in “Principles”; not looking at the “Full 
Detail” but managing “By Exception”; the former are provided by Grint and the 
final one by Vaughan. A central idea here is the one of “decision distancing” 
(Smart and Vertinsky, 1977:326) where they state that “in a six-level hierarchy, 
there may be a 98 percent loss of informational content”. Central to the issue 
addressed within this paper is therefore how the most appropriate 2% of 
information is filtered through to top executives.  
Lagadec (1993) points out that executives are not able to limit exposure to risk 
to one specific area, they have to be alert to the unwanted emerging from any 
area of their organisation or from any cause. He says an expert “can be 
satisfied with making very specific, limited diagnoses, while (decision makers) 
must integrate many elements” (Lagadec, 1993:xxiv). Therefore, as well as 
looking at general risk management, this research has examined literature 
covering: (1) accident investigation, (2) crisis management, (3) business 
continuity management, (4) operational risk management, (5) process risk 
management, (6) project and programme risk management, (7) resilience 
engineering and (8) high reliability. 
The key dilemma for the subject of Risk Management is the dialectic between 
the practical and the theoretical. On one side of the coin is the need to 
understand “Risk” and on the other is the desire or need to manage it 
effectively and efficiently. It could be argued that it requires an “ontological 
oscillation” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:266) between being a constructionist (in 
order to understand risk) and a positivist (in order to manage risk effectively 
and efficiently). This approach was justified by Snook (2000:76) in his award 
winning PhD dissertation at Harvard. Renn (1998:49) argues “both extremes, 
the constructivist and the realist perspective, miss the point, as risks are 
always mental representations of threats that are capable of claiming real 
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losses”. Therefore, a similar oscillating position is adopted in the construction 
of this paper. The position taken here is that things do exist but that it is 
impossible for humans to perceive them accurately because of the 
imperfections of the human senses (Blaikie, 2007:15-16), the limitation of 
language (Woolgar, 1980) or that instruments are not yet available to measure 
them (Lewin, 1945); individuals therefore view the same objects or events but 
perceive them differently. This has been summarised by Weick (1988:307) in 
what he called an “enacted environment” as: “the existence of these objects is 
not questioned, but their significance, meaning and content is”. Weick’s words 
endure twenty years after this text was first published. Smith and Elliot (2006) 
included it (in Chapter 14) as one of their “key readings in crisis management”. 
METHODOLOGY 
The phenomena discussed in this paper emerged from the inductive research 
of risk governance. The research needs to be seen in terms of Scholarship of 
Application (Boyer, 1990); here the emphasis is on taking existing knowledge 
and examining how it may be applied in practice and then reflecting on what 
that exercise might say about the original knowledge. 
The research focuses on the body of existing knowledge pertaining to risk (in 
its widest sense). Literature from the widest range of disciplines associated 
with risk was reviewed. These included project management, operational risk 
management (encompassing Enterprise Risk Management), accident 
investigation and prevention, crisis management, resilience engineering, High 
Reliability Organisations, and that which relates to Normal Accident Theory. 
The research extracted from the literature and lists the phenomena cited by 
the authors as having been found in their research which have caused the 
unwanted occurrences. Over 250 phenomena were identified. A winnowing 
process took place that identified duplicated coding, overlaps between 
phenomena and finally they were grouped under related headings. Miller 
(1956) suggests that the human mind is only capable of relating 5 to 9 ideas at 
any one time (hence his title “the magical number 7 plus or minus 2”). 
Therefore the existing body of knowledge needed to be synthesised in order to 
produce a workable number of categories, while trying not to lose the richness 
of the full body of work. The aim was therefore to identify about 20 categories 
under which all of the existing knowledge could be placed. It was, however, 
accepted that even this may not provide practitioners with an appropriate 
portal through which to access the existing knowledge. Therefore I looked for a 
triptych of main headings under which to group the categories. 
The final triptych of headings arrived at was 1) “Failure to See”, 2) “Failure to 
Appreciate” and 3) “Failure to Act”. The genesis of the first heading, “Failure to 
See” came from the idea that “seeing is a way of not seeing” (Van de Ven and 
Poole, 1995) which is examined in more detail later in the paper. The heading 
was used to capture any phenomena relating to the receiving of warning 
signals. The genesis of the second heading, “Failure to Appreciate” was 
Vaughan’s (1996) reference to the idea of “Seat of Understanding”. The 
heading was used to capture any phenomena relating to comprehending the 
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value of warning signals. Finally the heading “Failure to Act” came from the 
repeated queries by authors as to why individuals, who had had a warning, 
had failed to prevent a disaster. The heading was used to capture any 
phenomena relating to the action stimulated by warning signals. Similar 
categorisation had also been used by Turner (1976b:391) where he wrote 
about “emergent dangers”; he said, ‘Another problem which recurs at many 
points in the three reports is that of a failure to see or to appreciate fully the 
magnitude of some emergent danger.’ Power (2004:44) also used similar 
categorisation; he said ‘And yet … an intensified concern for organisational 
process may also incubate risks of its own, not least the failure to see, imagine 
or act upon the ‘bigger picture’.’ So between them, the two authors have used 
failure to see, imagine, appreciate and act. I did not use the heading failure of 
imagination, not because the idea is not important (see Weick, 1989 and 
2005), but because phenomena that might have been placed under this 
heading seemed to fall more naturally into the debate about seeing warning 
signals or appreciating what they meant. 
The results of the induction process are described below. The paper describes 
each grouping and shows how they are clustered under each heading. The 
paper concludes each grouping with an abstraction of the ideas that are seen 
to be central. The 24 abstractions are offered as a distillation of the body of 
existing knowledge available to practice.  
PURSUIT OF FORESIGHT 
In this section I examine the construct “failure of foresight”. First I will look at 
Stark’s concept of foresight and then will look at the original paper produced 
by Turner (1976b) on the concept of “failure of foresight”. I will also trace the 
development of the concept and its application to the present time. As the 
literature on failure of foresight is limited, this research has also considered 
papers extolling the requirement for foresight. The purpose of this section is to 
establish the phenomena that is failing and the reasons why this might be the 
case.  
What is Foresight? 
In 1961, Stanley Stark set about describing the construct of “Executive 
Foresight”. Accepting that the paper is in some ways dated, its core ideas are 
still useful. Stark’s main point is that while events may be uncontrollable, due 
the variety of ways in which they may manifest themselves, their 
consequences, however, are not (1961:42). While what may cause the 
unwanted issue may be unforeseeable, their consequences are not (1961:37-
38).  He questions whether anything ‘that is logically possible is unforeseeable’ 
(1961:42). He quotes Fayol and Copeland when he says ‘planning is…the 
exercise of foresight’ and ‘to see, in this context, means both to assess the 
future and make provision for it’; this is, as we shall see later, also a definition 
of “resilience” (see Wildavsky, 1988:77). Stark adds that 'Management has no 
choice but to anticipate the future' but 'the ability to forecast is quite limited' 
(1961:32). He highlights the fact that 'man...tends to resemble the ostrich in 
that his preventive action is often more effective in quieting his fear than in 
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removing him from danger'; this is the problem of denial. Stark also recognises 
the issues of “seat of understanding” (1961:40) and “amoral calculation” 
(1961:42). His paper therefore provides a solid starting point for any 
discussion on the failure of foresight. 
Stark bases some of his work on a 1931 PhD dissertation by Patterson who 
describes “the ability of foresight”. This consisted of:  
(1) the ability in any situation to think of a large number of 
consequences, (2) the ability to judge among consequences as to their 
probability, (3) the ability to judge among consequences as to their 
importance, and (4) the ability to decide the best course of action to 
pursue on consideration of all the consequences likely to follow. 
(1961:35) 
As can be seen, central to foresight is the consideration of “consequences” as 
much as the events themselves. 
Stark debates what he calls “temporal foresight” and prediction (1961:36). 
Table 13 lists the essential differences as he sees them. Stark sees temporal 
foresight preceding prediction. The importance of these terms is that they 
provide a warning of the variety of overlapping terms used within the academic 
literature. As will be explained in a later section, Stark’s characterisation of 
temporal foresight embraces what is referred to elsewhere as resilience and 
prediction encompassing what is also referred to as anticipation. Enzer (1980) 
on the other hand uses the terms “foresight” and “farsight” where the former 
links to Stark’s “prediction” and the latter links to Stark’s “foresight”. In this 
paper I adopt Stark’s delineation of the terms and suggest that foresight 
should focus on “what could occur” as its constant reference point.  
Table 13 - Foresight v. Prediction 
Temporal foresight  Prediction 
plural issues (group of events) which could occur single isolated event which will occur 
logic is the only constraint judgement about reality 
logical possibilities subjective probabilities (strength of 
expectation) 
measured continuously measured discretely 
may be measured ante facto only post facto 
 
Finally Stark gives us (1961:35) two types of foresight. While foresight 
“requires the awareness of possible future events that should be taken into 
account in deciding on a present action”, he divides it further into perceptual 
and conceptual foresight. Perceptual foresight he describes as “the ability to 
explore visually possible courses of action...to select the most effective ones 
for getting solutions to detailed visual problems”. On the other hand he 
describes conceptual foresight as the ability “to envision a problem situation in 
such ways that needs or consequences are anticipated ... ability in any 
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situation to think of a large number of consequences”. Therefore, it can be 
seen that foresight, in itself, is not a simple phenomenon. 
Turner’s Construct 
The concept of “failure of foresight” is taken from Turner (1976b) and his 
related work on Disaster Incubation Theory (DIT). Turner (1976b:381) divides 
DIT into six stages, see Table 14, which he describes as “The sequence of 
events associated with failure of foresight”. This paper will concentrate on the 
first two stages as they are the ones where failure of foresight originates and 
are therefore most relevant to my discussions of risk discourse. In his 
commentary on Turner and Pidgeon (1997), Kippenberger (1999:10) 
acknowledged that Turner’s work was premised upon physical disaster but 
that “his findings are readily applicable to many non-physical crises” such as 
those caused by large scale frauds and other forms of malpractice. Therefore, 
while I do not assert that Turner’s work can be used to predict, it can be used 
as a framework around which one can conceptualise all types of risks.  
Table 14 - Stages of DIT 
Stage I - Notionally normal starting point: 
(a) Initial culturally accepted beliefs about the world and its hazards 
(b) Associated precautionary norms set out in laws, codes of practice, 
mores, and folkways. 
Stage II - Incubation period: the accumulation of an unnoticed set of events 
which are at odds with the accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms for 
their avoidance. 
Stage III - Precipitating event: forces itself to the attention and transforms 
general perceptions of Stage II. 
Stage IV - Onset: the immediate consequences of the collapse of cultural 
precautions become apparent. 
Stage V - Rescue and salvage — first stage adjustment: the immediate post 
collapse situation is recognized in ad hoc adjustments which permit the work 
of rescue and salvage to be started. 
Stage VI - Full cultural readjustment: an inquiry or assessment is carried 
out, and beliefs and precautionary norms are adjusted to fit the newly gained 
understanding of the world. 
 
Where the aim of foresight is taken to be “to foresee future unwanted events in 
order to take action seen, both before and after the identified event, as being 
appropriate”. This literature review traces the development of the concept and 
its application to the present time. A search of ProQuest (on 14 Nov 2010), 
using the search strings “failure of foresight” and “failures of foresight” only 
found 20 scholarly journals containing the phrase in the text or citations; in the 
end, this number “snowballed” to 39. They start with Enzer (1980), who was 
writing at about the same time as Turner, but in a different field. There appears 
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to have been little take-up of Turner’s idea until it was used by Vaughan where 
she used the term in her investigation of the Shuttle Challenger accident 
(1997:411). While she had also used the term previously (Vaughan, 
1996:231), it was not until her later work that the idea seems to have gained 
traction.  
Turner (1976b) described “failure of foresight” (a phrase that he acknowledged 
was borrowed from another – Wilensky) as:  
The collapse of precautions that had hitherto been regarded culturally 
as adequate … some large-scale disasters that are potentially 
foreseeable and potentially avoidable, and that, at the same time, are 
sufficiently unexpected and sufficiently disruptive to provoke a cultural 
reassessment of the artefacts and precautions available to prevent such 
occurrences. (1976b:380) 
However, Turner’s comments may have been of their time. He stated that: 
When a trawler is lost in Arctic fishing grounds, or when a wall collapses 
onto a firefighting team, there is much less comment than when an 
accident kills passengers on a suburban commuter train. (1976b:380) 
This may no longer be the case. There have been recent cases in the UK of 
the fire-service and the police being prosecuted under Health and Safety 
regulations, which have had a significant effect on the service provided. 
Examples of this are: 
“Boy drowned as police support officers 'stood by'”. The parents of a 
schoolboy who drowned in a pond have demanded to know why two 
police support officers did not try to save their son.2  
A volunteer coastguard who was nominated for an award for rescuing a 
schoolgirl from a cliff has resigned after a row over health and safety. 
Paul Waugh climbed down to Faye Harrison, 13, who was hanging on 
by her fingertips and about to fall 200ft...He did not wear safety 
equipment as it would have taken time to go back to his vehicle which 
was some distance away. (Waugh) climbed down and held on to her for 
30 minutes until she could be winched to safety. Mr Waugh was later 
told that he had broken rules. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency 
(MCA) said it was not looking for dead heroes.3 
Firefighters have been ordered to use "common sense" during 
emergencies after health and safety rules prevented them rescuing a 
mother who lay dying in a mine shaft for six hours.
 4 
                                            
2
“Boy drowned as police support officers 'stood by'” 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/sep/21/1 accessed 5 Nov 10. 
3
 “Cliff hero resigns in safety row”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/tees/7183017.stm 
accessed 6 Nov 10. 
4
 Scotsman Newspaper Report dated 13 Mar 10: http://news.scotsman.com/news/Firefighters-
told-to-39use-common.6149249.jp accessed 5 Nov 10. 
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The 7/7 inquest heard how the transport police held back London 
underground staff from responding to the incident “and (how) nobody 
was sent to the track for at least 25 minutes” because of the potential 
danger to the rescuers.5  
This would suggest that such incidents now do cause the ‘cultural 
reassessment of the artefacts and precautions’ of which Turner had previously 
spoken. Therefore, there must be questions raised over the exclusions Turner 
articulated. 
In accounting for failures of foresight, undesirable events known about 
in advance but which were unavoidable with the resources available 
can be disregarded. In addition, little time need be spent on 
catastrophes that were completely unpredictable. Neither of these 
categories present problems of explanation. In the former case, 
because of lack of resources, no action was possible. In the latter, no 
action could have been taken because of a total lack of information or 
intelligence. (1976b:380) 
The case for the first exclusion needs to be reviewed because of the concept 
of “production pressure” (Perrow, 1999, first published in 1984) as a source of 
the unwanted occurrence. Production pressure is said to be an inappropriate 
balance between the drive for benefits delivery and the resources (including 
both time and money) allocated to the task resulting in the unwanted, both in 
terms of outcomes (accidents, disasters or crises) or process (“storming” – see 
Radell, 2006). Colligan and Murphy (1979:85) describe how workers are put 
under 'considerable pressure to increase production.’ This concept is also 
used by, amongst others, Perrow in his work on Normal Accidents, by Sagan 
(1993) on how ‘production pressures on lower-level personnel can … lead to 
unauthorised or unapproved activity’ and by Vaughan (1996) in her 
commentary ‘the historically accepted explanation of the Challenger launch 
decision: production pressure and managerial wrongdoing’. The issue of 
whether the “appropriate” resource could have been made available by 
reprioritisation, is a common theme of accident inquiry reports. Therefore, 
while Turner excluded production pressure, in the current context, failures due 
to an inappropriate allocation of resources are now likely to be labelled a 
failure of foresight. 
In the case of the second exclusion, there are questions over what, if anything, 
might currently be accepted to be “completely unpredictable”. Reports from 
accident inquiries all seem to be able to identify a root cause and they always 
seem to be able to show that warning signs were available but, for some 
reason, were missed. Therefore the scope of failure of foresight needs to be 
expanded to include all potential events, no matter what their source or their 
predictability. 
This widening of the Failure of Foresight concept has already happened 
elsewhere. Vaughan (1997:85) citing Turner states: ‘"failure of foresight": long 
incubation periods typified by signals of potential danger that were either 
                                            
5
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11629992 accessed 5 Nov 10. 
 Chapter 5   103 
 
ignored or misinterpreted.’ She does not acknowledge any of Turner’s original 
nuances. 
Additional Commentary 
Of the 39 articles (found through ProQuest), four were deemed not to have 
added value to this debate because, while they used the term, they did not 
come from the specified field of literature and did not reference Turner’s work. 
Enzer (1980), who was writing at about the same time as Turner, both clarifies 
and confuses the issue.  
In his discussion of failure of foresight in US energy policy, Enzer talks 
of ‘a failure of foresight, not because current conditions could not be 
anticipated, but because the US did not act upon available foresight’ 
(1980:12) and the need ‘to alert a sleeping nation to the significance of 
the emerging condition’ and the need to consider the full range of long-
term consequences (1980:14). He explains that ‘Incorrect forecasts are 
the result of two possible errors: either surprising changes occurred, or 
the system did not behave in the manner anticipated by the forecaster. 
Surprises come from the occurrence of developments, which were not 
considered likely’ (1980:13). He goes on to say, the ‘futurists consider it 
more important to “study” the future than to “forecast” it’ (1980:15). 
Finally, he says that ‘Better handling of uncertainty is the key to 
developing a farsighted posture’ and that there is an ‘essential 
difference between foresight…and farsight’. To Enzer foresight is ‘the 
predictive activity experts engage in when they indicate the most likely 
future and farsight (is) the understanding of how alternative conditions 
might develop in the future and how conditions can be changed’ 
(1980:16). We see the essential difference being whether those 
involved keep an open mind to emergent trends, what Enzer calls 
farsight, but what we see as being an essential part of foresight. Enzer’s 
work is excluded from future consideration because he is discussing 
scientific prediction of outcomes and consequences and the farsight 
necessary to see what might change. This is a different phenomenon to 
the foresight being examined in this paper, which is concerned with 
logical connections rather than scientifically understood connections. 
Further papers were excluded as, although they were from the appropriate 
field of literature and did reference Turner’s work in some way, they did no 
more than that. Locke and Golden-Biddle (1997:1045) do however helpfully 
remind us that ‘The central difficulty ... lies in discovering which ... problems 
facing an organization are prudent to ignore and which should be attended to’. 
Some articles identified “failure of foresight” as a generic problem and 
postulated that their idea was relevant to alleviating the problem (such as: 
identifying the relevant stakeholder (Bosher et al., 2007), a ‘better use of data’ 
(Sutcliffe, 2005) and encouraging the use of fresh perspectives (Vaughan, 
1997), but did not address failure of foresight directly. In her look at ‘the dark 
side of organisations”, Vaughan (1999) does however bring to a wider 
audience Turner’s point that ‘cultural beliefs contributed to “failures of 
foresight”, a history of discrepant events that were ignored or misinterpreted. 
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Prior to accidents, decision-makers saw “ill-structured” problems that 
afterwards became “well-structured”’. This should provide a suitable warning 
about some of the issues of trying to understand the problems of foresight by 
using hindsight. 
The remaining articles do specifically consider failure of foresight. Taking their 
contributions chronologically:  
Grabowksi and Roberts (1997) accepted Turner’s finding ‘that many 
disasters had long incubation periods characterized by a number of 
discrepant events signaling danger. These discrepant events were 
overlooked or misinterpreted during the incubation period, accumulating 
unnoticed’ (1997:155). Their recommendations were ‘Strong safety 
cultures help keep issues above ground, thus reducing the possibility of 
long incubation periods for unseen issues. Oversight, checks and 
balances, and strong cultural norms are organizational protections and 
buffers that reinforce an organization’s goals. They can mitigate risk by 
assuring that errors are caught’ (1997:157). 
After having collaborated with Turner, Pidgeon collaborated with 
O’Leary (Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000) to examine some more of the 
preconditions necessary for disasters to occur. They emphasise that (1) 
Critical errors remain latent, or misunderstood, because of wrong 
assumptions about their significance. (2) Dangerous preconditions may 
also go unnoticed because of the inherent difficulties of handling 
information in ill-structured and constantly changing situations. (3) 
Uncertainty also arises about how to deal with formal violations of 
regulations and (4) that when clear-cut warnings do arise, the outcomes 
are often worse than they might have been because those involved will 
initially minimise the danger, deny it or delay taking preventative action. 
They conclude that the barriers to preventing these failures of foresight 
are ‘information difficulties and organizational politics’. 
Weir (2002:306) asks the question why 'as senior managers...we seem 
(un)able to confront our role in the failure of foresight.' His answer is 
'There are a number of reasons ... political, academic, administrative/ 
managerial and philosophical.' He sees the political cause being at both 
the macro and micro levels. He sees part of the issue being that 
accidents are a normal occurrence and therefore our natural reluctance 
to accept that we have no control over such events is a state of denial; 
this, in turn leads to the difficultly "in speaking truth to power". Weir 
(2002:306) sees the problems that academia lacks ‘professional weight' 
for 'there is no Nobel Prize for Disaster Studies'. He accuses academics 
of 'prefer(ring) certainty about the relatively secure but unimportant' 
which leads to 'a failure of academic relevance'. He accuses managers 
and communities of 'believing that we have mastered technology' 
(2002:306) and so 'pay lip-service to the notion of "normal accidents" 
without being able to accept that the very normality of accidents is 
evidence that their occurrence can illuminate the deficiencies in our 
methods of normal operation.' The denial is seen as a philosophical 
need to see flaws in external issues rather than within ourselves. Weir’s 
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emphasis therefore is on learning and communication. He asks 
(2002:304) 'Why are we unable to learn the lessons of failure even 
when they are simple?' This begs the question as to what he means by 
the label "learn"; for one has to question whether organisational 
learning is ever "simple". 
Chapman (2005) has advocated a proactive stance that included ‘a 
continuous process of monitoring all identified hazards; predicting risk 
scenarios using a variety of techniques; and using organisational 
learning to profit from past mistakes. Proactive risk assessment is an 
answer to two habitual shortcomings, a failure of foresight (Toft and 
Reynolds, (2005, first published in 1994) and a failure to learn (Weir, 
2002)’, (Chapman, 2005:350). ‘The paper finds that to progress, we 
need two things:[1] better conceptual models and frameworks that 
reveal complexity and [2] make systems more transparent and more 
satisfactory approaches to risk management’ (Chapman, 2005:343). 
Choo asks the question ‘Can organizational disasters be foreseen?’ to 
which he answers ‘yes’. He relates this to the concept of “failure of 
foresight” (2008:34). Choo ‘identifies three types of information 
impairments that could lead to organizational disasters: epistemic blind 
spots, risk denial, and structural impediment. It examines common 
information and decision practices that make it hard for organizations to 
see and deal with warning signals. … (and) suggests what individuals, 
groups, and organizations can do to raise their information vigilance’. 
Adding to his previous work on failure of foresight, Woods (2009:498) 
sees ‘a few patterns emerge: (a) establishing foresight encompasses 
extremely difficult forms of cognitive work and is an unstable process, 
given pressures on or from an organization’s management, (b) the 
difficulties arise from basic dynamic and cyclic patterns in how adaptive 
systems behave, (c) emerging measures of how and where a system is 
brittle or resilient provide a critical resource for developing and 
sustaining foresight.’ He concludes (2009:501) that ‘Once information 
about how and where an organization is resilient and brittle can be 
generated and tracked over time, it can be used to supply the missing 
control feedback signal for proactive’ management. He goes on 
‘Organizations can use this control signal to assess how resilience is 
changing: are buffers being depleted? Are margins becoming more 
precarious? Are processes becoming more rigid? Are squeezes 
becoming tighter?’ The difficulty, at my level of analysis, for those 
involved in the risk discourse, is whether these questions are 
appropriate at the level at which they operate within the organisation. 
In their examination of firefighters, Barton and Sutcliffe commented that 
‘we often get so engrossed in what we’re doing we don’t notice that 
things have changed, or we ignore signals suggesting we should alter 
our course (2010:70)’. They went on to connect this to failure of 
foresight. They said ‘we had expected it was caused by firefighters 
having missed critical cues for changing their actions. Our reasoning 
came from a large body of research on organizational crises suggesting 
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that many disasters result from failures of foresight — from the 
accumulation of unnoticed sets of events’ (2010:72). They conclude that 
(1) When engrossed in an action, we tend not to notice small problems 
that may grow into large ones. (2) To overcome dysfunctional 
momentum, we have to be interrupted or create an interruption 
ourselves. (3) Practice ‘‘situated humility.” As no one person can solve 
the problem alone, diverse input is seen to be essential. 
This notion of failure of foresight through the incubation period has 
come to be one of the distinguishing features of scholarship on the 
critical pre-crisis phase. Finally Jaques (2010) concludes that ‘While 
crisis preparedness and prevention have become established as 
integral parts of organizational crisis management, there is no 
agreement on taxonomy and no accepted optimal process to formalize 
the methodology to deliver effective strategies.’ As Jaques says, the 
label ‘incubation period’ is used far more often than the label “foresight 
of failure” (ProQuest on 16 Nov 10 provided 1137 texts in scholarly 
journals of the label “incubation period”). However the underlying issues 
remain the same; why do clues, which are so clear after a failure, get 
overlooked before them? 
Following up on the point made about the label “incubation period”, in addition 
to the literature specifically looking at the issue labelled “failure of foresight”, 
consideration needs to be given to general literature of management failure, 
as well as that orientated towards crisis management, accident investigation or 
high reliability organisations. While this may not use the label “failure of 
foresight”, the theme behind this work is the same. There is an extensive 
literature that points to management inadequacies and shortcomings. Some 
examples of this are: the idea of “prodromes” introduced by Fink (2000, first 
published in 1986), which comes from the Greek for “running before” and looks 
at the precursors to crises/ disasters (also used by Jaques, 2010); accident 
investigation (and the like which looks to identify warning signs in order to 
prevent similar occurrences (see Reason,1990 and 1997; Toft and Reynolds, 
2005); crisis management (Smith and Elliot, 2006); resilience engineering 
(Hollnagel et al., 2006) which looks to develop ways of making systems more 
robust by learning from the past; and finally, the theme concerning “failure to 
learn” from past experience (Elliot et al., 2000 or Schobel and Manzey, 2011). 
There is also a link to the concept of Mindfulness (for an example see Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2007). Discussions of the causes of organisational failure take 
many forms. However, as Elliot (2006) acknowledges, the work of how to 
apply these lessons is much more limited. This paper looks to take a small, 
tentative step on that path. 
But is accurate “foresight” possible? There is a body of work (both popular and 
academic; see Taleb (2007) who represents the former and McDermott (1996) 
the latter) which questions whether accurate foresight or predictions are 
possible. While, in terms of absolute certainty they may be correct, this debate 
seems to reflect the nature of the discussion between advocates of Normal 
Accidents and High Reliability. As discussed later, both agree that accidents 
will happen. While the debate over mechanisms of failure is likely to remain for 
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some time, few would argue that in our flawed and complex world, not all 
accidents can be prevented, but some might. The perspective this paper takes 
is therefore, if some accidents are preventable or their effects might have been 
foreseen and therefore handled more effectively, why might their warning 
signs be missed? These missed warnings constitute a failure of foresight.  
Work on strategic foresight, as can be found in journals such as Foresight or in 
works such as the papers edited by Tsoukas and Shepherd (2004) were 
excluded because their focus is on strategic choice, rather than jeopardy 
prevention. They examine aspects of making the optimal choice, rather than 
the consequences of making the “wrong” choice. While this body of work has 
some interesting things to say about thinking about the future, it does not 
address the issue of failure of foresight per se.  
In summary, foresight is not about predicting the future, it concerns logical 
plausibility. However, for practitioners the scope is ever expanding. As 
accident inquiries seek to allocate blame based on more tenuous causal 
linkages, consideration may need to be given to what Weick has labelled 
“failure of imagination” (2005); i.e. what “might happen” even when people 
have no idea beforehand how it may happen. Foresight might be seen to be 
focused on the process by which organisations monitor and evaluate that 
which is changing around them so that they might react appropriately. While 
some question whether accurate foresight is possible, it is in the nature of 
mankind to try. While there are many courses of action open to those who try, 
this research focused on the potential barriers to acting appropriately whereby 
clues may go unseen or unappreciated. Despite issues of dysfunctional 
momentum and the extremely difficult cognitive work required to forestall 
failure, there being no agreement on taxonomy, the need for better conceptual 
models, and processes to make systems more transparent, some authors 
provide recommendations of how this might be achieved. The work suggests 
that a mind open to emergent trends, a process that continuously monitors all 
identified hazards, the expectation of instability of processes, and the need for 
emerging measures of how and where the system may become brittle, might 
help. It reminds us that we do not necessarily notice as things change despite, 
or because of, oversight, checks and balances, and strong cultural norms. It 
suggests that there may be issues around organisational learning and 
communication, involving information difficulties/impairments exacerbated by 
organisational politics. Research also recommends the better use of data and 
the involvement of relevant stakeholders in order to solicit fresh perspectives. 
The picture created is, as yet, piecemeal; it is not anywhere near 
comprehensive. In the next section I look at what else might be included in 
such discussion. 
MISSING THE CLUES 
There is a tendency of those who have had the advantage of hindsight to label 
those not so fortunate as “sloppy” (Turner, 1994), as ‘banal examples of 
organisational elites not trying very hard' (Perrow, 1994:218) or “complacency” 
(Hopkins, 2001:70). While these terms may be carefully defined in the various 
papers, the impression created is one where the responsible manager is seen 
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to be inadequate and, if they had just applied themselves a bit more, the 
problem would have been identified and the accident/ disaster prevented. 
While this may be unfair to those involved, there is also a more important 
issue. Cook and Woods (2006) talk of “Distancing through differencing”. Here 
people distance (disassociate) themselves from the situation by noticing the 
differences rather than similarities. If managers involved in accidents or other 
crises are labelled “sloppy” etc., those who have yet to be involved will 
distance themselves from such events because they do not see themselves in 
that way. If foresight is to be available to them, they have to be open to the 
possibility that the worst might happen to them and their organisation. 
Therefore, the premise underlying this paper is why might, clever, dynamic, 
and capable people be induced to miss relevant clues or make a flawed 
decision necessary to produce a significant failure of foresight?  
In this section of the paper, I look at the literature for clues as to what might 
explain the mental processes which contribute to the acceptance or rejection 
of potential signals of failure. The purpose of this review is to collate some of 
the significant concepts (factors) from the wide body of research related to 
failure of foresight and how they may affect the development of the mental 
models necessary to conceptualise the issues they face. However (and a 
significant limitation), there is not the room in this paper to provide a full 
description of all the issues identified, let alone provide an explanation of the 
relationship and overlaps between the various phenomena. This must 
therefore be the subject of a separate paper. The focus of this paper is to 
provide an initial review of the literature in order to provide preliminary shape 
to the debate on failure of foresight. 
For clarity, the factors identified are grouped into three areas: (1) failure to see 
the signals, (2) failure to appreciate the significance of signals and (3) failure to 
act appropriately. This is based on a model where individuals fail to perceive 
or recognise warnings or assess and respond adequately (Turner, 1976b:391). 
The concept of mindfulness has been used to provide additional definition to 
this description. Failure to see the signals would embrace the mindful ideas of 
“preoccupation with failure” and “sensitivity to operations” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007:9 and 12 respectively). Failure to appreciate the significance of signals 
would also embrace “reluctance to simplify” and “deference to expertise” 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007:10 and 15 respectively). Failure to act would 
embrace “Commitment to resilience” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007:14). These 
relationships will be described in more detail below. The key assessment 
criteria when looking at each concept in the literature is the idea of foresight/ 
hindsight. It is whether the concept can be invoked before the event, or are the 
associated “start rules” so non-specific that they can only be applied in 
hindsight. It should also be noted that the literature does not provide a clean 
separation between the three issues and so descriptions become circular and 
there is overlap between sections as theories merge. 
Failure to See the Signals 
I start by looking at the concept of failure to see the signals. Under this 
heading I look at (1) mindfulness, (2) the inconceivable, (3) barriers to seeing, 
 Chapter 5   109 
 
(4) denial, (5) context, (6) categorisation of signals, (7) the learning of lessons, 
(8) data sources and communication, and (9) recognising themselves as an 
“error-inducing” organisation. 
Within mindfulness, Weick and Sutcliffe talk of “preoccupation with failure” and 
“sensitivity to operations”. Under “preoccupation with failure” (2007:9) they 
advocate the framing of organisational activity within a pessimistic (negative) 
mindset: i.e. that every lapse or near miss should be perceived as a forerunner 
to impending disaster. The organisation should encourage the reporting of 
errors and that ‘weak signals of failure required a stronger response’. The 
difficult operational or strategic question then becomes, ‘which signals can be 
safely ignored?’ Sensitivity to operations reminds organisations to stay 
‘attentive to the front line, where the real work gets done’ (2007:12). While the 
temptation for any board is, in line with a well-used business mantra, “to stay 
focused on the core business” (Peters and Waterman, 2004); Minns’ (2010:22) 
‘findings confirm that a common approach is to focus on core business’. 
Jaques however provides an example of why this focus may lead to a failure to 
see warning signs. He cites the case of the ‘Dow Corning breast implant 
controversy…(where) a non-core market which represented a miniscule 
element of the company’s total sales … (drove) a $5billion dollar corporation 
into voluntary bankruptcy’ (Jaques, 2010:475-476). The question then 
becomes, where should top executives be looking for signals of potential 
failure? The answer “everywhere” may be sound in theory but is impractical. In 
practice executives need to be clear about their rules for inclusion and 
exclusion and the risk associated with their delineation. 
The debate about the validity of considering the inconceivable would seem to 
lead directly back to the debate between Perrow’s (1999) Normal Accident 
Theory and those who support the concept of the High Reliability Organisation 
as an alternative. While the advocates for each seem to see these as 
alternatives, in my reading of this body of work I see them, on this subject at 
least, as being complementary. I read Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory as a 
warning that as accidents are inevitable, one should think twice (or more) 
about the potential consequences before using high risk technology. While 
these accidents can happen at any time, (both an accident with a 1:100 
calculated probability and a 1:10,000,000 calculated probability might still 
happen tomorrow, with the latter being more likely to have happened within 10 
years). This does not however mean that there is no point in 1) trying to put off 
the inevitable or 2) preparing for such eventualities. In doing so, one must 
understand that, no matter how many precautions are taken, it is not possible 
to ensure that such an event will not occur. Therefore, the question is, if you 
use the technology, can you live with the potential consequences? (In a 
private email of 1 Nov 2010, Professor Perrow kindly confirmed that this 
reading correctly represented his views). Therefore, it can be concluded that 
Normal Accident Theory supports the contention that, even if current risk 
management practices label an event “highly improbable”, which therefore 
may be taken as being inconceivable, where these events have the potential 
to produce significant damage or harm, they should not be subsequently 
sidelined or ignored, as seems to be the current practice. 
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But what of the High Reliability school of thought? While Perrow seemed to 
focus on outcomes, I read the High Reliability theorists as concentrating on the 
processes necessary to ensure high reliability, i.e. how to turn the calculated 
probability of 1:100 to one of 1:10,000,000 or greater. Experience, however, 
shows that even when the calculated probability is very high, adverse events 
can still happen. For example, Perrow (1999:139) reports that a specific event 
of a DC10 aircraft had a calculated probability of less than one in a billion, yet 
the problem occurred 4 times in 4 years. The Haddon-Cave (2009:21) report 
acknowledged that the Royal Air Force’s Nimrod aircraft had flown for 400,000 
hours ‘with only four accidents recorded resulting in the loss of an aircraft’ 
(emphasis added). With the eight barriers to failure that had been designed 
into the drilling operation on BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico, 
the blow out that occurred in April 2010 may well have appeared to them to be 
inconceivable. While, it might be argued that these were not High Reliability 
Organisations, Le Porte (1994:207) does not talk of High Reliability 
Organisations being error-free. Instead he talks of ‘examining the conditions 
which seem substantially to reduce the incidence of regular accidents’. He 
goes on to say (1994:209) ‘we accept … that systems cannot be designed and 
operated in ways that can guarantee the avoidance of any failures … it is folly 
to suppose … that one can expect to design systems and operate them in 
failure-free modes for extended periods.”  Roberts points out that High 
Reliability can be fragile within an organisation (Bourrier, 2005:95): ‘We should 
not suppose that because an organization or an industry is highly reliable at 
time one it will be highly reliable at time two. Reliability enhancement requires 
constant attention, is expensive, and is very fragile.’ Therefore, neither Normal 
Accident Theory nor High Reliability literature supports the notion that 
occurrences perceived as being inconceivable, can or should be ignored. This 
now raises the question as to whether that which is “inconceivable” may 
contribute to “failure of foresight”.  
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007:10) recommend a reluctance to simplify as part of 
mindfulness because, for organisations, ‘the world they face is complex, 
unstable, unknowable and unpredictable’. Quoting an editorial in the New 
Yorker, Slovic, (2000:198) described ‘fail-safe systems failing’ as the 
‘unforeseeable … the whispering omen of a hovering future’. Standard risk 
management procedures use heat maps or matrices to help evaluate 
probability and consequence. The logic goes that those with the greatest 
probability and the highest consequences are given priority. Closely linked is 
the construct of “acceptable risk” as described, for example, by Heimann 
(1997) or Fischhoff et al. (1981). There is, however, limited debate about how 
to integrate the concept of acceptability and that of conceivability, leaving the 
practitioners to find their own solutions; for example, when Radell in Smith and 
Elliot (2006:296) talks of ‘keeping storming within the boundaries of acceptable 
risk’, this is more easily judged in hindsight than it is calculated in foresight. In 
Chapter 4, I argued that the use of risk indicators should be focused on 
envisaging the “inconceivable”, including the necessity to be ready for the 
inconceivable at the organisational level (Farjoun, 2010:210), at the 
operational level (Weick, 2010:540), and at the individual level (Cullen, 
2001:70) as the inconceivable can and does still occur. The question for the 
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executive is therefore, “of those issues that we have labelled so 
improbable as to be “inconceivable”, which still have such potentially 
serious consequences (the unacceptable) that we must stay mindful of 
them?” 
The barriers to recognising what one sees is a fundamental issue in respect of 
failure of foresight. These barriers might be created within the individual or the 
organisation. An individual’s perception of risk also provides reasons why 
signals may be missed. There are many texts which investigate risk perception 
(such as Slovic, 2000) and so the argument will not be repeated here. Three 
aspects are, however, highlighted here: personal association, timeframe and 
tangibility. That which affects a person directly is seen to be privileged over 
that which affects others, the short-term was privileged over the long-term and 
the tangible privileged over the intangible. Adams (2007) provides a taxonomy 
which groups risks as ranging from the tangible, through those visible through 
science, to the virtual; Reason (1990:12-13) categorises errors as ranging 
from behavioural and the contextual to the conceptual. Both of these 
categorisations can be seen to range from the tangible to the abstract (the 
more ambiguous). Within organisations, these barriers are both cultural and 
managerial. Vaughan (1996:394) points out that ‘Aspects of organisational life 
… created a way of seeing that was simultaneously a way of not seeing 
hazards.’ The idea that 'seeing is a way of not seeing' is used by Perrow 
(2007:74), Van de Ven and Poole (1995:510) cites Poggie, Blockley (1998:78) 
cites Turner, Manning (1999:285) attributes the idea to Burke, and both Cox et 
al (2006:1125) and Nævestad (2008) both cite Vaughan. Woods in Starbuck 
and Farjoun (2005:294) state ‘This pattern of seeing the details but being 
unable to recognise the big picture is commonplace in accidents.’ Slovic 
(2000:190) asserts ‘that people, acting within social organisations, downplay 
certain risks and emphasise others as a means of maintaining the viability of 
the organisation’. Smith (2004:357) puts the point slightly differently when he 
talks of ‘experience as an inhibitor’; Klein et al (2005:22) agree that 
‘Experience can sometimes interfere with problem detection’. The final 
example I use is Pidgeon (1998:100) who explains how cultures may 
desensitise our perceptions and thus create ‘blind spots’. Managerial blind 
spots are created by phenomena such as the “Fallacy of complete reporting” 
(Westrum1982:391) and “structure secrecy” (Vaughan, 1996:242). Anomalous 
events, warning signals and other issues that fall outside the normal cultural 
lens are readily neglected. While a number of mechanisms may create a 
cultural blindness to risk, the important issue is that this blindness exists. 
Therefore, executive teams need to make themselves aware of the 
personal and organisational filters that might inhibit their seeing 
warnings available to them. 
Linked to the previous issues is one of denial. This subject has been raised by 
many of those writing in the context of failure of foresight. The symptoms of 
denial can be seen in what has been called “myth management” and “fantasy 
documents”. Vaughan (1996:212) uses the term “myth management” to 
describe obtaining ‘legitimacy (and thus resources) by projecting and living up 
to a cultural image’. These myths can be perpetuated by what Clarke and 
Perrow (1996) called “fantasy documents”. These are plans that ‘are neither 
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wholly believed nor disbelieved…(they) cover extremely improbable events. 
They are tested against reality only rarely…(they) are likely to draw from a 
quite unrealistic view or model of organisations’. For those engaged in risk 
discourse, these phenomena should alert them to the potential gap between 
how the executives view their organisations and what really exists. Executives 
should therefore be concerned to ensure that “fantasies” do not enter into their 
systems. They should therefore need to assess whether their plans and 
policies, which are a product of their bureaucratic process, are likely to 
withstand ‘an abrupt and brutal audit’ (Lagadec, 1993:54) which would 
become very clear in hindsight. 
Context is an important consideration for failure of foresight. The context adds 
complexity. Lagadec (1993:20) suggests that ‘Geographic, cognitive, historical, 
political, cultural and symbolic factors all shape events’. Reason (1997:93) 
explains how apparently simple problems have a multiplicity of alternatives. 
His example is of a bolt with 8 nuts labelled “A” to “H”; Reason points out that 
there is one way to assemble them correctly and over 40,000 ways (factor 8) 
to get it wrong. This points to the fact that while performance indicators (such 
as “profit”) may be able to be relatively static, the significant unwanted 
occurrence may, in this example, be one of 40,000 issues; when NASA lost 
the Shuttle Columbia, it was not that they were unaware of the problem with 
the heat resistant tiles but that it was but one of 4,222 issues at that time 
classified as critical (Dunbar and Garud, 2005:209). For foresight, the 
relevance is that it is an issue of assessing the workload of any part of any 
system. For hindsight, this raises questions of the validity of any comments 
about managerial competence if the factor or workload is not considered. With 
so many potential problems arising from so many potential sources, 
executives cannot expect to cover them all. They can, however, expect to be 
questioned on why they decided what they did. Therefore, executives need to 
establish what risks are “acceptable” to them and why, and then test 
their reasoning to ensure that it is robust and not a “fantasy”. 
Warning signals may come in many different forms and be of different 
strengths. A number of writers have developed labels for signals of risk. The 
terms are described in Table 15. Executives need to be aware of the various 
forms if they are to be able to identify each as they appear. These categories 
can be used as part of the foresight process. As part of any risk discourse, 
executives need to be aware of the incoming data and need to be able to 
assess it against signals types in order to understand its relevance (both 
positive or negative) and be able to justify its inclusion or exclusion from 
the debate. 
Table 15 - Signal Types 
Type of Signal Description of Signal Source 
Strong Signal irrefutable evidence able to alter an organisational 
paradigm 
“signal, too strong to explain away, refute , or deny.” 
“a signal that ... overturned the scientific paradigm.” 
Vaughan, 
1996:364, 
379. 
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Routine Signals “an anomaly that occurs in a predictable manner”  
“these that occur frequently...even when acknowledged to 
be inherently serious, loses some of its seriousness as 
similar events occur in sequence and methods of assessing 
and responding to them stabilize.” 
Vaughan, 
1996:246  
Vaughan, 
1997:87 
Loss of salience  Warnings signs lose their potency: 
as a result of research which “Normalises Deviance”. 
These facts were known in the company, and by hindsight 
they are easy to understand as indicators that process 
safety was seriously at risk. Nevertheless, this was not 
leading to appropriate action. Clearly the meaning of these 
events was not fully understood 
Vaughan, 
1996:244, 
397 
 
Zwetsloot, 
2009:498 
Weak Signals “warning signals very close to the normal background 
noise” 
“suspected (but un-proven) correlation”, “information is 
informal and/ or ambiguous”  
one that was unclear, or one that, after analysis, seemed 
such an improbable event that working engineers believed 
there was little probability of it recurring 
Lagadec, 
1993:47 
Vaughan, 
1996:245, 
262, 355 
Vaughan, 
1997:87 
Mixed Signals “Signals of potential danger were  followed by signals that 
all was well, reinforcing the belief in acceptable risk”  
Vaughan, 
1996:245-
263 
Messy Signals “ambiguity of information. Ambiguity means that the same 
information has multiple (and sometimes conflicting) 
meanings. Environments and situations that are 
unpredictable and rapidly changing provide unclear, messy 
signals, so that people can draw different yet equally 
plausible conclusions from observing the same ‘objective’ 
data.” 
Sutcliffe, 
2005:421 
Decoy Signals The investigation revealed that the entire industry’s 
attention was drawn towards mining safety and that tip 
safety was hardly on the agenda. Mining safety worked as a 
“decoy problem”, obscuring the more serious problems 
looming in the background (Turner, 1978).  
“decoy problems” that draw attention away from more 
serious problems elsewhere. 
Rijpma, 
1997:21  
 
Turner and 
Pigeon, 
1997:42 
Missing Signals where organisations’ barriers prevent salient information 
being added to the conversation. 
Vaughan, 
1996:349, 
356,358,35
9 
Silent Evidence “people in other locations had potentially useful information 
and opinions that they did not enter into the conversation.”  
“Organisations work very hard at silencing people”. 
Vaughan, 
1997:93  
Kerfoot, 
2003:294   
Misinterpreted 
Signals 
mean one thing; understood to mean the reverse Vaughan, 
1996:315 
True but Useless Often a lack of information drives those affected to fill the Lagadec, 
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information void…with inexact or irrelevant data seized at random. 
Where data are collected because they are available, not 
because they are relevant. 
1993:81 
Grint, 
2008:14 
 
Having raised earlier the construct of “distancing through differencing” (where 
individuals fail to see the similarities between their own position and that 
experienced by others and therefore fail to see the lessons to be learnt), this 
phenomenon is now linked to benchmarking (learning from the experience of 
others). The lessons may come from external organisations, from near misses 
or from accidents. In addition, there are the “forgotten lessons”; these can be 
seen to be closely related to signals that have “lost saliency”. The mechanism 
might be such factors as “drift” which is discussed later. Other mechanisms 
that might cause lessons to be missed are “management distancing” and 
“inattentional blindness”. Reason (1998:296) explains “management 
distancing”. He says 'The human controllers of … systems have become 
remote from the processes they manipulate and, in many cases, from the 
hazards that potentially endanger their operations. Both this distancing effect 
and the rarity of bad events make it very easy to not be afraid, as evident at 
the Chernobyl nuclear power station’. The term “inattentional blindness” was 
coined by Mack and Rock (1998) to describe the visual perception of 
unexpected objects. They concluded that, where an occurrence is unexpected, 
observers fail to notice it even when the occurrence is fully visible. This is 
because the observers’ attention is already engaged on other aspects of what 
is in front of them. (The link to the phenomenon of “decoy signals” may be 
noted.) The question for the executive is therefore whether they are 
seeing all the lessons that are available to them and whether they 
understand, and therefore take into account, factors that might be 
working against them in this regard. 
The theme of this section has been the examination of data sources and 
communication. This is not a simple problem. For example: 
The facts in this case ‘were known in the company, and by hindsight 
they are easy to understand as indicators that process safety was 
seriously at risk. Nevertheless, this was not leading to appropriate 
action. Clearly the meaning of these events was not fully understood by 
many company people, especially the higher managers who have the 
primary responsibility for safety (Zwetsloot, 2009:496). 
Whether the issue is that the executives think they know more than they do 
know (Westrum’s (1982) fallacies of “centrality” and “incomplete reporting”) or 
that staff are reluctant to “speak truth unto power” (the “Unrocked boat”, 
Reason 1997:6); taboo data (Kutsch and Hall, 2010:247), or flaws in internal 
reporting systems or a failure of auditing or regulatory bodies, the problem 
often comes down to one labelled as a “failure of communications”. 
Communications are often cited as being a general issue but the question 
becomes whether one can judge, at the time, whether what your organisation 
is doing is good enough. The concern is that this can only be judged in 
hindsight. The constant question for an executive is therefore whether the 
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right information is getting to the right people within the right timeframe 
and how they would know if it was not before it was too late. 
Throughout his book of Normal Accidents, Perrow (1999) points to factors that 
may indicate an “error-inducing organisation”; the relevant characteristics are 
set out in Table 16. Woods (2005:296) used Hollnagel’s (1993) ‘five classic 
patterns ... seen in other accidents and research results’ as the basis for his 
analysis. Hollnagel’s factors are: (1) a drift towards failure as defences eroded 
in the face of production pressure, (2) taking past success as reason to be 
confident, (3) fragmented problem-solving clouds the big picture, (4) not 
revising assessment as new evidence accumulates, and (5) breakdowns at 
organisational boundaries. Woods (2009:499), in the case of NASA, cites 
‘insufficient time to reflect on unintended consequences of day-to-day 
decisions, insufficient time and workforce available to provide the levels of 
checks and balances normally found, breakdowns in inter-group 
communications, too much emphasis on cost and schedule reduction’. While 
others may add to this list, together these authors provide a rich picture of 
factors, which those taking part in risk discourse may use in order to generate 
foresight about their organisation. 
Table 16 - Error Inducing Organisations 
Page Factor 
p.176 authoritarian organisational structure [Centralisation of power] 
p.367 group and power interests 
p.370 latency period may be longer than any decision-maker's career' 
p.176 
and 
p.230 
ambiguous cognitive model; that enables an inaccurate mental 
model to be created 
p.176 dysfunctional systems/ processes 
p.246-
247 
“forced errors” – [“do wrong or be sacked”] 
p.187 (“prescribed”) behaviour is hard to enforce 
p.189 a system that does not breed cooperation 
p.176 economic pressure to perform [“Production Pressure”] 
p.175 failure appears to be continuous, but recovery is possible 
p.176 complex equipment, barely maintained 
p.192 blame transfer outwards from centre 
 
The question for those conducting risk discourse is whether they have 
clear evidence that they do not fall into this category of organisation. 
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In summary, I have explored nine areas that may contribute to “failure to see” 
warning signs. These were (1) mindfulness, (2) the inconceivable, (3) barriers 
to seeing, (4) denial, (5) context, (6) categorisation of signals, (7) the learning 
of lessons, (8) data sources and communication, and (9) seeing themselves as 
an error-inducing organisation. Each of these raises questions for an executive 
who wishes to be alert to such warnings in order to forestall a failure of 
foresight. The considerations that emerge from the literature pertinent to 
“failure to see” are summarised in Table 17. 
Table 17 - Forestalling Failure to See 
1.  To be clear about their rules for inclusion and exclusion of subject areas 
and the risk(s) associated with their delineation. 
2.  Of those issues that are labelled so improbable as to be “inconceivable”, 
which still have such potentially serious consequences (the 
unacceptable) that we must stay mindful of them. 
3.  To make themselves aware of the personal and organisational filters 
that might inhibit their seeing warnings available to them. 
4.  To assess whether their plans and policies, which are a product of their 
bureaucratic process, are likely to withstand “an abrupt and brutal audit”. 
5.  To establish what risks are “acceptable” to them and why, and then test 
their reasoning to ensure that it is robust and not a “fantasy”. 
6.  To be aware of the incoming data and need to be able to assess it 
against signal types in order to understand its relevance (either positive 
or negative) and be able to justify its inclusion or exclusion from the 
debate. 
7.  To question whether they are seeing all the lessons that are available to 
them and whether they understand, and therefore take into account, 
factors that might be working against them in this regard. 
8.  To question whether the right information is getting to the right people 
within the right timeframe and how they would know if it was not before 
it was too late. 
9.  To question whether there is clear evidence that they do not fall into the 
category of an “error-inducing” organisation. 
Failure to Appreciate the Significance of Signals  
In this next section I now examine why signals that have been seen may fail to 
be appreciated. Under this heading I look at (1) mindfulness, (2) the 
messenger, (3) synthesis, (4) interpretation of data, (5) drift, and (6) situational 
comprehension. 
Within mindfulness, Weick and Sutcliffe talk of “reluctance to simplify” and 
“deference to expertise”; these may be seen to contribute to a “failure to 
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appreciate”. Under “reluctance to simplify” Weick and Sutcliffe (2007:10) 
describe how ‘people simplify in order to stay focused on a handful of key 
issues and key indicators’ and how, in their view, high reliability organisations 
need to ‘take deliberate steps to create more complete and nuanced pictures 
of what they face of … the complex … and the unpredictable’. The perils that 
emerge are also encapsulated within the construct of “taming wicked/ messy 
issues” (see Grint, 2008 or Hancock and Holt, 2003). Weick and Sutcliffe 
however acknowledge that “when you organise, you simplify”. There is a large 
body of work which acknowledges that the use of heuristics is necessary 
simply in order to act in a timely manner. This, coupled with Ockham’s razor 
and Miller’s “Magical Number 7” (Miller, 1956), militates against any espoused 
“reluctance to simplify”. The question therefore becomes one of how to create 
the appropriate balance; to simplify the issue enough to be able to 
conceptualise it but not too much so you fail to appreciate its significance. The 
question for the executive is therefore to judge whether they have 
enough relevant detail to enable them to appreciate the complexity of the 
mechanisms acting at the time.  
Under “deference to expertise”, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007:15) talk of how 
‘Rigid hierarchies have their own special vulnerability to error’. The errors 
include both a failure to recognise a problem and a failure to act appropriately. 
Vaughan (1996:261 and 363) provides the phrase “seat of understanding” 
which I have defined elsewhere (based on work by Klein et al., 2005) to mean 
having the training, knowledge, experience and current data required to make 
the appropriate judgements. Structure, culture, power and politics have all 
been found to militate against judgements and decisions falling to those most 
appropriate. This issue is debated within the High Reliability Organisation area 
as the balance between centralisation and decentralisation. The debate 
involves factors such as where power and authority lies, where does expertise 
and detailed knowledge lie, the timeliness, completeness and understanding 
of new data. These rational factors compete with more irrational ones such as 
hierarchy, need for control, ego and hubris. The question for those conducting 
risk discourse is therefore how to judge the most appropriate level within 
their organisations for decisions to fall, given the need for the 
appropriate seat of understanding, resource power and need to act in a 
timely manner. 
In the appreciation of a signal, the messenger may be as important as the 
message. This is especially relevant when discussing what Adams’ labelled as 
“virtual risks”; here one is reliant on the expertise and understanding of others. 
These messengers might fall into three categories: “heroes”, “Cassandras” 
and those who “cry wolf”. Heroes are those whose warnings are heeded and 
the unwanted is prevented, Cassandras are those who provide valid warning 
but are ignored and those who cry wolf are those who provide false warnings 
(heeded or unheeded). While in hindsight it becomes very clear into which 
category each warning falls, in foresight it is not so clear. For risk discourse 
the question therefore becomes whether the messenger (source of any 
data) is having an effect on how the data is viewed and, if so, whether 
this can be judged to be “rational” and therefore “valid”. 
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After the data has been gathered and recognised as being important then 
there is a need to synthesise it to ascertain its full value. As important as this 
process is to forestalling failure of foresight, there is little literature debating the 
relative merits of the various forms of synthesis available. Most of the 
academic literature that relates to risk management and synthesis are looking 
at the research methodology used in academic papers. Those that are 
addressing the synthesis of risk data tend to favour mathematically based 
solutions. There is little work addressing the collation and synthesis of ideas 
necessary in the formative stages of risk discourse. Weick (2005) describes 
“Failure of imagination” and notes from the 9/11 Commission Report that 
‘Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies’(2005:425). 
While this could have been included under the heading of barriers, it is 
included here because, in order to counteract failures of imagination, Weick, 
based on the concept of mindfulness, suggests the replacement of ‘deductive 
thinking with abductive thinking, shifting a culture of analysis towards a culture 
of imagination…(a) focus on sense-making rather than decision making’ 
(2005:436). The danger at the other end of this dimension is that individuals 
use existing rules or regulations as an excuse for poor analysis or thinking 
(Toft and Reynolds, 2005:103). The question for risk discourse is to 
discuss what method of analysis would be most appropriate to the 
problem at hand and whether a formal system of analysis may ‘reduce 
the effect of personal bias’ (Elliot, 2006:403). 
Interpretation of the signals (of potential dangers) is subject to errors shaped 
by a still wider system that includes history, competition, scarcity, bureaucratic 
procedures, power, rules and norms, hierarchy, culture, and patterns of 
information (Vaughan, 1996:415). Linked to Vaughan’s summation of factors 
that shape interpretation are Perrow’s categorisation of victims into four groups 
(Perrow, 1999:67) and the clear difference in viewing perspective of the insider 
versus outsiders (Vaughan, 1996:406; Boin and Schulman, 2008:1054). These 
provide an initial choice of perspectives from which to start discussions of risk. 
Each may provide a separate starting point for the discourse thus providing the 
“requisite variety” suggested necessary for a richer analysis; Nævestad traces 
the “law of requisite variety” back to Ashby (1956) where he suggests that 
‘only variety can control variety’. Also linked to the debate on interpretation of 
signals are factors such as whether a scientific or intuitive approach is used 
(an issue prominent within Vaughan 1996), hubris (see Weick, 1997:401; 
Taleb et al., 2009:81), the “problem of induction” (see Snook, 2000:3 and 214; 
Taleb, 2007:27 and 41; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008:15-106) and “fallacy of 
centrality” (for the concept see Westrum, 1982:393; for a practical example 
see Snook, 2000:177). The question for those involved in risk discourse is 
to discuss which factors might be acted on and affect the perceptions 
that contribute to how they appreciate the signals available to them.  
Central to Turner’s ideas of disasters development is the construct of a gap; 
‘discrepancy between the way the world is thought to operate and the way it 
really is rarely developed instantaneously’ (Turner, 1976a:758). This is the gap 
that enables the “incubation” of the unwanted, the period where discrepancies 
‘accumulate unnoticed’. ‘The phenomena of drift … is a common theme in 
organisational literature’ (Snook, 200:196). Farjoun, (2005:60-80) talks of 
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“Safety drift” while Weick and Sutcliffe, (2007:9) talk of a ‘Drift into automatic 
processes’ as organisations become mindless. Snook’s (2000) construct of 
“Practical Drift” is a more detailed description. Practical drift is ‘the slow, 
steady uncoupling of local practice from written procedures’ and this provides 
a mechanism by which gaps occur; this is seen to be a particular issue where 
there is ‘local adaptation (that) can lead to global disconnects’. In the context 
of this paper, it would seem potentially more likely where management has 
moved from the expert to the investigator, as described above. Related to 
Practical Drift is Vaughan’s (1996) construct of the “Normalisation of 
Deviance”. This theory describes a mechanism where ‘signals of potential 
danger (are) normalised’ (1996:xiv) or become regarded as being normal, i.e. 
to lose their salience. Vaughan describes sophisticated and nuanced 
mechanisms that include three factors: “Organisational Culture”, “Culture of 
Production” and “Structural Secrecy”. Each of these factors is described in its 
own chapter. Snook sees the difference between practical drift and 
normalisation of deviance as being that the latter has to do with how the 
environment affects policy and the former has to do with coordination (Snook, 
2000:223). Snook sees the flip side of practical drift as being “practical sailing” 
which can be summarised as the successful mutual adjustment of autonomous 
bodies; where local adjustment within a global framework is successful rather 
than a failure. The question for those involved in risk discourse is how to 
recognise each form of drift as it occurs. While in hindsight this may be 
clear, this is a different matter in foresight, even when those involved know 
what to look for. 
Linked to “seat of understanding” is “situational comprehension”. Whereas 
“seat of understanding” is about the person’s endogenous disposition, 
situational comprehension is about the exogenous factors that play on their 
ability to comprehend what is happening around them. For the purpose of this 
paper, situational comprehension has been divided into two of its aspects; the 
first is the situation itself and the second is how those involved receive the 
relevant data. The situation itself may be one that is stable, a well tried and 
tested system which is thought to be well understood. At the other end of the 
perspective is the new or novel situation. Here the literature has made us 
aware of two phenomena of interest. They are the “liability of newness” and 
“unruly technology”. Vaughan extends the idea of liability of newness from its 
original context but reminds us that the liability of newness includes the 
necessity of generating and learning new roles; it has costs in time, worry, 
conflict, and  inefficiency; there is an absence of standard routines (1996:275) 
and that they therefore require interpretive flexibility in the absence of 
appropriate guidelines; that unexpected glitches are commonplace and need 
debugging through use; that there are likely to be extensive system-wide 
problems with technological components; and, that practical rules, based on 
experience, supplement and take precedence over technical decision-making 
and formal universal rules (1996:140). There is therefore a high degree of 
reliance on human interaction with the system that might fail. Mechanisms of 
failure have been described by Rochlin and Weick. Rochlin (1991:117) 
describes the concept of “having the bubble”. The bubble is where a person 
who has the appropriate seat of understanding has a temporary 
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comprehension of a complex and dynamic situation. The system expects the 
person to become fatigued or have lapses and at that moment they have to 
call “lost the bubble” and a deputy, who has been shadowing the situation, 
steps in. This process demonstrated to Rochlin a clear understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of human comprehension in such circumstances. 
Closely aligned to the bubble is the phenomenon of “cosmological episodes”. 
Weick (1993:633) describes a cosmological episode as occurring “‘when 
people suddenly and deeply feel that the universe is no longer a rational, 
orderly system. What makes such an episode so shattering is the sense of 
what is occurring and the means to rebuild that sense collapse together’. While 
Stein (2004) contrasts the Three Mile Island incident with Apollo 13’s safe 
return to earth in order to understand how to prevent such a collapse of 
comprehension, there needs to be questions for those involved in risk 
discourse about how well they understand their system, who will have to 
handle potential crises and whether they are mentally equipped to do so. 
In summary, we have explored six areas that may contribute to a “failure to 
appreciate” warning signs: (1) mindfulness, (2) the messenger, (3) synthesis, 
(4) interpretation of data, (5) drift, and (6) situational comprehension. The 
considerations for failure of foresight that emerge from the literature pertinent 
to “failure to appreciate” are summarised in Table 18. 
Table 18 - Forestalling Failure to Appreciate 
1.  The question for the executive is therefore to judge whether they have 
enough relevant detail to enable them to appreciate the complexity of 
the mechanisms acting at the time. 
2.  To judge the most appropriate level within their organisation for 
decisions to fall, given the need for the appropriate seat of 
understanding, resource power and the need to act in a timely manner. 
3.  To question whether the messenger (source of any data) is having an 
effect on how the data is viewed and, if so, whether this can be judged 
to be “rational” and therefore “valid”. 
4.  To discuss what method of analysis would be most appropriate to the 
problem at hand and whether a formal system of analysis may help to 
reduce the effect of personal bias. 
5.  To discuss which factors might be acting on and affecting the 
perceptions that contribute to how they appreciate the signals available 
to them. 
6.  How to recognise “drift” as it occurs. 
7.  To question how well they understand their system, who will have to 
handle potential crises and whether they are mentally equipped to do 
so. 
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Failure to Act (Appropriately) 
Finally, after having looked at failure to see and failure to appreciate, now we 
look at reasons for failing to act appropriately. Under this heading we look at 
(1) Commitment to resilience, (2) Alternative Options, (3) Rule-based or 
Knowledge-based action, (4) The mechanisms of cohesion (5) Unresponsive 
bystander, (6) Group dynamics, (7) Amoral calculations, and (8) Failures of 
organisational learning.  
Weick and Sutcliffe highlight the need for “Commitment to resilience”. Weick 
and Sutcliffe make clear what they mean: they say ‘To be resilient is to be 
mindful about errors that have already occurred and to correct them before 
they worsen and cause more harm’ (2007:68). Here we see the need to act 
(appropriately). They also say: 
The ability to cope with the unexpected requires a different mind-set 
than to anticipate its occurrence. The mind-set for anticipation is one 
that favours precise identification of possible difficulties so that specific 
remedies can be designed or recalled. A commitment to resilience is 
quite different. 
This is consistent with Wildavsky’s (1988:77) definitions. He says ‘Anticipation 
is a mode of control by a central mind: efforts are made to predict and prevent 
potential dangers before damage is done’; whereas ‘Resilience is the capacity 
to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, learning 
to bounce back’. These may be restated as anticipation results in a specific 
“plan B” whereas resilience requires capacity (buffer/ unused capability) with 
which to respond. In other disciplines this differentiation is not used. This 
usage of the terms can be contrasted with Schulman (1993:368) where he 
describes “anticipation” as ‘an approach that equates reliability to invariance’ 
and “resilience” as ‘responding to, rather than trying to weed out, the 
unexpected would be the ultimate safeguard of stable performance.’ Hollnagel 
et al. in an edited volume on Resilience Engineering (Hollnagel et al., 2006:6) 
say ‘resilience is therefore the ability to create foresight – to anticipate the 
changing shape of risk, before failure and harm occurs’. To them, anticipation 
is part of resilience. Therefore as different disciplines define these terms in 
different ways, two practical questions arise. The first is whether those 
involved in the risk discourse are clear about how they use the terms, and the 
second is whether they are clear about the way in which they plan to act (have 
a plan B or buffer capacity) as they discuss their options. 
The second issue is the discussion of options. As part of the discussion of any 
series of options, it is usual to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
each. Where these options are discussed, this is mostly limited to process 
rather than discussions of unwanted outcomes or the unintended 
consequences associated with each option. This may lead to inappropriate 
action being taken. There is no differentiation between the disadvantages 
when implementing an option and the potential jeopardy associated with an 
option. There may therefore be an advantage in more clearly differentiating 
between process and outcome when considering what action should be taken. 
Weick (1988:307) warns, in the context of enactment, of the relationship 
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between action, inaction, understanding, misunderstanding, appropriate and 
inappropriate action. This part of the discourse may be aided by consideration 
of an appropriate quadrant analysis tool. Based on the basic “advantages” and 
“disadvantages”, Vaughan’s (1999) construct of “Bright” and “Dark sides”, the 
HRO/NAT differentiation between process and outcome, a revised grid is 
offered in Table 19. Failure to appreciate the differences may lead to a failure 
to act appropriately. 
Table 19 - Options Quadrant Analysis 
 Processes Outcome 
“Bright side” Advantages Benefits 
“Dark side” Disadvantages Jeopardy 
The question that therefore arises is whether those involved in the risk 
discourse are clear about the action required (process) and to what end 
(outcome), and the jeopardy associated with each. 
Many commentators privilege a rule-based approach for action. Enquiry 
reports often recommend the tightening of rules and so do some academics 
(see for an example Hopkins, 2008). Linked directly to this is the assumption 
often that if rules are broken, it is always inappropriate or wrong. Flavell-While 
(2009) reports a discussion on the practicality of a rule-based approach 
between Hopkins and Peter Webb. Hirschhorn (1993:148) also debates the 
practicality of “verbatim compliance” and concludes that management need to 
develop two classes of procedure. The first is ‘broad in scope and applied to a 
wide range of circumstance’ and strictly applied. The second is detailed and 
specific, employees are free to vary it ‘as long as they fulfil its intention’. This 
links to Schulman’s (1993:357-8) paper on the viability of “verbatim 
compliance”. He argues that while much of the previous organisational theory 
would mean that ‘it is reasonable to expect a high degree of rigidity and formal 
rules’, he advocates caution in the use of such an approach. Reason 
(1990:44-46) debates Rouse’s model which included when the use of rules 
may be appropriate, and added to the discussion can be the phenomena of 
the “liability of newness” or “unruly technology” (Vaughan, 1996). The debate 
on how rule-based and knowledge-based procedures might be intertwined 
within the organisation is too extensive to do it justice here and is worthy of a 
fuller synthesis in its own right. However, even though rules and regulations do 
provide a starting point for any debate on drift, the validity of rules should not 
be taken at face value. Therefore, any debate on actions based upon existing 
rules and regulations also needs to debate how the context or situation might 
have evolved since the rule was written, in what direction, and whether they 
need to catch up with practice or practice needs to be reined in by the rules. 
They therefore need to consider whether the rule has become time-expired, 
whether it is appropriate for the circumstance, whether the action required is 
clear and whether the direction is “absolute” or “guidance”. This needs to be 
done even before consideration of the expertise and competence of the rule 
writers. Those engaged in risk discourse need to be aware of the 
strengths and limitations of rule-based and knowledge-based 
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approaches and be clear when each should be applied within their 
organisation.  
Linked to this action is the issue of how to ensure that the most appropriate 
mechanism of cohesion/ coordination is applied in the circumstances. Roberts 
(1990) and Weick (2005) are examples of authors who use the terminology of 
pooled, sequential and reciprocal interdependence from Thompson (1967). 
Snook (2000:153) characterised these as coordination by standards, 
coordination by plans and mutual adjustment. Linked closely to the mechanism 
of coordination is the use of rule-based or knowledge-based actions. While 
accident enquiries often recommend a tightening of rules (with little debate 
over their advantages and disadvantages), as stated above, there is a 
substantial body of literature that warns of some of the downsides of relying on 
rules to ensure safety and reliability. The question for those involved in risk 
discourse is therefore to debate the appropriate use of these five 
mechanisms (standards, plans, mutual adjustment, rules and 
experience) and how to enhance each and safeguard the organisation 
against the weakness of each. 
The fourth issue has been referred to as the “Unresponsive Bystander”. Snook 
and Connor (2006:182) talk of “structurally induced inaction” and refer to a 
book by Latané and Darley (1970) called “the Unresponsive Bystander”; 
Ghaffarzadegan (2008:1675) refers to this phenomenon as “social shirking”. 
Snook and Connor also refer to later work by Latané and Nida (1981:308) 
which sets down the four conditions under which “bystanders” might intervene. 
These are that they “notice the event”, perceive it as requiring action, feel 
responsible for taking action (or not, such as when someone else is in charge, 
better qualified or has the time) and feel that they have the skills and 
resources necessary to be effective. Snook and Connor then relate this to 
decision-making within an organisation. They assert that ‘three psychological 
processes tend to decrease the likelihood of intervention’ (2006:183). The first 
is the potential embarrassment of failure. The second is that individuals look to 
clues from those around them on how to act (what Ghaffarzadegan 
(2008:1676) called “pluralistic ignorance” – ‘when bystanders assume nothing 
is wrong because nobody else appears concerned.’) and the third is where 
responsibility is defused. After the fall of Singapore during World War 2, 
Churchill is said to have mused ‘Why didn’t I know? Why didn’t my advisers 
know? Why wasn’t I told? Why didn’t I ask?’ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007:84). 
The question that therefore arises is whether those involved in the risk 
discourse are conscious of the potential for inaction by themselves as 
individuals and of the group overall and what mechanisms they may put 
in place to guard against these issues. 
Fifth, group dynamics have been clearly shown to have a role in causing a 
failure to act appropriately. The ones that I will cover here are “groupthink”, 
“folly” and “risk shift”. The first of these, “groupthink”, has received wide 
coverage. While the term was coined by William Whyte in Fortune magazine, 
(1952), the first major studies are attributed to Janis in the 1970s. Over time 
eight symptoms have been identified and mitigation processes have been 
developed. In summary these symptoms are: an illusion of invulnerability, 
 Chapter 5   124 
 
rationalising away warnings, an unquestioned belief in the morality of the 
group, stereotyping of adversaries, direct pressure to conform, self-censorship 
of “deviant” ideas, illusions of unanimity and self-appointed “mindguards”. 
While scholars still debate the exact nature of the phenomenon, there is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that decision-making groups need to be aware 
of groupthink’s insidious effects on effective decision-making. Not so well 
known is the related phenomenon of “folly” as articulated by a historian, 
Barbara Tuchman (1984). Her criteria for folly are: (1) the action was 
perceived as counter-productive in its own time, not requiring hindsight 
(1984:2); (2) feasible alternatives were available (1984:2); (3) the fallacy 
should be that of a group, persisting over generations of leaders, (1984:2); (4) 
the role of “Wooden-Headedness” (a source of self-deception) (1984:4-5); and 
(5) the role played by Cognitive Dissonance (1984:280). Enzer (1980:12) 
provides a clearly related example of folly from the development of US energy 
policy in the 1970s. The final issue is “risky shift” which is where ‘The result of 
group polarization is a failure to take into account the true risk of a course of 
action followed by a shift towards riskier decision making’ (Choo, 2008:41). 
Groupthink, folly and risky shift have all been identified as risk factors within 
the decision making process of groups. Where there is potential for decisions 
to have disastrous consequences, those involved in risk discourse should 
debate whether their group is taking any steps to guard against the 
threats created by these group dynamics. 
Sixth is the concept of “amoral calculation” in the face of production pressures. 
Vaughan (1996:35) describes amoral calculation as the ‘rational calculation of 
cost and opportunities’ which values ‘economic success more highly than the 
well-being of workers, consumers or the general public’. In the case of the 
shuttle Challenger, as in many other cases, the violation of rules (see, 1996:57  
and 278) is seen to be a symptom. This phenomenon has also been referred 
to as “good people doing dirty work”. Research suggests ‘that culture, 
structure, and other organisational factors, in combination, may create a 
worldview that constrains people from acknowledging their work as "dirty".… 
Plus, rather than contemplating or devising a deviant strategy for achieving the 
organisational goals and then invoking techniques of neutralising in order to 
proceed with it or rationalising it afterwards, they never see it as deviant in the 
first place' (Vaughan, 1996:408). Snook (2000:207) suggests however that 
‘Individual responsibility is not ignored’ and that the issues should be framed 
more on the lines of "good people struggling to make sense," rather than as 
"bad ones making good decisions.” Perrow uses the term “Executive Failure”" 
(2007:146) where they 'knowingly take risks in violation of regulatory law' 
(2007:167) in order to maximise profit. 'This entailed a risk ... that, (in the 
circumstance he describes) for about a decade … paid off'. Here we see the 
interaction between production pressure, consequences over time and their 
effects on different stakeholder constituencies. The current risk management 
procedures which allow exclusions on the grounds of improbability or on cost-
benefit may be used as a rational justification for such amoral calculations; the 
Ford Pinto case (Perrow, 1999:310) provides such an example. These cases 
however need to be separate from what Kakabadse (2010) describes as the 
“dark side of leadership” which are enacted when people with 
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socio/psychopathic traits take control of organisations. This becomes a wider 
issue of governance rather than being an issue of failure of foresight. The 
question therefore becomes whether those involved in risk discourse are 
clear that the criteria they use for making decisions may not be viewed 
by others, at some later stage, to be amoral. 
Finally, I return to the issue of organisations’ learning. A common question in 
the literature is about why organisations fail to learn from the past; why, when 
the potential for disaster is clear, the appropriate action was not taken. Smith 
and Elliot (2007:519) state that ‘There is a growing body of evidence that 
organizations are resistant to learning from crisis’ and emphasise that 
organisational learning is not only about understanding of causes and 
mechanisms but also the requirement for the ‘full cultural adjustment’ 
(2007:52) necessary to prevent the next unwanted event. As stated in the 
introduction to this paper, the issue with organisational learning is therefore not 
only the “why” something occurs but a full understanding of the “how” to 
prevent it. This is therefore a much more demanding standard than is 
presented by the need to understand “why” something has occurred (as 
difficult as this question in itself might be to answer). Therefore, the questions 
for those conducting the risk discourse are not only what might occur 
(including the inconceivable) but also (1) what might cause it, (2) how might it 
be prevented, (3) is the necessary process in place, (4) are our people 
effectively trained, (5) do they have the necessary resources, (6) will they 
recognise the problem should it arise, (7) will they see the right action to take, 
(8) will they implement the necessary action appropriately, and (9) will we get 
the same answers if we ask these questions tomorrow? 
In summary, I have explored eight areas that may contribute to a “failure to act 
(appropriately)” on warning signs: (1) commitment to resilience, (2) alternative 
options, (3) rule-based or knowledge-based action, (4) the mechanisms of 
cohesion (5) unresponsive bystander, (6) group dynamics, (7) amoral 
calculations, and (8) failures of organisational learning. The considerations for 
failure of foresight that emerge from the literature pertinent to “failure to act” 
are summarised in Table 20. 
Table 20 - Forestalling Failure to Act 
1.  Define the group’s understanding of the terms “anticipation” and 
“resilience”. 
Define whether the action needed is to create a “plan B” or to 
generate buffer capacity. 
2.  Is the action required about process or outcome and is the jeopardy 
associated with each of them clear? 
3.  To be aware of the strengths and limitations of rule-based and 
knowledge-based approaches and be clear when each should be 
applied within their organisation. 
4.  To debate the appropriate use of the five mechanisms of action and 
coordination (standards, plans, mutual adjustment, rules and 
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experience) and how to enhance each and safeguard the 
organisation against the weakness of each. 
5.  To be aware of the factors affecting the potential for inaction by 
themselves as individuals and of the group overall and what 
mechanisms they may put in place to guard against this issue. 
6.  To debate whether their group is taking any steps to guard against 
the threats created by group dynamics. 
7.  To debate whether the criteria being used for making decisions may 
not be viewed by others, at some later stage, to be amoral. 
8.  What might occur (including the inconceivable): 
(1) what might cause it, (2) how might we prevent it, (3) is the 
necessary process in place, (4) are our people effectively trained, (5) 
do they have the necessary resources, (6) will they recognise the 
problem should it arise, (7) will they see the right action to take, (8) 
will they implement the necessary action appropriately, and (9) will 
we get the same answers if we ask these questions tomorrow? 
Summary 
In this main section we have discussed a number of mechanisms that may be 
seen to contribute to the failure of foresight. In order to forestall such failures, 
we have examined a wide range of academic literature in order to distil a 
range of mechanisms of failure previously identified. The purpose is to enable 
us to formulate an initial set of questions to be used during risk discourse. The 
subject has been broken down into three sub-sections. These subsections 
were based on the construct of “failure to see”, “failure to appreciate” and 
“failure to act (appropriately)”. Consideration was given to whether the 
phenomena could be applied with foresight or whether their application 
depended on hindsight. 
Accepting the limitation of the methodology, the considerations pertinent to 
failure of foresight that emerge during the analysis of the literature are 
summarised in Table 21. 
Table 21 - Forestalling Failure of Foresight 
1.  To be clear about their rules for inclusion and exclusion of subject 
areas and the risk(s) associated with their delineation. 
2.  Of those issues that are labelled so improbable as to be 
“inconceivable”, which still have such potentially serious consequences 
(the unacceptable) that we must stay mindful of them. 
3.  To make themselves aware of the personal and organisational filters 
that might inhibit their seeing warnings available to them. 
4.  To assess whether their plans and policies, which are a product of 
their bureaucratic process, are likely to withstand “an abrupt and brutal 
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audit”. 
5.  To establish what risks are “acceptable” to them and why, and then 
test their reasoning to ensure that it is robust and not a “fantasy”. 
6.  To be aware of the incoming data and need to be able to assess it 
against signal types in order to understand its relevance (either 
positive or negative) and be able to justify its inclusion or exclusion 
from the debate. 
7.  To question whether they are seeing all the lessons that are available 
to them and whether they understand, and therefore take into account, 
factors that might be working against them in this regard. 
8.  To question whether the right information is getting to the right people 
within the right timeframe and how they would know if it was not before 
it was too late. 
9.  To question whether there is clear evidence that they do not fall into 
the category of an “error-inducing” organisation. 
10.  The question for the executive is therefore to judge whether they have 
enough relevant detail to enable them to appreciate the complexity of 
the mechanisms acting at the time. 
11.  To judge the most appropriate level within their organisation for 
decisions to fall, given the need for the appropriate seat of 
understanding, resource power and the need to act in a timely manner. 
12.  To question whether the messenger (source of any data) is having an 
effect on how the data is viewed and, if so, whether this can be judged 
to be “rational” and therefore “valid”. 
13.  To discuss what method of analysis would be most appropriate to the 
problem at hand and whether a formal system of analysis may help to 
reduce the effect of personal bias. 
14.  To discuss which factors might be acting on and affecting the 
perceptions that contribute to how they appreciate the signals available 
to them. 
15.  How to recognise “drift” as it occurs. 
16.  To question how well they understand their system, who will have to 
handle potential crises and whether they are mentally equipped to do 
so. 
17.  Define the group’s understanding of the terms “anticipation” and 
“resilience”. 
Define whether the action needed is to create a “plan B” or to generate 
buffer capacity. 
18.  Is the action required about process or outcome and is the jeopardy 
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associated with each of them clear? 
19.  To be aware of the strengths and limitations of rule-based and 
knowledge-based approaches and be clear when each should be 
applied within their organisation. 
20.  To debate the appropriate use of the five mechanisms of action and 
coordination (standards, plans, mutual adjustment, rules and 
experience) and how to enhance each and safeguard the organisation 
against the weakness of each. 
21.  To be aware of the factors affecting the potential for inaction by 
themselves as individuals and of the group overall and what 
mechanisms they may put in place to guard against this issue. 
22.  To debate whether their group is taking any steps to guard against the 
threats created by group dynamics. 
23.  To debate whether the criteria being used for making decisions may 
not be viewed by others, at some later stage, to be amoral. 
24.  What might occur (including the inconceivable): 
(1) what might cause it, (2) how might we prevent it, (3) is the 
necessary process in place, (4) are our people effectively trained, (5) 
do they have the necessary resources, (6) will they recognise the 
problem should it arise, (7) will they see the right action to take, (8) will 
they implement the necessary action appropriately, and (9) will we get 
the same answers if we ask these questions tomorrow? 
DISCUSSION 
The inconceivable risk, described in this paper, is part of a family of risks that 
have been given a variety of labels. Taleb (2007) brought the low probability, 
high impact events, which he calls “Black Swans”, to a wider audience. Merna 
and Al-Thani (2008:75) refer to these events as “Alligators” and comments that 
while these are dangerous, he says that they can be avoided with care. Renn 
(2008a:162) refers to these risks as a “sword of Damocles” that have a ‘very 
high potential for damage and, at the same time, very low probability of 
occurrence’. The debate revolves around foreseeability, controllability, 
manageability and saliency of warnings. Current risk management processes 
lead to the exclusion of occurrences which are conceived as being very rare, 
even if their potential for damage or harm might be considered to be extreme. 
There is a school of thought (stereotyped as the “precautionary principle”, but 
again this term has a wide range of meanings attributed to it), who advocate 
that these risks should just be avoided. For examples see Hopkins (2008) and 
Sheehan (2009:37). This approach, while being theoretically desirable, may 
not be practical or may occur when the organisation considers the risk to have 
been managed. Therefore, the focus of risk discourse should continually 
consider the implications of the potential to create harm and how organisations 
might try to justify inactivity should the inconceivable manifest itself. 
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Emerging from an examination of the literature from the perspective of failure 
of foresight are a number of key issues: (1) the amount of research that needs 
to be synthesised, (2) the focus on hindsight rather than foresight, (3) the 
filtering process faced by top executives and, (4) rule-based versus 
knowledge-based approach to action. I also discuss the key limitations of this 
research and link these to suggestions for future research. 
This paper has provided an indication of the amount of research that is 
relevant to the issue of failure of foresight. The existing research needs to be 
synthesised in order to develop a map of key and subsidiary themes. The 
availability and accessibility of this research to practitioners, in its current form, 
has to be questioned. There are many competing claims, with apparent 
overlaps and contradictions. Research is required to collate the available work, 
to contrast the competing claims and to validate their utility if our 
understanding of what can go wrong is to be used more effectively to forestall 
failure of foresight. 
It is clear from the literature described above that top executives are 
“distanced” from the front line activity and that relevant data is filtered as the 
information is passed to them and as their directions are passed out to their 
organisation. Adams provides a useful categorisation in this context. Adams 
(2007:38) describes three levels of data that affect the perception of, in his 
case, risk as (1) perceived directly, (2) perceived through science (where there 
is a direct link between the measurement and the phenomenon) and (3) virtual 
risks (where proxies are measured and judgements then have to be made 
about the state of the phenomenon of interest). The mechanisms of upward 
filtering have been discussed and given such labels as “structural secrecy” and 
“operational secrecy”; this is labelled “reporting cascades”. However, as 
Vaughan (1996:94 and 259) and Grint (2008) have pointed out, top executives 
examine issues by exception and look at principles; the label “Organisation 
filter” represents where the executive’s span of responsibility has become such 
that the executive moves from being, in Grint’s words, “expert to investigator”. 
At this point the executive creates their own conceptualisation, which may or 
may not be accurate, based on the information they receive and their existing 
understanding of the mechanisms operating within their organisation that 
produce the outcomes required (the “envisaged end state”). The executive 
then issues directions, which are translated into operational activity and 
cascaded through the organisation in order to revise the operational routine 
required. The implications of this need to be examined for the mechanism by 
which their general directions are transformed into detailed action at lower 
levels. A related question is whether, in their conceptualisation of issues, top 
executives have a detailed conceptualisation of how they expect their direction 
to avoid failures is interpreted and translated into action at the lower levels of 
their organisation, or how they envisage the weaknesses in this process and 
the potential for gaps to occur within which disasters have space to incubate. 
This potential mechanism of failure (communications barriers) deserves more 
detailed research and may be part of the answer to why organisations fail to 
learn. The issues are summarised in Figure 8 
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Figure 8 - Communications Barriers 
A key issue arises out of the constructive tension between theory and practice, 
between academia and practitioners. This has been highlighted by Elliot 
(2006:394) where he states that ‘crisis management (theory) into practice is 
very difficult’. He talks of ‘the priority of much research (is) dealing with 
complex constructs at a more theoretical level’, that ‘much that is written on 
practice is based upon flimsy, possibly anecdotal evidence’ (2006:396) and 
therefore that research on practice should now be exercised with the same 
rigour as the research into theory. This points to the privileging within 
academia of the “why” question (Van de Ven, 1989:486), whereas practice is 
more concerned with “how”; the assumption of some academics who appear 
to have an expectation is that because the “why” can be articulated, the “how” 
will naturally follow. Where accident prevention does not follow, managers are 
labelled “sloppy” or some other such adjective and accused of failure of 
foresight. When Elliot joins with Smith in the final chapter of their book (Smith 
and Elliot, 2006), they acknowledge the importance of theory and ‘that theory 
and practice are inextricably interwoven’, they acknowledge that there remains 
a critical tension between the two. They highlight the fact that ‘there is often no 
evidence’ on which to base decisions and therefore on which to act. This 
appears to be a reprise of the debate within Vaughan (1996) as to whether 
those within NASA had the evidence upon which to act or should have relied 
on their intuitive judgement in the absence of any clear evidence. This is not to 
argue against a science “gold standard”, where this is possible, but to suggest 
that progress may also be made by offering tentative propositions, taking small 
steps with an open mind where clear evidence is not readily available. This 
highlights one of the many paradoxical ideas identified within the literature; in 
this case it is on one hand (Hopkins, 2008) insistence on finding clear 
evidence versus Weick’s (2005) warning against “failures of imagination”. 
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Finally, there is considerable literature and practice (reports from enquiries) 
that privileges the use of a rule-based approach to taking action. However, the 
arguments for the case are inconclusive as there is a considerable body of 
evidence in support of the opposing position. This important subject needs 
further exploration and debate over the utility of rule-based and knowledge-
based action if the proposed solution (“more and better rules”) to one case is 
not to present a potential risk in future cases. 
Before concluding, several limitations of this paper need to be acknowledged. 
The first, as previously stated, is that this paper does not claim to be either a 
comprehensive review of the literature or a detailed analysis and validation of 
the phenomena discussed. It is only a collation of some of the phenomena in 
order to initiate discussion on how to enhance foresight. More detailed 
research is required to synthesise the main body of work (including that 
covering constructs such as “incubation period” and “learning organisations”) 
in order to understand how knowledge of the mechanisms that have been 
identified as leading to failure may be used to forestall failure. 
The second limitation is that this research lacks a variety of perspectives. This 
work is limited to the single perspective of the author. Consistent with the 
quest for common understanding, this debate needs to be enriched by other 
researchers in order to add their perspectives to the discussion. Further 
research is needed therefore in order to enrich this debate. 
The third limitation of this paper is that it is theoretical. Empirical research is 
now required in order to assess whether the questions developed in this paper 
lead to a richer understanding of risk within the target community.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper offers a tentative step towards a theory of how failures of foresight 
might be forestalled. This work looks to start the process by which a wider 
body of relevant academic knowledge is applied to practice and whether we 
look to enhance practice enabling us also to learn about the limitations of 
existing theory. The premise for the paper is that, if the existing research in 
this area is valid, what questions does it raise for those trying to forestall such 
failures. The paper has identified 24 groupings, under three main headings, 
designed to make the existing research more accessible to practitioners. In 
turn, this knowledge may be used to stimulate risk discourse and help those 
concerned to develop a clear mental model, and therefore conceptualisation, 
of the issues they face. My proposition is that as each individual’s 
conceptualisation of the issues becomes clearer, this will enable improved 
cross-understanding within a group over the course of any discussion. This 
proposition now needs to be tested empirically. 
The research has also revealed a vast array of academic work that could be 
relevant to this subject. There is now a clear requirement for this work to be 
synthesised in order to identify the scope of the competing claims. In time, this 
scoping study should lead to further work validating or reconciling these 
competing claims. All this is necessary before a general theory of Foresight 
Failure Forestalling can be developed.  
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The paper has also identified a reflexive dimension to this task. For example, 
one of the tenets of mindfulness is the “reluctance to simplify”. This research 
however has identified over 200 factors that previous research would suggest 
are relevant to failure of foresight. The prospect of developing a model with 
over 100 variables is daunting. However, not to consider such an option would 
be to deny ourselves mindfulness. Another example is the contradictory claims 
for the use of evidence between the research and management paradigms. 
These issues are reflected within an oscillating ontological basis for this work 
that may lead to some demanding epistemological challenges in the future. 
Now that the literature has been synthesised to the degree that it has, the 
synthesis needs to be fully tested for its validity. To do this the groupings need 
to be operationalised as questions for management and then tested for their  
‘feasibility (could the process be followed?); usability (how easily could the 
process be followed?); and utility (did the process provide a useful step in the 
strategy  formulation  process?)’ (Platts, 1993:11). 
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CHAPTER 6 - FORESTALLING FAILURE OF 
FORESIGHT 
Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to demonstrate to those involved in risk 
governance that the relevant academic work has “practical utility”. This paper 
operationalises the categories of risk derived from a previous synthesis of the 
literature associated with failure of foresight. The purpose of the 
operationalised questions is to act as a prompt to provoke new ways of 
thinking in order to break the hold of an existing paradigm, which can make 
“seeing a way of not seeing”.  
The research used semi-structured interviews of board members/ executives 
from a wide range of organisations across both the public and private sectors, 
including government. The purpose of the interviews was to assess the 
“practical utility” of a set of questions developed from the academic literature. 
The respondents were asked to comment, from their perspective, on the 
usability, utility and feasibility of the questions. They were also asked to 
comment on their appetite to learn about the phenomena that underlie the 
questions. Where the respondents commented on how they might use the 
questions, this was also noted.  
The paper finds that while the questions do have practical utility, this depends 
on the attitude with which the individual approaches the questions. With minor 
amendments to the wording, respondents were able to understand the 
questions and, where they were not familiar with the issue, they did provide a 
prompt to their thinking. The respondents also thought that the questions could 
be used as part of their governance process, despite the fact that some might 
be addressing very sensitive issues. The respondents’ desire to learn more 
about the underlying material was found to depend more on their general 
appetite to learn, than be related specifically to these questions. Respondents 
had limited familiarity with the extensive existing body of knowledge. They did 
however generally agree that the questions provided a structure (portal) 
through which the literature might be investigated as the knowledge had been 
assembled into more manageable blocks. 
The results need to be seen as preliminary. No claim is being made that these 
questions are, in any way, definitive; however, the results do show that the 
questions are considered by the respondents to have practical utility. While the 
results of the research are limited by the methodology used, the research did 
solicit a wide range of potential views. It is accepted that not all respondents 
showed an inclination to use the questions as a prompt to their thinking; 
however, enough did in order to start a debate and to enable further work to 
be undertaken. Further work should look at how the subject might be taught to 
its target audience, their willingness to use such a tool, the effect of the tool on 
the understanding of risk and an organisation’s ability to control or manage 
risk. 
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This categorisation and operationalisation of the existing research has not 
been done before; this paper should therefore be useful to both researchers 
and practitioners. For practitioners it not only provides a prompt to new ways 
of thinking (to see the data they have in a different way thereby providing new 
insights), it may also provide easier access to the extensive body of existing 
knowledge. On the other hand, it may prompt researchers to reconsider claims 
that their work has application in foresight or whether it can only be used in 
hindsight to explain why something unwanted occurred. 
INTRODUCTION 
Where organisations have accidents or other major disasters, their 
management is often accused, by academics and others, of failing to have the 
foresight to prevent the occurrence. The question that arises therefore is 
whether there is existing knowledge within the academic literature which, if 
practitioners were aware of and able to use, may go some way to forestalling 
such failures. 
Project 2 provides a synthesis of the relevant academic literature. It extracted 
a number of theories, mechanisms and tools that are considered by their 
authors to contribute to the understanding of how and why organisations fail to 
see warning signs, appreciate their significance or to act on them in order to 
forestall failure. Around 250 phenomena were identified as being relevant. 
After a process of winnowing out duplicates and giving consideration as to 
whether they could be applied with foresight, these phenomena were 
synthesised into 24 groupings. The groupings are summarised in Table 22. 
Table 22 - Project 2 Findings 
1.  To be clear about their rules for inclusion and exclusion of subject 
areas and the risk(s) associated with their delineation. 
2.  Of those issues that are labelled so improbable as to be 
“inconceivable”, which still have such potentially serious consequences 
(the unacceptable) that we must stay mindful of them. 
3.  To make themselves aware of the personal and organisational filters 
that might inhibit their seeing warnings available to them. 
4.  To assess whether their plans and policies, which are a product of 
their bureaucratic process, are likely to withstand “an abrupt and brutal 
audit”. 
5.  To establish what risks are “acceptable” to them and why, and then 
test their reasoning to ensure that it is robust and not a “fantasy”. 
6.  To be aware of the incoming data and need to be able to assess it 
against signal types in order to understand its relevance (either 
positive or negative) and be able to justify its inclusion or exclusion 
from the debate. 
7.  To question whether they are seeing all the lessons that are available 
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to them and whether they understand, and therefore take into account, 
factors that might be working against them in this regard. 
8.  To question whether the right information is getting to the right people 
within the right timeframe and how they would know if it was not before 
it was too late. 
9.  To question whether there is clear evidence that they do not fall into 
the category of an “error-inducing” organisation. 
10.  The question for the executive is therefore to judge whether they have 
enough relevant detail to enable them to appreciate the complexity of 
the mechanisms acting at the time. 
11.  To judge the most appropriate level within their organisation for 
decisions to fall, given the need for the appropriate seat of 
understanding, resource power and the need to act in a timely manner. 
12.  To question whether the messenger (source of any data) is having an 
effect on how the data is viewed and, if so, whether this can be judged 
to be “rational” and therefore “valid”. 
13.  To discuss what method of analysis would be most appropriate to the 
problem at hand and whether a formal system of analysis may help to 
reduce the effect of personal bias. 
14.  To discuss which factors might be acting on and affecting the 
perceptions that contribute to how they appreciate the signals available 
to them. 
15.  How to recognise “drift” as it occurs. 
16.  To question how well they understand their system, who will have to 
handle potential crises and whether they are mentally equipped to do 
so. 
17.  Define the group’s understanding of the terms “anticipation” and 
“resilience”. 
Define whether the action needed is to create a “plan B” or to generate 
buffer capacity. 
18.  Is the action required about process or outcome and is the jeopardy 
associated with each of them clear? 
19.  To be aware of the strengths and limitations of rule-based and 
knowledge-based approaches and be clear when each should be 
applied within their organisation. 
20.  To debate the appropriate use of the five mechanisms of action and 
coordination (standards, plans, mutual adjustment, rules and 
experience) and how to enhance each and safeguard the organisation 
against the weakness of each. 
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21.  To be aware of the factors affecting the potential for inaction by 
themselves as individuals and of the group overall and what 
mechanisms they may put in place to guard against this issue. 
22.  To debate whether their group is taking any steps to guard against the 
threats created by group dynamics. 
23.  To debate whether the criteria being used for making decisions may 
not be viewed by others, at some later stage, to be amoral. 
24.  What might occur (including the inconceivable): 
(1) what might cause it, (2) how might we prevent it, (3) is the 
necessary process in place, (4) are our people effectively trained, (5) 
do they have the necessary resources, (6) will they recognise the 
problem should it arise, (7) will they see the right action to take, (8) will 
they implement the necessary action appropriately, and (9) will we get 
the same answers if we ask these questions tomorrow? 
 
The aim of this research is to operationalise the categories previously 
synthesised from literature in order to provide a framework (“the coherent 
whole” – Ed AMR, 2011) to “provoke” discussions (‘gets us talking, digging, 
comparing, refining, and focusing on the right question’ – Weick, 2004) about 
risk governance and to act as “portals” for practitioners into the existing body 
of knowledge. 
The context for this research is the field of corporate governance and its 
relationship with risk management as illustrated within the UK’s Combined 
Code (FRC, 2010a). This provides more detailed directions to that provided  
by the UK’s Institute of Director (IoD, 2009). This approach has a wider 
application as the UK approach is principles-based rather than being rule-
based; therefore, the assumption is that this work will have a general 
application to other principles-based governance regimes. However, there is 
an issue over what the sections of the code that refer to risk management 
mean to practitioners. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) opened this to 
debate. The FRC has conducted its own consultation exercise (FRC, 2010b) 
‘to explore how companies are responding to the new UK Corporate 
Governance Code provision on Board’s responsibilities for risk’. It should be 
noted that, as confirmed in an interview as part of this research, the risks of 
interest are all circumstances that adversely affect the delivery of the 
company’s strategy. The Code is not only interested in financial risks. This is 
therefore consistent with the purpose of my research. The FRC have produced 
six questions as a catalyst to ‘new good practice’. The questions were: 
• What are the respective roles of the board, board committees and 
management, and how do they interact? Where does oversight end 
and operational management begin? 
• How are boards determining their appetite for risk? 
• What are the risks that the board needs to “own”? 
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• What information and advice do the board and audit committee 
need to carry out their responsibilities? 
• How do boards obtain confidence that the risk management and 
internal control system function effectively at operational level? 
• How do boards report effectively on these issues to shareholders? 
My research looks to provide an alternative list of questions to that proposed 
by the FRC, based on the existing body of knowledge on organisations’ 
accidents and disasters, around which “best practice” may coalesce. This 
paper is in four sections. The first will describe the methodology used. The 
second will describe the results of the interviews. The third section discusses 
the findings and the potential implications for future research and practice. The 
final section provides my conclusions.  
METHODOLOGY 
The section on methodology is considered under three headings. The first is 
context, the second describes the staged process used and the third details 
the respondents. 
Context 
The context describes the purpose of the research, sets out the ontological 
position taken, and the tests to be used. 
The purpose of this research is to demonstrate the potential practical utility of 
the academic work on the subject of risk to practitioners involved in the 
governance of risk. A secondary purpose of the research is to provide 
practitioners with a portal into the body of knowledge that exists within the 
academic literature pertaining to risk. The approach taken (Scholarship of 
Application – Boyer, 1990) requires that two aspects be examined. The first 
looks at what practitioners may learn from the application of existing 
knowledge and the second is what those concerned might learn about our 
existing knowledge from trying to apply it. I looked to accomplish the first task 
by providing a set of questions to see if they are found to be useful to 
practitioners (or as Corley and Gioia (2011) express it, they have “practical 
utility”). The aim of these questions is to provoke new thinking within the 
respondents and provide these practitioners with a structured portal through 
which to access the wider body of knowledge. The second issue concerns 
what we learn about this knowledge by trying to use it. This was explored 
during the previous synthesis of the existing body of knowledge (Project 2 – 
covered in the previous chapter).  Two issues were identified during this 
process. The first was that, just because we “know”, this is not enough for us 
to be able to expect that unwanted occurrences will be prevented; such 
knowledge needs to be consciously transferred into action. The second is that 
before an academic is able to suggest that their work can be used to prevent 
unwanted occurrences, they have to be able to show that their work can be 
used in foresight and not just in hindsight. If hindsight is required, the model or 
theory may still have application in understanding an event but cannot, by 
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itself, be used to prevent unwanted occurrences. These concerns were tested 
during the interviews and this led to a third issue, which is implicit in the first 
two. If practitioners were able to exploit existing knowledge, the research 
needed to address whether practitioners had an appetite to learn, in more 
depth, ideas currently available within the academic literature. This was 
examined by looking at whether the respondents feel the need for, or might 
wish to access, the wider body of knowledge associated with each question 
and, if so, whether they had preferences or priorities as to which these were. 
There is an ontological oscillation associated with research into risk (see 
Renn, 2008a). In this research, the oscillation is more towards the socially 
constructed aspect of risk; i.e. how people perceive risk prior to taking action. 
This research is about whether those engaged make sense of the questions 
and, in turn, whether the questions can break their current “way of seeing” (a 
question of perception) in order to enable “new ways of seeing” to emerge. In 
this way, this research looks to provide a mechanism to counter the blind spots 
that prevent management at all levels from seeing or appreciating the risks to 
their organisation and themselves, as these new issues emerge. 
To test the effective application of the existing knowledge to practice first 
required that the 24 groupings from the previous synthesis be operationalised 
into the form of provocative questions. The emphasis on the need for “good 
questions” rather than answers comes from John Reed, the Academy of 
Management's 1999 Executive of the Year (Huff, 2000). While the ultimate test 
of this approach would be whether their application reduced the number of 
unwanted events within organisations, this goal is seen to be too ambitious at 
this point in the research. Therefore the scope of the research will be limited to 
whether the questions are seen to have “practical utility” as a first step in their 
validation. Platts (1993:11) provides three criteria for assessment of the 
question’s “practical utility”. The criteria Platts used were feasibility (could the 
process be followed); usability (how easily could the process be followed); 
and utility (did the process provide a useful step in the strategy formulation). 
These criteria have had to be adapted from Platts’ research examining the use 
of a process; in this research the issue was whether a series of questions help 
to stimulate fresh thinking within respondents. Therefore the criteria were 
adapted, based on an “I agree/ I disagree” response, as follows: 
 Usability became “I understood the question at face value”. 
 Utility became “the question provided a useful prompt to my thinking”. 
 Feasibility became “I could use the question as part of a risk-based 
discussion”. 
In order to address the second task (the issue of learning), the respondents 
were asked to respond to the statement “I see benefit from learning more on 
the issues that underlie the question”. 
Staged Process 
The method used to address these tasks was broken down into three stages. 
The first was to operationalise the questions derived from the previous 
research. The second was to pilot the questions amongst those who train, are 
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consulted by or advise the target audience. The third part consisted of a series 
of interviews with members of the target audience to ascertain whether the 
questions provided them with the stimulus necessary to question their current 
stance on the management of risk; this was deemed to constitute practical 
utility. 
During the first stage, the method used was for the research to take the 
statements derived from the literature and adapt them, in such a way as, to 
make them understandable to practitioners while retaining both their essence 
and their richness (i.e. their links to the body of knowledge from which they 
were derived). Stage 1 consisted of two processes. The first was to turn the 
statements derived from Project 2 (see the previous chapter) into questions. In 
addition to the issues raised in Project 2, upon a reflexive review, two 
additional questions were added. The first additional question was based on 
the premise that every action has both benefit and jeopardy associated with it. 
If this is the case then a question needs to be raised as to whether too much 
caution may also have its disadvantages. This leads to the question: “What are 
the risks to our organisation and society from being too cautious?” The second 
additional question is derived from the construct of “seeing being a way of not 
seeing” (covered in the previous chapter) and is linked to the concept of cross-
understanding (Huber and Lewis, 2010:7).  A question was therefore needed 
as to whether the group all saw the world through the same filter (paradigms). 
The morphing of the questions, in its raw format, can be seen in Appendix B. 
The second process was to analyse each statement in order to identify the 
issue to which it referred. This process identified four categories. The first was 
covering the problems being addressed, the second consisted of issues with 
the group considering the problem, the third was to do with the processes that 
the group use, and the fourth and final category was to do with the outcome of 
the process. These categories (problem, group, process and outcome) were 
considered to be likely to have greater resonance with practitioners than the 
categories adopted in Project 2 (seeing, appreciating and acting). This view 
was tested during the pilot study (stage 2). 
For the second stage, the method used was to pass the questions in turn to 
the respondents who, each time, reviewed the questions and amended the 
document. The purpose of this work was twofold. Firstly it was to ensure that 
the questions were comprehensible to the target audience, rather than 
retaining traceability to their original format. Second, it was to ensure that no 
question was considered to be “irrelevant”. The hurdle of “irrelevance” was 
seen to be high as questions were all derived from literature, so to label a 
question as irrelevant would be to question the whole area of academic work 
that had been encapsulated in the question. Before the fifth version of the 
questions was finalised, it was once again passed to all four respondents for 
their comments. No amendments were received at this stage. The 
development of the questions, in their raw format, is set out in Appendix C. 
This was the form in which the questions were sent out to the respondents in 
Stage Three.  
For the third and final stage, the method used was to send out to each 
respondent what was called a “workbook” (see Appendix D). The purpose of 
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the workbook was to provide the respondents with the questions, the 
background to the questions (thereby retaining some of their richness) and 
space in which to write notes if they so desired. The respondents were given 
time to consider the questions and then face-to-face meetings were arranged 
in order to capture their feedback. If a face-to-face meeting proved to be 
impractical, then a phone interview was conducted (Table 3 is annotated 
accordingly). It should be noted that while the answers in the workbook were 
geared towards an “I agree/ I disagree” response, the responses given during 
the interviews were far more nuanced. As well as the more reasoned 
responses (predicated around “why” they espouse the views they do), the 
interviewer looked for more visceral reactions, which was described in the 
workbook as the “squirm test”. This approach is what Morgan (1997:306-309) 
call the “Ah ha!” experience where the question resonates with the respondent 
as being valid. 
The basic format of each interview was to ask just the four questions on 
Usability, Utility, Feasibility and Learning. The aim was to record the 
respondents’ perceptions of the usability, utility and feasibility of the questions 
and the respondents’ reasoning. The respondents were asked whether they 
wanted to concentrate primarily on those with which they agreed or those with 
which they disagreed. The respondents were also asked an open question 
about whether they had any other comments to make. At the end of each 
interview, respondents were asked whether they felt that they had benefited 
from the experience and exposure to the questions. While it was expected 
most respondents would, out of politeness, answer positively, as indeed they 
did, the purpose of the questions was to provide a benchmark, or “take the 
mental temperature” of the respondent, against which to judge their other 
answers. For example: Respondent 10 stated that ‘he did not find the 
experience as annoying as many others’. He also added that he had spent 
three times as long as requested in considering the questions because of the 
interest they provoked. He also stated that he could easily have answered “I 
agree” to all the questions but this would not have made a very interesting 
interview. On the other hand Respondents 12 and 15 acknowledged that they 
were both enthusiastic learners and therefore it would be expected that they 
may approach the question of learning with more enthusiasm than 
Respondent 11 who stated that he found difficultly to find time for such work. 
Respondent 11 expressed the view that he wanted others to synthesise such 
work into key principles. The question therefore helped to provide indications 
of the mindset in which respondents framed their answers. 
All interviews were recorded. Responses were collated by respondent, using 
five Excel tables, one for each of the questions asked (Usability, Utility, 
Feasibility, Learning and additional comments). The recordings were analysed 
in order to extract the reasoning behind the views held by respondents on the 
practical utility of the questions. The report, set out below, uses the same 
format. 
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Respondents 
The sample, while being pragmatic (being based on personal and professional 
contacts), did provide diversity in terms of (1) public and private sectors, (2) 
types of industries (3) years of experience, and (4) the male and female mix.  
For Part 2, the aim was to use a small sample of people (five) who advise, 
were consulted by, or provided training to, those working at the board/ 
executive level within organisations. They are described in Table 23. On 
receipt of the questions, one person withdrew with the comment “the language 
in most cases is very (unnecessarily) complex which could alienate your 
audience”. 
Table 23 - List of Initial Respondents 
Respondent Description Sector 
1 Female, 33 years’ experience, general finance 
and leadership. BSc (Hons), Cert IoD. 
Currently employed in the development and 
delivery of board level leadership and 
management training. 
Chair of medium size charity, 400 employees, 
3500 active volunteers, turnover £40m p.a. 
Government 
and Charity 
2 Female, 15 years as a consultant focused on 
organisational change following 10+ years in 
international companies as an internal change 
specialist,  MBA. 
Specialises in planned change through projects 
and programmes. 
Public and 
Private 
3 Male, 27 years’ experience, BSc (Eng)(Hons)  
FCMA; Head of Risk and Assurance for a 
business of branded consumer products with a 
£500m turnover, selling in over 150 countries 
around the world.  
Private and 
Apparel 
4 Male, 35 years in the oil and petrochemical 
industry.  MIChemE, CMIOSH, BSc (Hons in 
Chem Eng), HSE management.  
Oil and 
petrochemical  
production 
industry 
5 (Withdrew)  
 
For Part 3, the aim was to use a sample of people who work at the board/ 
executive level within their organisations. The sample was self-selecting, 30 
people were approached. This included a key representative of the 
organisation that produces the UK’s governance code (Respondent 14) in 
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order to ascertain whether the questions had practical utility for them and 
those at whom the code is aimed. Of those who replied and were initially 
willing to take part, eleven were unable to fix a time in their diary during the 
window within which the data was being collected, and one Chief Operating 
Officer withdrew before being interviewed as a result of advice from his legal 
counsel who was concerned that ‘such sensitive areas … could comprise 
(their) employer’; he had only mentioned the subject in passing because he 
thought that the person ‘might be interested in the breadth of the subject 
matter’. Those who were finally interviewed are described in Table 24.  
 
Table 24 - List of Main Respondents 
Respondent Description Sector 
6 Male, Chief Financial Officer, 18 years’ 
experience, CMA & Qualified Treasurer, 
financial generalist and IT project management 
for a privately owned, global brand 
management house. 
FMCG and 
apparel.  
7 Male, Chief Executive Officer, 35 years’ 
experience, FCMI & CFCIPD, 3 Star military 
officer. 
Government  
8 
(Phone) 
Female, Non-Executive Director, 32 years’ 
experience, MSc in statistics, advises on 
Strategic Change. 
Private and 
Public sectors 
9 
(Phone) 
Male, Managing Director,  Banking Services for 
a global region of a large global financial 
services company, 20 years’ experience, 
BEng/MBA.  
Banking 
10 Male, Non-Executive Director to Government 
Departmental Board, 40 years’ experience, 
Geologist, Accountancy, Advises on finance, 
commerce, governance and risk.  
Extraction 
industry and 
Public sector 
11 Male, Director General, 36 years’ experience, 3 
Star military officer. 
Government 
12 Female, Chief Executive of a Government 
Agency, 2 Star Civil Servant, 30 years’ 
experience, specialises in Customer Service 
delivery operations. 
Government 
13 
(Phone) 
Female, 50+ years’ working experience, 
financial policy 
 
Government, 
Public Sector 
and 
Manufacturing  
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14 Male, 25 years’ working experience, 7 years 
with the regulatory body. Representative of the 
regulatory body that produces the UK’s 
governance code. 
Independent 
Public Body 
15 
(Phone) 
Female, 30 years’ working experience of which 
20 has been at board level, Business Degree, 
Specialisation – Marketing. Non-Executive 
Director, Working mainly in the retail and 
financial sectors 
Public and 
Private sectors 
16 
(Phone) 
Male, Chief Executive Officer, 37 years’ 
working experience, 11 at board level; Master 
Mariner. International shipping management 
company 
Shipping 
Industry 
 
17 
(Phone) 
Male, Chief Executive, 30 years’ working 
experience in global equity management  
company. 
Finance/ 
investments 
 
Interviewing was stopped when it was considered that no significant new data 
would be obtained. Responses had ranged from the enthusiastic to the 
sceptical. The consensus was clear and the limitations identified and other 
criticisms were consistent. It was concluded that no new data would 
significantly affect the findings of this research. The diversity of respondents 
did provide evidence that different sectors might approach their use of the 
questions in different ways. It was considered that further work may produce 
more data on this issue and, while this was considered to be both interesting 
and relevant to the overall intent, it was seen as being outside the scope of 
this research.  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUESTIONS 
As a result of Stages 1 and 2, the original 24 categories were finally reduced to 
20 questions, grouped under 4 headings. These headings emerged during the 
process; they were “the problem”, “the group”, “the process” and “summarising 
questions”. It was in this form that the questions were presented to the Stage 3 
respondents (see Appendix D).  
RESULTS 
The results of the interviews are presented under the four headings of 
“usability”, “utility”, “feasibility” and “learning”. The results contain many 
contradictory views. There has been no attempt to reconcile these 
contradictions but only to report them faithfully to enable the reader to see the 
variety of opinions held. From the outset, it has been accepted that there is 
unlikely to be a definitive set of questions. It is envisaged that the most that 
can be achieved is that the majority of the questions have practical utility to 
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some respondents. The practical utility envisaged is that the questions 
provoke thinking about the issue and provide an introduction to the body of 
knowledge that exists on this subject. 
Usability   
The issue of usability is whether the question was understood as presented. 
Three main issues concerning usability were raised as a result of interviewing 
the respondents. The first was cognitive focus, the second was about the 
specific wording within their individual context and the third was on specific 
aspects of the wording. 
An individual’s world view, temporary or fundamental, clearly affected the way 
they interpreted individual words. This understanding is an individual construct 
which, on a number of occasions, led to the reader clearly interpreting the text 
in a way unintended by the author. One example of this was Respondent 8 
who interpreted “seat of understanding” in Question 9 to mean “responsibility”; 
discussions indicated that she had been working on “delegation” around the 
time she was reading the questions and this had, in her view, clearly affected 
the way she interpreted certain words. This would suggest that no wording 
was ever likely to lead to a perfect shared interpretation in all circumstances. 
This is what Woolgar (1980) described as “the limitation of language”.  
Substantial numbers of the comments on usability came down to the specific 
wording of the questions in the context specific to the respondent. The 
comments highlighted some contradictions. While Respondents 1 to 4 
recommended questions be simplified and shortened, Respondent 7 felt 
Question 19 would benefit from expansion even if it ended up being a 
paragraph rather than a sentence. Respondent 3 suggested, as part of the 
pilot phase, that three questions be amalgamated as they all referred to the 
comprehension of warning signals; they became Question 7. Respondent 6 
saw the three parts to Question 7 as being three distinct issues and suggested 
that they be separated into three distinct questions. Even people from the 
same organisation might take different views on the wording; Respondent 3 
worked for Respondent 6. It was also clear that, in all cases, the respondent 
had understood the question and therefore the question’s phraseology was left 
as it was. It became clear that no wording would satisfy all respondents and all 
future potential users. 
A number of direct comments were made on the construct of the questions 
and these were adopted where they were considered to be appropriate. Some 
examples provide illustrations of this point. Respondent 9 commented that the 
questions contained ‘quite a bit of jargon’ which made them difficult to 
understand. Respondent 10 pointed to Question 8 being a compound question 
and suggested that clarity might be assisted by separating the different 
concerns into clearly separate questions. Respondent 8’s misinterpretation of 
the term “seat of understanding” demonstrated the weakness of using 
conceptual ideas within the question as a “hook” into the richness underlying 
the question: Respondent 10 just did not understand the same term and 
therefore did not understand the question.  
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The conclusion reached on usability was that no wording would satisfy 
everyone. The ambition was therefore for most of the questions to have 
meaning to most respondents. Taking into account the comments received, 
the questions could however still be improved. 
Utility   
The issue of utility was whether the questions provided a useful prompt to 
thinking. Three main issues concerning utility were raised as a result of 
interviewing the respondents. The first was the range of divergent views 
amongst respondents. The second was the issue of the questions being 
“utopian” in design. The third and final issue was an issue about “utility for 
whom?”  
There was considerable disagreement about utility between the respondents. 
This can be demonstrated in the debate over Questions 19 and 20, the 
summarising questions. Respondent 8 felt that the questions added no 
additional value as they were only repeating what had gone before. However, 
Respondent 11 preferred the same questions as they encapsulated all the 
previous issues and did not burden him with detail. 
The ambition of the questions was seen, by some, to limit their utility. 
Respondent 13 said, ‘it is very important not to have questions that make a 
group of people, … just feel that "that is just ridiculous, the scope is far beyond 
us’. She expressed her view that a number of the questions aimed for Utopia’, 
that they needed to be aimed ‘at a lower level of abstraction’ and that they 
needed to be aimed at a more specific issue within an organisation. 
Conversely Respondents 12 and 15 saw these as appropriate and provocative 
questions to ask. 
Part of the debate on utility revolved around the question “having utility to 
whom?” The results demonstrated different interpretations of the questions. 
The first interpretation was whether the questions prompted the respondent 
into thinking differently. Several disagreed that the questions had prompted 
their thinking because they were already very aware of the issues involved. 
Those that disagreed with utility for this reason were then asked about the 
questions’ wider utility. Respondent 8 commented that while several of the 
questions did not have utility for her, she felt that they had wider utility. An 
example of the range of views held by respondents is illustrated by the 
summary of Questions 19 and 20. Respondents 8 and 13 thought that 
Question 19 ‘added nothing new’, while Respondent 11 stated that ‘these 
questions in particular made him think’. Respondents 9 and 12 disagreed that 
Question 20 had utility while Respondents 11 and 15 agreed that it had.  
The conclusion reached on utility was that not all the questions could be 
expected to provoke new thinking in the same way. The ambition was again 
for most of the questions to provoke new thinking in most respondents. 
Respondents 6, 8 and 12 acknowledged that a number of the questions had 
made them “squirm”. While perceived utility of the questions was mixed, the 
fact that everyone found utility in some of the questions may be enough to 
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start a debate about risk which, according to three respondents (7, 12 and 15), 
does not happen enough. 
Feasibility   
The issue of feasibility was whether the questions could be used as part of a 
discussion on the risks that face their organisations. The results demonstrated 
that, in general, they could. Four main issues were raised by respondents. The 
first was the political sensitivity of the issues in the questions. The second was 
the potentially virtuous circle between academic and practical work. The third 
was whether all the questions could or should be used at once (as a checklist) 
and finally, and closely linked, was the potential ways of employing the 
questions. 
The feasibility of some questions was tempered by organisational politics. 
Respondent 6 said ‘you ask some absolutely spot on questions but it is an 
issue of how honest can you be’. Respondent 9 expressed a concern over the 
sensitive nature of some of the issues. While he saw the need to ask the 
questions, he was concerned about the potential adverse consequences of 
raising these issues. Respondent 15 made the point that ‘these are not 
inappropriate questions to ask. If you cannot ask them then this is a key 
warning that this is not a board I want to be on’. She went on to say ‘that it is 
also a matter of how and when the questions are asked’.  
The respondents provided illustrations of how the feasibility could be 
enhanced by a virtuous circle between academic work and practice. 
Respondent 14 confirmed that ‘there was a fair degree of convergence 
between the issues that came up at our meetings (as the regulator they had 
been talking to industry about their major concerns) and those you had 
identified’. He also noted that the format used provided a more 
comprehensible structure to the questions. Respondent 12 also commented 
that the structure was useful; it helped her, as a practitioner, to be able to use 
the points that she already knew from her own experience. As an adviser to a 
board, she would be able to point to work done in academia which would 
provide credibility to what she already knew. In turn, as part of this research, 
what she knew from her experience strengthens this research. The fact that 
the very different approaches of practice and scholarship both saw certain 
subjects as being important, adds weight to their inclusion in the list and to the 
feasibility of their use.  
The respondents debated the feasibility of using all the questions at once. 
Along with Respondents 6 and 8, Respondent 11 expressed the view that 
while it may be feasible to use the questions, he would not see them all being 
used at once. Rather they saw the questions being used as they were 
required. Respondents 11’s concerns went further; he was concerned that the 
questions might be used systematically as part of the process. His concern 
was that they may be used “unthinkingly” and therefore would hinder rather 
than promote the new thinking required. A number of respondents (6, 7, 8 and 
12) remarked, in one way or another, on the tendency within organisations to 
use questions such as these as “checklists”. They warned against this 
approach and emphasised the need therefore for the questions to be open in 
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design rather than being able to be answered with a yes/no reply. They agreed 
that, to enhance this approach, the questions should provoke respondents to 
seek to provide evidence to support their views or assumptions, rather than 
relying on assertions. 
Five respondents stated that they saw enough benefit from using the 
questions that they would try to apply them to their particular circumstances. 
Respondent 1 said that she intended to use the questions as part of her 
personal review of her charity’s risk registers in order to identify potential gaps. 
She would then raise a limited number of her key concerns; she pointed out 
her fear that if too many issues were raised at once, this might overwhelm the 
capacity and will of their organisations to deal with them. Respondent 4 said 
that he intended to separate out the questions most appropriate to each of the 
people who reported directly to him and ask them to review the questions in 
order to try to identify if they raised any fresh concerns. Respondent 12 stated 
that she now intended to pass the list of questions to her executive team and 
then conduct a team review; she concluded by saying ‘I’ve been really thinking 
about this (the way to use the questions to provoke new thinking) and our 
conversation was very useful indeed – indeed, the timing could not have been 
better!' Respondent 16 stated that he may use some of questions as “break 
out” sessions at the annual meeting of the organisation’s top executives. 
Respondent 11 also said he would use them. These responses show a range 
of potential ways to use the questions to stimulate thinking and to resist the 
temptation to turn them into a process. 
The conclusion reached on feasibility was that all the questions could be used 
under the right circumstances. As the questions do not constitute a process, 
respondents were left free to use the questions when they seemed 
appropriate. The respondents offered a range of ways this may be done, 
demonstrating the great flexibility in their use. 
Future Learning 
A secondary purpose of the questions proposed by this research was to 
provide access (a “portal”) into the extensive body of existing knowledge on 
risk. The fourth issue raised with respondents was whether there was any 
appetite amongst practitioners to research the original academic material. For 
the body of existing knowledge to have practical utility, practitioners have to 
want to access it. With the design of this research, access was to be provided 
firstly by “hooks” within the questions and secondly through the notes provided 
as part of the background to each question. These questions raised a third 
issue and that is whether the appetite to investigate this material is affected by 
the individual’s general appetite to learn. These subjects will be examined in 
turn. 
A number of the original questions were given “hooks” to what were 
considered to be key pieces of literature; these hooks failed. The purpose of 
the hooks was to suggest key ideas in order to entice respondents to find out 
more about the point at issue. Respondents saw the hooks as unhelpful 
jargon. All these hooks have been removed from the questions and replaced 
by more commonly used words. In this approach, it is recognised that this still 
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leaves the questions open to an interpretation unintended by their author. The 
trade-off here is seen as being between an alternative interpretation that still 
leads to new thinking or an accurate term that stops the thinking process. The 
former was seen to be more constructive. 
The material listed under the background also had a limited impact on the 
respondents. Some respondents became defensive about how little of the 
material they were aware. Three respondents commented on particular items 
that they would now investigate further. Overall, little interest was shown in 
individual pieces of research. However, surprise was shown at the amount of 
relevant research that had been conducted by academics. Interest was 
expressed in the packages of work associated with each question. With the 
exception of Respondent 11, who stated that he was ‘not interested in the 
details’ unless it would help him understand the context better, all the others 
expressed an interest in learning more about the background to a number of 
the questions, if not all at once, as the requirement arose. Even Respondent 
11 stated that, while he was not interested in the details of the underlying 
work, he would only be interested when it had been refined into ‘doctrine’ 
(within AJP-01(D) (2010) doctrine is defined as ‘Fundamental principles by 
which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is 
authoritative but requires judgement in application’.) Therefore the conclusion 
drawn is that while executives are less likely to investigate individual items of 
research, they are more likely to be interested in a package of research 
focused on each of the questions. 
The results would seem to show that there is an appetite to learn; however, 
this may be driven more by the individual’s personality and circumstances than 
by this particular subject matter. At one end of the spectrum was Respondent 
11. At the other end of the scale was Respondent 12, who has a ‘thirst for 
learning’ and described ‘how this whole exercise had made me wake up and 
smell the roses’; as she had never done any risk management training, she 
was already researching what training was available to her. She also stated 
that she had been ‘gob-smacked by how many models there were’ and while 
realising that she did not have the time to find out about them all, ‘a few to 
refresh her thinking’ would be useful. Respondent 8’s comments represented 
those in the middle. She stated that “yes”, she had a desire to learn more but 
“what” ‘depends on the circumstances’ prevailing at the time. Respondent 6 
said that he was now ‘going to Google the rubber-band theory’. Respondent 7, 
who sees himself as having considerable experience of, and training in, 
managing risk acknowledged that this research has shown him that he had 
much more to learn. He comments that the amount of material ‘out there … 
even surprises me’. Respondent 15 saw that the level of interest was likely to 
depend on 1) the sector and 2) the personal appetite for learning which, in her 
experience, was higher amongst Non-Executive Directors than executives. 
Therefore these results suggest that if this work were to be developed as 
packages of education, they might be more successfully focused at Non-
Executive Directors as their primary target and executives as the secondary. 
The conclusion that therefore can be drawn from this research is that there 
may be a limited appetite to learn about the background research that 
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underpins the questions. Even those with a self-declared “appetite to learn” 
showed little inclination to examine, what is to them, the raw material. 
Therefore, it might be concluded that, a valuable area for future research 
would be to examine how the material that exists might be taught to 
practitioners. It would appear that little of the general practical utility of the 
existing research has been realised. 
The conclusion reached at this point is that, while the questions can be 
refined, they do have potential practical utility. 
RESHAPING THE QUESTIONS 
Important when shaping the questions is to remember that these questions 
should not be seen as being definitive. No question should be seen to be 
privileged over another as this would have implications for whole areas of 
research, which is a subject outside the scope of this research. They are not 
designed to provide the final answer but should be seen as a catalyst to the 
start of a debate about risk within an organisation. As a result of discussions 
with respondents, a number of design parameters emerged for the questions if 
their practical utility was to be maximised: 
 While each question has been derived from a rich source of ideas, for 
clarity each question should contain a single clear idea. Where 
compound questions are required, each part of the question should be 
clearly separated. (Respondent 10)  
 The question should ask, or at least imply, that the evidence on which 
the judgement is made should be made explicit rather than those 
individuals involved relying on intuitive judgement. This is to ensure all 
underlying assumptions are aired and debated, which in turn, would 
enhance shared understanding within the group. 
 The use of the negative question was deliberately used in order to 
challenge the “positive perspective” often held by senior management 
(this has been referred to as “optimism bias”). Respondents 10 and 12 
stated that they did not like question 20 because it was phrased in the 
negative; when asked why, their answers were based on the fact that 
this was the way it was usually done. Upon reflection, Respondent 10 
acknowledged that a negative question did force him to see the 
question in a different light. 
 Respondents 10 and 13 pointed out that the questions, to them, were 
not always clear in the way the terms “executive” and “the board” were 
used. The intent of this research is to focus on those with governance 
responsibilities whether this is as a “unitary board” or in organisations 
that have distinctively separate roles such as those of the executive or 
as a board member. Therefore the term “board/ executive” was adopted 
to capture both cases.  
 
Appendix E illustrates the final development of the questions; additions are in 
italics and deletions are ruled through. The final form of the questions is given 
in Table 25. 
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Table 25 - Final Question Formulation 
The Problems 
1.  Where do we need to have clear and fully justifiable criteria for which 
events or scenarios are included in and excluded from our risk 
management process? 
2.  While we normally monitor “outcomes” (“end”), where do we need to 
monitor the “processes” (“means”) that might create unacceptable 
outcomes? 
3.  What risks are “acceptable” to us and why; how have we tested our 
reasoning for both core and non-core activity (against both internal and 
external yardsticks) to ensure that our reasoning is robust? 
4.  Of those issues that we judge to be so improbable as to be 
“inconceivable”, which of these still have such potentially serious 
consequences (unacceptable) that we must stay alert to them? 
5.  What evidence do we have that we have a shared understanding 
about: 
(1) when we will prepare an alternative plan (anticipation),  
(2) when we will set aside reserve capacity (resilience), 
(3) where we just react to situations (reactive)? 
6.  How might our approach to risk taking be stifling our organisation? 
The Group 
7.  Are we aware of what factors might:  
(1) inhibit us from taking note of warning signs,   
(2) affect our perception of them, 
(3) restrain us from acting upon them? 
8.  a. How well do we understand our system’s operating modes 
(routine, high tempo, emergency and maintenance) and manage 
the transition between them? 
b. How well do we know those who will have to handle potential crises 
and are we sure they are equipped to do so? 
9.  How do we judge the most appropriate level within our organisation 
for decisions to be made and whether each decision maker has the 
appropriate intuitive understanding of the issues, the organisation and 
its resources, and the ability to act in a timely manner? 
10.  What proof is there that we are conscious of the dynamics and 
personal interactions that might cause our board and executive team 
to be dysfunctional (thereby generating risk) and what are we doing 
to ensure that we do not fall into these traps? 
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The Process 
11.  How can we be sure that we have a culture that takes every key 
opportunity to learn from unwanted events experienced within the 
organisation (accidents and near-misses) and from the experience of 
other organisations? 
12.  How do we, as the board/ executive group and as an organisation, 
ensure that we are getting the appropriate and relevant data to feed 
into our risk discourse? How do we judge appropriate and relevant? 
13.  How do we judge whether the way we analyse risk is appropriate to 
the risks we face? 
14.  What might give us confidence that after an unwanted event our 
decision-making will stand up, in hindsight, to critical external 
scrutiny? 
15.  How do we ensure that all the members of the board/ executive have a 
shared view and understanding of the organisation, the way it works 
and its risks? 
16.  What evidence can be provided that our plans and policies are 
robust enough to withstand a disruptive event? 
17.  How might we notice where an emerging gap between our practice 
and our formal procedures becomes a potential source of risk? 
18.  When would we expect our people to use their experience and 
intuition rather than adhering strictly to written plans or standards; 
when might this cause problems? Where might our “rule-book” 
actually hamper the achievement of our organisational goals?  
Summarising Questions 
19.  What “unwanted” occurrences (including those perceived as 
“inconceivable”) might affect our organisation? 
20.  What evidence exists to show that our organisation’s culture, structure 
or processes do NOT provoke errors or rule violations? 
 
Overall, the research is about knowledge transfer between the academic 
community and practitioners. The questions are aimed at those who are 
described, for the purpose of this paper, as the intuitive user (see the next 
section on “Level of expertise” for an explanation of this term). This person is 
least likely to be versed in the theoretical knowledge that underpins risk 
management practices. It is accepted that no single set of questions will be 
perfect for all contexts (an 80% fit would therefore be seen as the target). 
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DISCUSSION 
Before discussing the findings, it is important to remind ourselves of the 
context and purpose of this work. This research is set in the context of 
“Thinking about how to think about” risk (adapted from Wildavsky, 1988:2). 
Here risk is seen to be a social construction and something negative that 
worries us. However, a key problem is that we have ways of seeing that also 
mean we might not see what is in front of us. The question therefore becomes 
how might we see in a new way in order to appreciate what is “really” 
happening around us and how might this lead us to act in an appropriate way 
that forestalls failure? The issue becomes, how might knowledge from 
previous research help forestall failure and what do we learn about this 
previous knowledge from trying to use it? More specifically, do the questions 
derived from previous research have practical utility (Corley and Gioia, 2011)? 
This was tested using the criteria of usability, utility and feasibility derived from 
Platts (1993). 
An important aspect of this discussion is its reflexive nature – looking at the 
answers through the lens of the material being considered. The research into 
risk has identified a number of behaviours amongst decision makers that might 
aggravate or mitigate potential risks. The answers provided by respondents 
therefore cannot be taken at face value; not only does consideration need to 
be given to what they were trying to say and what they were trying to avoid 
saying, but the answers need to be considered in the light of knowledge 
gained from previous research into risk. This includes such issues as denial, 
cognitive dissonance, management distancing and distancing by 
differentiation, to name but four of the issues that emerged during Project 2. 
The discussion of the results comes under 12 headings:  
1) the limitations of this research,  
2) links to the UK Combined Code (2010),  
3) discussions with the Regulator,  
4) levels of expertise,  
5) failing to ask,  
6) knowing, but not acting,  
7) attitude towards the questions,   
8) desire to learn,  
9) a coherent whole,  
10) liability v. risk,  
11) implications for future research, and  
12) implications for future practice. 
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Limitations 
It is recognised that this research, in common with all research, has its 
limitations. The key limitations discussed here are firstly that the respondents 
were self-selecting. The second limitation is the one presented by the use of 
telephone interviews. The third limitation is that the understanding of the 
literature used is based on the reading by a single person. The final limitation 
is that the research is based around the UK’s governance code which has 
implications for the generalisability of this work.  
The list of respondents was self-selecting. As such the concern is that this 
might have biased the result of the work. As a qualitative piece of research, 
the intent was to access the breadth of potential views, rather than a desire to 
understand the types of views held as categories or the numbers of 
respondents that fell into each category. The results show that many of the 
questions had both supporters and detractors. It is therefore considered that a 
sufficient balance within the sample was achieved. The results showed that 
the questions had practical utility, yet they could still be improved. On the 
subject of learning, the sample provided examples of respondents who would 
wish to learn more and those who would not. Therefore the anticipated 
spectrum was captured which helps to identify both those most likely to be 
interested in future learning and the reason why others did not wish to learn 
more. Further research may now be undertaken to examine the number of 
board members and executives that fall into these categories and the 
implication for future risk governance. For two reasons the number of 
invitations to participate not accepted was neither a surprise nor revealing. The 
first reason is that research at this level within organisations is notoriously 
difficult to undertake. The second is that risk as a subject area does not have 
the same profile, and therefore interest, as matters such as finance and that it 
can be handled with intuitive skill possessed by those in charge of 
organisations. However, given the sample achieved, it does suggest that the 
questions have practical utility and there are a number of people operating at 
this level within organisations who feel that they might benefit from learning 
more about the literature that underpins this work. Further research would be 
required to quantify the constituencies that hold these views. 
While the limitations of telephone interviews (Saunders et al., 2007:342) are 
recognised, in these circumstances (structured interviews) it was felt that the 
convenience and access provided by using telephone interviews outweighed 
the potential disadvantages. In practice, while the quality of the interaction 
between researcher and the respondents was easier when the interviews were 
held face-to-face, upon analysis this was not a key factor in the quality of the 
data obtained. The key factor proved to be the openness (which might be 
interpreted as a lack of defensiveness) of the respondent. 
The understanding of the literature is limited to that of one person’s reading. It 
is recognised that a richer understanding of the material would be gained by 
the use of multiple readers who then debate the number of possible 
interpretations. This matches the requisite variety advocated within the 
literature necessary to recognise unusual circumstances. While this may 
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appear to be an important limitation, due to the limited ambition of this work, 
which is inviting others to participate and comment, it is not considered to be 
significant in practice. 
This research uses the UK’s code of corporate governance, the Combined 
Code 2010, as its example of such a code. The UK has adopted a principle-
based approach rather than a rule-based approach to corporate governance. 
The use of a single national code may limit, in some ways, the generalisability 
of these findings. This approach should not however provide any limitations in 
prompting how to think about thinking about risk. Also, as the UK code is 
principle-based, it is likely that this research will be more generalisable to other 
national codes that are also principle-based rather than to codes that are rule-
based (such as the US’s Sarbane-Oxley Act). Further research is required to 
examine whether the questions can be linked in the same way to alternative 
national codes of governance.  
In summary, while the limitations of this research are recognised, they are not 
thought to detract from the findings. 
Link to the UK Combined Code (2010) 
Respondents 8, 13, 14 and 15 raised the issue of the link between the 
questions presented by this research and the national code of practice for 
corporate governance with their reference to risk and risk management. As 
previously stated, for the UK this is the Combined Code (FRC, 2010a). Table 
26 sets out the sections in the Combined Code in which risk is stated or 
implied and to which the questions may be linked [see italics]. This is to 
demonstrate where there is a direct link between the current Code and the 
questions provided by this research. 
Table 26 - UK Combined Code 2010 
4. In their responses to explanations, shareholders should pay due regard to 
companies’ individual circumstances and bear in mind, in particular, the size 
and complexity of the company and the nature of the risks and challenges it 
faces. 
A1. Every company should be headed by an effective board [or Dysfunctional? 
– Q10]  which is collectively responsible for the long-term success of the 
company. 
A3. The chairman is responsible for leadership of the board and ensuring its 
effectiveness on all aspects of its role. 
… ensuring constructive relations between executive and non-executive 
directors. [Links to annual review of Chairman’s performance. See A4]. 
A4. Non-executive Directors – As part of their role as members of a unitary 
board, non-executive directors should constructively challenge [asking all the 
questions the executive might wish to avoid] and help develop proposals on 
strategy. 
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Non-executive directors should scrutinise the performance of management in 
meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of 
performance. They should satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial 
information and that financial controls and systems of risk management are 
robust and defensible [Q14]. They are responsible for determining 
appropriate levels of remuneration of executive directors and have a prime role 
in appointing and, where necessary, removing executive directors [Q9 and 10], 
and in succession planning. 
… the non-executive directors should meet without the chairman present at 
least annually to appraise the chairman’s performance [Q9 and 10]. 
B.1. The Composition of the Board – The board and its committees should 
have the appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and 
knowledge of the company [seat of understanding – Q9] to enable them to 
discharge their respective duties and responsibilities effectively. 
The board should include an appropriate combination of executive and non-
executive directors (and, in particular, independent non-executive directors) 
such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s 
decision taking. [Preventing dysfunctional activity – Q10].  
B.4. Development – All directors should receive induction [seat of 
understanding – Q9] on joining the board and should regularly update and 
refresh their skills and knowledge. 
The chairman should ensure that the directors continually update their skills 
and the knowledge and familiarity with the company [seat of understanding 
– Q9] required to fulfil their role both on the board and on board committees. 
The company should provide the necessary resources for developing and 
updating its directors’ knowledge and capabilities.  
To function effectively, all directors need appropriate knowledge of the 
company [seat of understanding – Q9] and access to its operations and staff. 
B.5. – The board should be supplied in a timely manner with information in a 
form and of a quality appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties.  
[Appropriate and relevant data – Q12 but the issue posed by Questions 7a, 
7b, and 7c is whether those receiving the information extract from it the full 
implications for the organisation]. 
B.6. – The board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation 
of its own performance and that of its committees and individual directors. 
[Preventing dysfunctional activity – Q10]. 
C.1. – Financial And Business Reporting – The board should present a 
balanced [risk is implied in this statement] and understandable assessment of 
the company’s position and prospects. 
C.1.2. The directors should include in the annual report an explanation of the 
basis on which the company generates or preserves value over the longer 
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term (the business model) and the strategy for delivering the objectives of the 
company. [Q15]. 
C.2. Risk Management and Internal Control – The board is responsible for 
determining the nature and extent of the significant risks [what is included 
and excluded - Q1; tight and loose Q2] it is willing to take in achieving its 
strategic objectives. The board should maintain sound risk management 
[Q11; Q12; Q13; Q14; Q15; Q16; Q17; Q18] and internal control systems. 
C.2.1. The board should, at least annually, conduct a review of the 
effectiveness [Acceptable - Q3: Consequences - Q4: mitigations - Q5] of the 
company’s risk management and internal control systems and should report 
to shareholders that they have done so. The review should cover all material 
controls, including financial, operational and compliance controls. 
C.3. Audit Committee and Auditors – The board should establish formal 
and transparent arrangements for considering how [process: Q11; Q12; Q13; 
Q14; Q15; Q16; Q17; Q18] they should apply the corporate reporting and risk 
management [although this is focused on Financial risk] and internal control 
principles and for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the company’s 
auditor. 
D.1. – The Level and Components of Remuneration 
The remuneration committee should judge where to position their company 
relative to other companies. But they should use such comparisons with 
caution in view of the risk [downside of an unwanted outcome] of an upward 
ratchet of remuneration levels with no corresponding improvement in 
performance. 
D.1.4. – The aim should be to avoid rewarding poor performance [Q10]. They 
should take a robust line on reducing compensation to reflect departing 
directors’ obligations to mitigate loss. 
Schedule A – Remuneration incentives should be compatible with risk 
policies [what are the risk polices? Q3] and systems.  
E.1. –  Dialogue with Shareholders – There should be a dialogue with 
shareholders based on the mutual understanding of objectives. The board as 
a whole has responsibility for ensuring that a satisfactory dialogue with 
shareholders takes place [shared understanding – Q8]. 
 
Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, can be seen to 
have a clear association with the Combined Code. However, this research 
suggests that a number of questions that emerge from the research do not 
have such explicit linkage to the Code. Question 6, which addresses the issue 
of proper balance of risk is only implied by (1) the direction to “Comply or 
Explain” and by (2) section C.2.1. which requires the board to review the 
effectiveness of the risk management process; making the connection 
depends on how organisations define “effective”. While Section B.5. of the 
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Code asks about the timely provision of data, it misses the issues that lie 
behind Question 7. The premise behind B.5. might be interpreted to be that if 
the right data is provided then the appropriate decisions will result; as written it 
would seem to miss the issues that lie behind Question 7 and one has to be 
conversant with guidance provided elsewhere (FRC, 2011) in order to 
understand the full scope of this section. Question 7 questions the premise 
that provision of data is sufficient and asks the board/executive to examine any 
such assumption. Question 11 highlights that there is nothing in the Combined 
Code that requires those involved in governance to learn from their own 
experience or that of others. Questions 19 and 20 are not specifically 
addressed but are also implied by the existence of the Combined Code. While 
a substantial correlation can be seen between the proposed Questions and 
the Code (between this research proposition and practice), it is not yet perfect. 
Further work is needed in this area. 
Discussion with the Regulator 
Respondent 14, as a representative of the UK Regulator (the Financial 
Reporting Council), found a ‘fair degree of convergence’ between the issues 
identified in his work and this research; he emphasised that ‘there is a lot of 
correlation between the two’. He also stated that the categories under which 
issues were grouped by this research ‘seem to work pretty well’. His views 
were formed as the result of conducting a series of meetings to inform the 
development of the Code in respect of risk management. He noted that, 
although he had not discussed every question with his respondents, there was 
‘nothing in his discussions that suggested that any question was irrelevant’. He 
confirmed that he saw practical utility in the research as ‘this approach of 
producing prompts is much better than trying to prescribe processes’. He also 
confirmed that the work had been helpful to him in ways of rephrasing some of 
his questions. 
Respondent 14 was also able to provide evidence that the purpose of the 
research offered practical utility. He confirmed that the Code looked to address 
more than just the financial risks to an organisation. Its focus was ‘any key risk 
to the delivery of the strategy’. This established the link, in the organisation’s 
collective mind, between risk and strategy. His discussions endorsed the view 
that the ownership of risk remains with the operational branch and that the risk 
function was about providing advice and challenge. In this way he saw risk 
being linked to performance management. Respondent 14 reported that those 
who contributed to his work concluded that ‘the board did not spend enough 
time discussing risk’; this view was also expressed by Respondents 7 and 12. 
Discussion with Respondent 14 established that all but two questions could be 
directly linked to the Combined Code. These were Questions 7 and 11. 
Question 11, which refers to learning, did however surface as part of his work. 
The issue of ‘what they could learn from what others had been through’ was 
raised. The issue of “knowledge into action” was not examined during his 
work; the issue is discussed further below. 
The discussion with the regulatory authority did indicate that the research 
approach and findings were consistent with their work. The research however 
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was seen by them to be more systematic and structured and looked at the 
same issues in greater depth. These discussions proved to be important in the 
reshaping of the questions. 
Level of Expertise 
There is a wide range of expertise amongst practitioners of risk management. 
Respondent 8 started a discussion about who the questions were aimed at; 
while both the researcher and respondent were clear that the level of analysis 
was the board/ executive level of the organisation, what the respondent was 
looking to address was whether the questions were aimed at the expert or 
non-expert user. Having reflected on the question, the answer developed in 
two parts. 
The first part of the answer is that the questions are aimed at the non-risk 
expert; this is seen to be the executive who has had no formal training in risk 
management or who has not specialised in the consideration of risk. These 
executives rely on their general experience and knowledge to make sound 
judgement on matters of risk. The implication of this is that the questions must 
therefore be phrased using language that is designed to be clear and have no 
terms that have very specific meanings to some parts of the risk management 
community. 
The second part of the answer to Respondent 8’s question led to the 
development of a nominal scale of users. The groupings are seen to have 
varying degrees of training, education, experience and specialisations in 
matters of risk. A rudimentary scale is proposed at Table 27: 
 
Table 27 - Scale of Users 
Scale of Users Description 
Intuitive User No training and uses their own general ability and 
experience in order to make judgements in respect of risk. 
Trained or Experienced 
User 
While they may have some general training, they have 
mainly learned the craft of risk management through 
extensive trial and error. 
Subject Matter Expert 
(SME) 
Has received some formal training, or through extensive 
practical experience of managing a specific risk speciality.  
Multidiscipline SME   Has training and or experience of a number of recognised 
risk management disciplines. 
Scholar/ Practitioner Has extensive knowledge of the research and theory that 
underlie risk management practice and has extensive 
practical experience. 
Academic Has extensive knowledge of the research and theory that 
underlie risk management practice but has little practical 
know-how. 
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It is envisaged that, while the basic questions should have practical utility to 
the intuitive user, they should also provide a portal to the more detailed 
research that lies behind the questions. The other users, with more experience 
and knowledge, may use their understanding to adapt the questions to their 
audience, incorporating more detail. They may become aware of areas of 
existing knowledge with which they had not previously been made familiar; for 
some details see the right hand column of the original workbook (see 
Appendix D). The details are provided with the aim of enhancing the 
knowledge of those with experience or seen as being experts.  
This scale is seen as being only a prototype. Research is now required in 
order to develop suitable categorisation of users. Consistent with the approach 
adopted in this paper, the purpose of these categories would be to stimulate 
users to ask themselves the question: “Where would I place myself: [1] an 
intuitive user; [2] an experienced user; [3] an SME, of which risk discipline(s); 
[4] Scholar? What does this tell me about my actual level of knowledge and 
the gaps in my knowledge and how does this correspond to my assumptions 
about my knowledge and practice?” 
In summary, the relationship between practitioner and knowledge can be seen 
to be multifaceted. Therefore it is unlikely that any single framework can be 
optimised for all potential audiences. This research can be seen to have the 
ambitious goal of linking detailed research with intuitive users. The scale of 
this ambition has emerged during the course of the research. However, no 
matter what level of expertise a person has, they are still seen to need to ask 
the right questions, be open to the data they receive and be prepared to 
acknowledge the limits of their own knowledge.  
Failure to Ask 
A key issue is the willingness or the ability of those involved in this process to 
ask difficult and challenging questions. The “failure to ask” was a major theme 
explored during Project 2; a number of responses illustrated that this was still 
an issue amongst these respondents. Respondent 13 said that 'it was taken 
for granted that we had contingency plans’. Two respondents (9 and 16), while 
accepting the questions at issue, expressed the belief that their organisations 
“had the matter covered” rather than question whether what they did “was 
appropriate”. Respondent 9 suggested that, because he was in a heavily 
regulated industry, he relied on the regulatory process to detect irregularities. 
This reliance upon regulatory systems comes as a stark contrast to findings 
within the literature. Amongst others, Vaughan’s (1996) discussion of the 
Challenger Accident and Perrow’s (2007) discussion about how to reduce 
society’s vulnerabilities, both debated the role of regulators and found them 
wanting for a variety of reasons. These writers both cite political, structural and 
social limitations to all types of regulatory systems and point out that all the 
available options have their inherent weaknesses. In all these circumstances, 
it is the assumption that what is done is adequate but it can be seen to present 
an unmonitored potential source of vulnerability. But just asking can also be 
seen not to be enough. 
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Knowing, but Not Acting 
The key issue for any such thinking framework is whether knowing leads to 
action. The purpose of these questions is to prompt more detailed thinking and 
reflection on particular areas that may generate risk for their organisation. Any 
such questions need to prompt more than just an acceptance that the 
questions have utility. Users need to approach such issues, not with a 
question about whether they are addressing the particular issue, but 
questioning whether they are doing “what is appropriate in the circumstances”, 
i.e. not only are they doing enough but, given the circumstances, are they 
doing too much. This behaviour may be seen to be consistent with concerns 
expressed within the literature about the tendency of individuals to deny issues 
that are relevant to them or trying to “distance” themselves from the issues’ 
relevance. It is also a key concern of this research as expressed in the 
relationship between “seeing, appreciating and acting”. Respondent 6 said that 
‘it is not (just) about asking the right questions, it is about how you build them 
into the management’s (process)’. Discussion with Respondent 14 exposed 
the false assumption [see Project 2], contained within the Combined Code, 
that data knowledge would lead to action.  
Respondent 11 provides evidence that thinking differently does not necessarily 
lead to doing things differently. While Respondent 11 said that the questions 
had provoked him to think differently, and in his role as a school governor he 
would probably use the questions, he did not see himself using them in his 
core business. When asked to explain “why not”, he took some time to 
consider his answer and then acknowledged that there was no reason why 
not; this would seem to demonstrate that cultural norms and “ways of doing” 
are much harder to change than simply providing new ways of thinking. The 
issue for the future is how research may help those concerned by linking this 
work to other work that addresses the concerns about how to avoid issues, 
such as denial or distancing, when considering such questions.  
Attitude towards the Questions 
The interviews revealed that attitude is as important as the questions. A range 
of attitudes were expressed when it came to examining the questions. The 
range included those who found reasons for not using the questions as 
prompts to their thinking, to those who found the exercise stimulating. 
Comments on attitude can be separated into two groups. The first is the 
attitude of the individual respondents and the second is the attitude of the 
groups with whom they work. 
Practical utility therefore comes down to individual utility. The extremes in 
attitudes of the respondents can be demonstrated using comments provided 
by them. Respondent 16 said ‘Great questions and I enjoyed thinking about 
them’. Respondent 12 said ‘I’ve been really thinking about this and our 
conversation was very useful indeed’; she also described it as ‘a very useful 
and enjoyable exercise’. Respondent 7 said ‘It would be nice to devote an 
hour to just talk about this’; he was referring to working with his executive 
team. Conversely, Respondent 13 said ‘the questions existed at too high a 
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level of generalisation to be easy to think about’; she expressed reservations 
about the utility of such an abstraction exercise. Respondent 11 stated ‘I did 
not feel hugely stimulated to read anything in the right hand column’ (the 
detailed research); his focus was on applying distilled principles rather than 
exploring the subject at the level of these questions. These and other 
comments indicated that the attitude with which an individual approaches the 
questions is as important as the questions themselves.  
Group dynamic and social norms are also likely to affect the practical utility of 
such questions. As individuals combine into groups or teams, group dynamics 
and social norms have an effect on the behaviour of boards and executive 
teams (an issue raised by Question 10). Respondent 15 clearly differentiated 
between boards she would take part in, where such questions are asked, 
rather than those either run by ‘Alpha males … who want to exert themselves’  
or boards composed of ‘dead white males’ (a caricature of where requisite 
variety is lacking) where the challenge of such questions would be 
unacceptable. The questions are therefore more likely to have practical utility 
for groups that welcome constructive challenge (Respondent 15). Examples of 
this were provided by Respondents 6 and 12 who already have plans to ask 
the questions within their teams in ways that suited their organisations. 
No set of questions, by themselves, can transform a process, let alone a 
process of risk governance. The potential users of such questions have to be 
open minded enough to want to accept the challenge presented by any such 
questions. The practical utility of any such set of questions should not 
therefore be judged by the willingness of any population to adopt them; that is 
a separate question, which is not being asked by this research. That some 
respondents have been stimulated by the questions, shows that they have 
practical utility. It is accepted that this might, at present, be to a very limited 
population. 
While consideration of the questions ‘just takes a moment of thought, - a 
moment can be a long time and thinking is difficult’ (Respondent 10, 
paraphrasing A.E. Housman). These questions are not primarily about what 
organisations do, they are about provoking discussion about what they are not 
doing (that they should be). Therefore, the attitude with which an individual 
approaches these questions is as important as the questions themselves, as is 
the individuals’ desire to learn. An exercise such as this is therefore unlikely to 
be an easy one. 
Desire to Learn 
An important consideration on whether practitioners will learn, is their desire to 
learn. The difference in the appetite to learning of board/ executive members 
was clear to see in the responses from Respondents 11 and 12. Respondent 
11 stated that he had no inclination to look any deeper into the work on which 
the questions were based. Respondent 12 stated that she would love to spend 
time looking at the background material but regretted that time would not 
permit this; she would, however, spend time determining which areas might 
prove the most beneficial to study. Respondent 8 produced a more typical 
answer in that she saw benefit from examining each area in more detail and 
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saw that this should be done as the issue becomes a priority for her 
organisation. These answers should be seen in the light of Question 11 and 
suggest that those who indicated a reluctance to learn from others were 
missing the opportunity to benefit more cheaply than would be the case if they 
had their own organisational disaster. What this evidence does suggest is that 
an organisation’s ability to learn from the work of others is likely to be limited 
by their attitude to learning rather than the availability of the relevant 
information. 
A Coherent Whole 
The questions should not be seen as a list of unrelated items, but rather users 
should try to ‘explain how seemingly disparate or unrelated theories fit together 
to form a coherent whole’ (Editor AMR, 2011).  Governance also requires a 
clear overview of the organisation and its activities. Respondent 6 stated that 
the questions covered a wider scope than might traditionally be considered to 
be risk management. Respondents 7 and 16 remarked on how the questions 
overlap and were interrelated; this links back to Perrow’s discussion of 
interactive complexity with Normal Accident Theory. This complexity is difficult 
to represent in the linear form provided by the list format. Therefore, there is a 
need to develop a holistic overview. One option may be to develop the 
question set in the form of a strategy map (Kaplan and Norton, 2004); 
Calandro and Lane (2006) have discussed the integration of risk and 
performance in this format. Another approach may be to take a systems 
thinking approach such as used by Barber (2008). The illustration used at 
Figure 9 is based, for its greater simplicity, on the strategy map format. This 
format provides the opportunity to illustrate the potential interactions between 
the questions. At this stage, which connections are annotated is thought not to 
be important; what is important is that they “provoke”, that they ‘[get] us 
talking, digging, comparing, refining, and focusing on the right question’ 
(Weick, 2004). A holistic view does, however, raise some interesting 
anomalies. 
Liability v. Risk 
In his discussion of Normal Accidents, Perrow (1999) expressed the view that 
he saw that there was sometimes a conflict between the work of lawyers, 
trying to limit liability, and the efforts required for effective risk management. 
Perrow’s comments related particularly to the shipping industry; Respondent 
16 expressed the view that the problem still exists in the industry today. 
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What “unwanted” occurrences 
(including those perceived as 
“inconceivable”) might affect our 
organisation?
When would we expect our 
people to use their 
experience and intuition 
rather than adhering strictly to 
written plans or standards; 
when might this cause 
problems? Where might our 
“rule-book” actually hamper 
the achievement of our 
organisational goals? 
How might we notice where 
an emerging gap between 
our practice and our formal 
procedures becomes  a 
potential source of risk?
What evidence can be 
provided that our plans and 
policies are robust enough 
to withstand a disruptive 
event.
How do we ensure that all the 
members of the board/ executive have 
a shared view and understanding of 
the organisation, the way it works and 
its risks?
What might give us confidence 
that after an unwanted event our 
decisions-making will stand 
up, in hindsight, to critical 
external scrutiny?
How do we judge whether the 
way we analyse risk is 
appropriate to the risks we face?
How do we, as the board/
executive group and as an 
organisation, ensure that we are 
getting the appropriate and 
relevant data to feed into our 
risk discourse? How do we judge 
appropriate and relevant?
How can we be sure that we 
have a culture that takes every 
key opportunity to learn from 
unwanted events experienced 
within the organisation 
(accidents and near-misses) and 
from the experience of other 
organisations?
What proof is there that we are conscious of the 
dynamics and personal interactions that might cause 
our board and executive team to be dysfunctional 
(thereby generating risk) and what are we doing to 
ensure that we do not fall into these traps?
How do we judge the most appropriate level 
within our organisations for decisions to be made 
and whether each decision maker has the 
appropriate intuitive understanding of the issues 
and the organisation, and its  resources, and the 
ability to act in a timely manner?
a.   How well do we understand our system’s 
operating modes (routine, high tempo, 
emergency and maintenance) and manage the 
transition between them?
b.   How well do we know those who will have to 
handle potential crises and are we sure they are 
equipped to do so?
Are we aware of what factors might: 
(1) inhibit us from taking note of warning signs,  
(2)  affect our perception of them or
(3) restrain us from acting upon them?
How might our approach to risk 
taking be stifling our organisation?
What evidence do we have that we have a shared 
understanding about:
(1) when we will prepare an alternative plan 
(anticipation), 
(2) whenwe will set aside reserve capacity 
(resilience) or 
(3) where we just react to situations (reactive)?
Of those issues that we judge to be so 
improbable as to be “inconceivable”, 
which of these still have such 
potentially serious consequences 
(unacceptable) that we must stay alert 
to them?
What risks are “acceptable” to us and 
why; how have we tested our 
reasoning for both core and non-core 
activity (against both internal and 
external yardsticks) to ensure that our 
reasoning is robust?
While we normally monitor “outcomes” 
(“end”), where do we need to monitor the  
“processes” (“means”) that might create 
unacceptable outcomes?
Where do we need to have 
clear and fully justifiable criteria 
for which events or scenarios 
are included in and excluded 
from our risk management 
process?
What evidence exists to show that our 
organisation’s culture, structure or processes 
do NOT provoke errors or rule violations??
“20" Questions
 
Figure 9 - Schematic of "20 Questions"
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Respondent 6 also expressed concern that the legal process of discovery, for 
cases of litigation, provides an incentive to organisations to reduce the 
documentation and explicit evaluations necessary for effective risk 
management. Respondent 15 commented that organisations run by ‘lawyers 
and economists’, where they rely on rules, have a tendency to fall prey to the 
‘law of unintended consequences’. These examples, coupled with the 
withdrawal of one potential respondent after advice from his in-house council, 
suggest that this conflict may be worth a more detailed examination. Further 
research may therefore be required to determine the extent to which the 
interests of liability mitigation may militate against effective risk management. 
This issue also suggests that there may be serious conflicts between different 
components of risk management. This should, in turn, alert us to there being the 
potential that other unseen conflicts may exist within the overall concept of Risk 
Management. Research is therefore also required to determine where there 
may be other potential conflicts within the suite of activities referred to as risk 
management. 
Implications for Future Research 
This research has a number of implications for future research. These are 
divided into two groups. The first set of implications is for accident/ disaster 
research in general and the second set is for the direction of this research.  
The first set looks at two related issues: these are the transfer of knowledge into 
action and, the issue of hindsight versus foresight. The first, knowledge into 
action, is to question whether knowing is enough. This research has 
demonstrated that there is an assumption within some areas of research that, to 
understand the cause of an unwanted occurrence is tantamount to prevention. 
This is characterised by authors who expressed incredulity that an organisation 
that “knew” it had an issue did not prevent an unwanted event manifesting itself. 
Future research needs to be more specific about how they see new knowledge 
being transformed into the action necessary to prevent the unwanted occurring 
if their work is to avoid the label “true but useless” (Grint, 2008:14). The second 
issue is linked to the first and is the subject of hindsight. Authors that have 
examined the cause of accidents and then offer their knowledge of the cause as 
the solution to the next one need to examine more rigorously their employment 
of hindsight and foresight. While authors are well aware of these two 
perspectives, there is little discussion about the part each plays in the 
investigation of the cause, proposals for prevention and transferring that 
knowledge into action. Again, without this analysis, their work may attract Grint's 
“true but useless” label.  
The second set of implications is for this area of research. The first issue is the 
future direction for this research, the second is potential areas of integration 
with other research and the third is the issue of pedagogy.  
There are two potential avenues in which this research might go. The 
first is to conduct wider surveys of management to ascertain their attitude 
towards the approach proposed by this research. While this may provide 
statistical data for the population/ industry, it is unlikely, at this stage, to 
add much to what we already know. What we do know is that there will 
be some who have an affinity with this approach and others who will 
reject it. A more important piece of research therefore is to look at 
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whether this approach produces benefits for organisations. The path 
favoured would be to follow up those organisations that have expressed 
an interest in using this approach and see whether, in practice, they have 
found benefits from using it. Only once practical benefits have been 
proven is it likely to be worthwhile to take this work to a wider audience.  
There are attractions to the integration of this work with work already 
done on executive behaviour such as “dark side of leadership” (Toor and 
Ogunlana, 2009) or executive conflict (Fink, 2000:75). The purpose of 
this work would be to synthesise the two fields with two aims. The first 
would be to identify whether “dangerous behaviours” recognised within 
each literature set correlate. The second would be to use the executive 
behaviour literature to find ways of presenting this new material to this 
target audience.  
Also in the area of integration, this research suggest an approach that 
enables a way that the various disciplines related to risk management, 
such as (1) accident investigation, (2) crisis management, (3) business 
continuity management, (4) operational risk management, (5) process 
risk management, (6) project and programme risk management, (7) 
resilience engineering and (8) high reliability, to be considered in an 
uniform way and then integrated with fields such as performance 
management. This is seen to be necessary if the subject are to have 
practical utility for those involved in organisational governance activity. 
This links to the third potential area of research. 
This research suggests that the detailed academic work relating to 
organisational disasters would appear to have had minimal penetration of 
this target community. This deduction leads to two potential areas of 
work. The first would use qualitative methods to determine the actual 
penetration of this knowledge and the second would, through the 
scholarship of teaching (pedagogy: Boyer, 1990), determine how this 
valuable material might be presented to practitioners more effectively. 
Implications for Future Practice 
The practical implications of this work are, 1) its slow adoption within a limited 
community, 2) the benefits of constructive pessimism as an alternative social 
lens, and 3) it provides an alternative structure to examine organisations as a 
whole. I will now address these in turn. 
New ideas are generally adopted very slowly by target audiences until a “critical 
mass” is achieved; Morgan (1997:276) uses the metaphor of the ‘hundredth 
monkey’ to describe this phenomenon. The metaphor describes how a single 
monkey adopts the practice of washing sand off potatoes before eating them. 
The practice was then seen to be slowly adopted by others until ‘a critical point 
was reached (the symbolic hundredth monkey)’. This research is proposing a 
new idea to practice and therefore can only initially expect the idea to reach a 
limited audience until the idea has proven itself. It would therefore be unrealistic 
to expect this approach to have an immediate, significant impact on practice. If 
however, the utility of this work can be established in respect of the Combined 
Code, the hundredth monkey might appear within a reduced timeframe. A 
longitudinal study would be required to monitor any such progress. 
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This research might be characterised as adopting an approach which I refer to 
as “constructive pessimism”. That is, it looks for the sources of potential harm 
but rather than these stifling the organisation, it posits that by identifying them 
and handling them appropriately, that this would enable the organisation to 
pursue its strategic goals more energetically. The writing on denial (such as 
Stark, 1961) and cognitive dissonance (Schwarz, 2005) would suggest that 
humans have difficulty in accepting their own weaknesses. This concern is 
reinforced by a number of respondents’ comments on the negative phrasing of 
Question 20; they did however accept that the format of the question did make 
them think differently. The negative question does therefore provide an 
alternative lens through which to examine an organisation. The format of the 
question design is to prompt implicit assumptions to be transformed into explicit 
evidence and is also designed to force new ways of thinking about issues 
(sometimes referred to as “Red Teaming”; see Sheffi, 2005:54). The 
implications of this for practice is that organisations should encourage 
individuals to adopt different ways of thinking in order to counter the danger of 
their way of seeing blinding them to what is happening around them. 
The research can be seen to have practical utility as it provides practitioners 
with both a holistic picture (“a coherent whole”) of the existing research and 
access to the wider body of existing knowledge. Figure 9 provides a schematic 
illustrating how these issues may interact. Utilising constructive pessimism, 
each area starts with a red flag until there is evidence to the contrary, therefore 
stimulating a different way of thinking. The premise behind this approach is to 
keep open the possibility that every aspect of an organisation provides a 
potential source of risk (“an unwanted occurrence”) and only where there is 
clear evidence that they are under active management should their status be 
changed. The scorecard is supported by notes that point to the background 
reading required to appreciate fully the richness of the existing knowledge in 
each area. This research does not attempt to deliver a final format for the portal. 
Appendix D demonstrated one potential method of designing such a portal: 
further research (focused on the scholarship of pedagogy) is required to 
examine the most effective ways this may be done, taking into consideration the 
potential audiences and developments in technological means. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to demonstrate to those involved in risk 
governance that the relevant academic work has “practical utility”. The aim of 
this device is to assist board members, executives and managers to break the 
hold of their “seeing being a way of not seeing” that might prevent them from 
seeing, appreciating and acting on signals of impending corporate disasters. 
The research provides, through the schematic at Figure 9 a “coherent whole” for 
a widely diverse body of literature which in turn provides a portal back into the 
literature. 
The research has taken the phenomena identified in the relevant literatures, 
which had previously, during Project 2, been synthesised into 24 subject areas. 
These 24 subject areas have subsequently been operationalised into 
provocative questions appropriate to practitioners involved in a corporate 
governance role. The questions were finally arranged under the four main 
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headings of “The Problems”, “The Group”, “The Process” and “Summarising 
Questions”. 
The research went on to establish a link between the question set and the UK 
code for corporate governance and could be seen to have practical utility to all 
the organisations that fall under the remit of this code. It is anticipated that the 
work would also be generalisable to those jurisdictions which have “principle-
based” governance codes. This work’s applicability to jurisdictions which have 
“rule-based” governance codes would have to be tested by further research. 
As a result of this research, the questions have been refined to ensure that 1) 
they were open questions, 2) they prompted the exposure of underlying 
assumptions and hidden evidence and 3) all jargon was removed as, where it 
was used, it had proved to be ineffective as “hooks”. One important 
consideration was that the questions make respondents think, not necessarily in 
the way expected by the questions’ designer. 
This research also suggests that it is not only the questions that are important 
but also the attitude with which the individual approaches them. Engaging with 
these issues is likely to be challenging and as Respondent 5 highlighted, it may 
not be a challenge that everyone is prepared to accept. The individual’s ability 
to avoid denial and to ask, not only, “what are we doing” but more importantly, 
“what are we not doing” (which we should) is thought to be essential if that 
individual is going to be provoked into seeing in a new way.  
Finally, this research has an important finding that reflects back on previous 
research. The evidence obtained by this research suggests that little of the 
current body of knowledge has reached, or had impact on, those at board/ 
executive level, even amongst those that see themselves experienced in risk 
management. This would suggest a failure of academics to demonstrate the 
relevance of their work to general practice. The research reinforces that there is 
a view that knowing equates to relevant action and questions whether “knowing 
is enough”. It suggests that while knowing may be enough to explain the cause 
of an incident, it is not enough where action is required to prevent a potential, 
unwanted occurrence. Researchers should be required to support any assertion 
that their construct can do more than just explain, by showing how the 
knowledge might be turned into effective action. That is, if their new knowledge 
is to have practical utility within risk management, they need to be able to show 
how, without the benefit of hindsight, it might be used to forestall future failures 
of foresight. 
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Appendix A Argument for First Person Narrative 
 
The research will describe the development in my understanding of this subject. 
The research will be validated by the questions, “What greater understanding 
do I now have of the subject, and might this be accessible, palatable, relevant 
and useful to others?” The justification for this approach is threefold. 
The first issue is that risk is a matter of perception (Milburn and Billings, 
1976:116; Slovic, 2000); Renn (1998:49) states ‘risks are always mental 
representations of threats that are capable of claiming real losses’, Leiss 
(1992:344) talks of ‘normative structures and subjective judgment in risk 
assessment’. Stankiewicz, (2009:106) says that ‘in order to reduce the 
uncertainties and risks … every conflicting party endeavors... find(s) strategies 
to reduce the hazards according to its own interests’. Holton (2004:24) states 
that the litmus test for exposure is “Would we care?” and Leitch (2008:30-31) 
also sees risk as being ‘exposed to uncertainty that we care about’. Risk 
assessment can therefore be seen to be indivisible from personal bias. Snook 
(now a professor at Harvard) has stated6 that ‘I believe it is silly (and unrealistic) 
to suggest that anyone can be truly “objective.” We are all products of our life 
experiences; as a reader, I would much rather know authors’ relevant 
background and read their views “in light of” this information, rather than cling to 
some unrealistic dream that they have been unbiased’. Gigerenzer concurs with 
this view; when discussing the communication of risk he states (Gigerenzer, 
2003:239): ‘The idea that it is possible to communicate information in a "pure" 
form is fiction’. It is my intention to make explicit my perspective, experience 
and world view alongside the technical issues. 
The second issue is that no matter how intelligent and well-informed an author 
is, they are always limited to what they know and what they feel that they can 
prove (whatever form of proof they privilege). K.S. Shrader-Freschette’s 1991 
book on “Risk and Rationality: Philosophical Foundations for Populist Reforms” 
(an example chosen at random) has been reviewed by both Mary Douglas and 
William Leiss. While Mary Douglas took a constructionist approach to risk 
(Lupton in Mythen, 2006,13), her criticism (Douglas, 1993:485) of Shrader-
Freschette, however, comes across as being positivist in that it allows no 
leeway for the author’s interpretation of Douglas’ work on Cultural Theory. 
Douglas seems to attribute malice to Shrader-Freschette; she accuses the 
author of 'misquotation, false note references and blatant self-contradictions' as 
opposed to accepting that the author may be coming at the subject from a 
different perspective. Douglas uses their differences to undermine the whole of 
the book when she says ‘if the gross misrepresentation of cultural theory is 
typical, there will be other topics on which this book is misleading.’ Douglas’ 
defence of her position comes across as someone who has made up her mind 
rather than one who would be stimulated by reconsidering her thoughts in the 
light of other people’s ideas. By using the first person narrative I intend 1) to 
strive to keep an open mind to alternative perspectives on the subject of risk 
and 2) to keep in the reader’s mind the fact that this is my perspective that there 
                                            
6
 (email Snook/Lauder 21 1646 Jun 09) 
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may be other ways of considering the subject on which I am commenting, and 
that they should stay open to the perspective of others and be more willing to 
take on new perspectives in order to help the ideas mature. 
The third issue is that the study of risk has divided into a number of schools (or 
clans). These clans all use their own language; they use the same terms but 
define them differently. This makes cross-clan communication fraught. The 
research will therefore have to define how it uses each term and this will be at 
odds with some of the audience’s understanding and world view. It is therefore 
unlikely that any research that is trying to span Risk Management will achieve 
immediate consensus. As the researcher, I can only explain clearly my 
perspective and trust that others may find this useful. 
Shrader-Freschette’s book was also reviewed by William Leiss; he seems to 
have liked it. In his review he says (Leiss, 1992:347), 'I admire greatly the thrust 
of what is to me the most important of the three different books that make up 
Shrader-Freschette’s Risk and Rationality.’ However, he goes on to criticise the 
author for her lack of certainty in the language that she uses. Leiss (1992:346) 
accuses her of ‘pussyfoot(ing) around’ and criticises her for equivocal language. 
He writes: ‘”One might argue”: well, does one so argue or not?’  
Every author is faced by the issue of what to include and what to exclude, about 
which arguments need to be developed, and to which one only needs to allude. 
Every author will face criticisms from referees, reviewers and readers for the 
judgements they have made. As any subject develops, new facts, concepts and 
arguments will emerge. Therefore few papers are likely to be seen as definitive 
and so, once again, articles written in the third person provide an illusion of 
certainty that is rarely warranted. By writing in the first person, the author 
reminds the reader that the discussion is bounded by the author’s current 
knowledge, experience and world view.  
Therefore, consistent with a number of articles already published in 4 star 
academic journals, it is considered that the most likely way for the research to 
achieve credibility is for the approach and the method to be clear and 
accessible for ‘In an uncertain world, certainty can be a dangerous ideal’ 
(Gigerenzer, 2003:90). Knowing that it may not be possible to achieve 
consensus, it is felt that the best route would be to describe the journey of 
development and invite others to see why the chosen route was taken and to 
decide, for themselves, whether they find the work useful in their understanding 
of the subject. 
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Appendix B Morphing of Questions 
 Project 2 Outcome Version 1 Final 
Problem 
1.  To be clear about their 
rules for inclusion and 
exclusion of subject area 
and the risk associated with 
their delineation. 
 
Are our rules for which 
issues (scenarios) are 
included in and excluded 
from the risk register clear 
and fully justifiable? 
Where do we need to 
have clear and fully 
justifiable criteria for 
which events or 
scenarios are included 
in and excluded from 
our risk management 
process? 
2.  Is the action required about 
process or outcome and, 
is the jeopardy 
associated with each 
clear. 
Are we clear about whether 
our key risks are related to 
our processes or our 
outcomes and, is the 
jeopardy associated with 
each clear? 
While we normally 
monitor “outcomes” 
(“end”), where do we 
need to monitor the  
processes (“means”) 
that might create 
unacceptable 
outcomes? 
3.  To establish what risk are 
“acceptable” to them and 
why and then test their 
reasoning to ensure that it 
is robust and not a 
“fantasy”. 
What risks are “acceptable” 
to us and why; how have 
we tested our reasoning 
(against both internal and 
external yardsticks) to 
ensure that our reasoning 
is robust?   
What risks are 
“acceptable” to us and 
why; how have we 
tested our reasoning for 
both core and non-core 
activity (against both 
internal and external 
yardsticks) to ensure 
that our reasoning is 
robust? 
4.  Of those issues that are 
labelled so improbable as 
to be “inconceivable”, which 
still have such potentially 
serious consequences (the 
unacceptable) that we must 
stay mindful of them? 
Of those issues that we 
label as, so improbable as 
to be “inconceivable”, which 
still have such potentially 
serious consequences 
(unacceptable) that we 
must stay alert to them? 
Of those issues that we 
judge to be, so 
improbable as to be 
“inconceivable”, which of 
these still have such 
potentially serious 
consequences 
(unacceptable) that we 
must stay alert to them? 
5.  Define the groups 
understanding of the terms 
“anticipation” and 
“resilience”. 
Define whether the action 
needed is create a “plan B” 
or to generate buffer 
capacity). 
Are we clear about in what 
circumstances (1) we will 
prepare an alternative plan 
(anticipation), (2) we will set 
aside reserve capacity 
(resilience) or (3) where we 
just react to situations 
(reactive)? 
What evidence do we 
have that we have a 
shared understanding 
about when: 
(1) we will prepare an 
alternative plan 
(anticipation),  
(2) we will set aside 
reserve capacity 
(resilience) or  
(3) where we just react 
to situations (reactive)? 
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6.   What are the risks to our 
organisation and society 
from being too cautious? 
How might our approach 
to risk taking be stifling 
our organisations? 
The Group 
7.  To  discuss which factors 
might be acting on and 
affecting the perception that 
contribute to how they 
appreciate the signals 
available to them. 
 
To make themselves aware 
of the personal and 
organisational filters that 
might inhibit their seeing 
warning available to them. 
 
To question whether the 
messenger (source of any 
data) is having an effect on 
how the data is viewed and, 
if so, whether this can be 
judged to be “rational” and 
there “valid”. 
 
To be aware of the factors  
affecting the potential for 
inaction of themselves as 
individuals and of the group 
overall and what 
mechanisms they may put 
in place to guard against 
this issue.  
 
To question for the 
executive is therefore to 
judge whether they have 
enough relevant detail to 
enable them to appreciate 
the complexity of the 
mechanisms acting at the 
time. 
Are we aware of the 
personal and organisational 
filters that might inhibit us 
from seeing available 
warning signs? 
 
How well do we understand 
the factors that might affect 
our perception of  the 
“signals” available to us? 
 
Are our views on the 
validity of the available data 
prejudiced by our views on 
the source of the data and, 
if so, can our views be 
justified? 
Are we aware of what 
factors that might:  
(1) inhibit us from taking 
note of warning signs,   
(2) those that might 
affect our perception 
of them or 
(3) those that might 
restrain us from acting 
upon them? 
8.  To question how well they 
understand their system, 
who will have to handle 
potential crisis and whether 
they are mentally equipped 
to do so. 
How well do we 
understand: our system, 
those who will have to 
handle potential crises and 
whether they are mentally 
equipped to do so? 
 
a. How well do we 
understand our 
system’s operating 
modes (routine, high 
tempo, emergency 
and maintenance) & 
manage the 
transition between 
them? 
b. How well do we 
know those who will 
have to handle 
potential crises and 
are we sure they are 
equipped to do so? 
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9.  To judge the most 
appropriate level within 
their organisations for 
decision to fall given the 
need for the appropriate 
seat of understanding,  
resource power and to 
need to act in a timely 
manner. 
How do we judge the most 
appropriate level within our 
organisations for decisions 
to be  made and that each 
decision maker has the 
appropriate “seat of 
understanding”,  resource 
power and the ability to act 
in a timely manner? 
Are we familiar with the 
phenomena which may 
cause our inaction as 
individuals and as a group 
and what are we doing 
about them? 
How do we judge the 
most appropriate level 
within our organisations 
for decisions to be made 
and whether each 
decision maker has the 
appropriate intuitive 
understanding of the 
issues and the 
organisation,  resources 
and the ability to act in a 
timely manner? 
10.  To debate whether their 
groups is taking any steps 
to guard against the threats 
created by group dynamics. 
Are we familiar with the 
forms of dynamics that 
might cause our group to 
be dysfunctional and what 
are we doing to counter 
them? 
 
 
What proof is there that 
we conscious of the 
dynamics and person 
interactions that might 
cause our board and 
executive team to be 
dysfunctional (thereby 
generating risk) and 
what are we doing to 
ensure that we do not 
fall into these traps? 
The Process 
11.  To question whether they 
are seeing all the lesson 
that are available to them 
and whether they 
understand, and therefore 
take into account, factor 
than might be working 
against them in this regard. 
From what lessons do we 
look to learn and what have 
we learnt that might prevent 
the unwanted from 
happening? 
How can we be sure 
that we have a culture 
that take every key 
opportunity to learn 
from unwanted events 
experienced within the 
organisation (accidents 
and near-misses) and 
from the experience of 
other organisations? 
12.  To be aware of the in-
coming data and need to 
be able to assess it against 
signals types in order to 
understand it relevance 
(both positive or negative) 
and be able to justify its 
inclusion or exclusion from 
the debate. 
Are we aware of what data 
is available, do we 
understand it relevance 
(both positive or negative) 
and are we able to justify its 
inclusion or exclusion from 
the debate? 
How do we, as the 
board/executive group 
and as an organisation, 
ensure that we are 
getting the appropriate 
and relevant data to 
feed into our risk 
discourse? How do we 
judge appropriate and 
relevant? To question whether the 
right information is getting 
to the right people within 
the right timeframe and 
how they would know if it 
was not before it was too 
late. 
How do we be sure that the 
right information is getting 
to the right people within 
the right timeframe? 
13.  To discuss what method of 
analysis would be most 
appropriate to the problem 
How do we judge whether 
our methods of analysis 
(both formal and informal) 
How do we judge 
whether the way we 
analyse risk 
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at hand and whether a 
formal system of analysis 
may ‘to reduce the effect of 
personal bias. 
are appropriate to the 
problems at hand? 
appropriate to the risks 
we face? 
14.  To debate whether the 
criteria being used for 
making decisions may not 
be viewed by others, at 
some later stage, to be 
amoral. 
Might the criteria that we 
use for making decisions 
be viewed by others, at 
some later stage (post-
accident),as amoral? 
What might give us 
confidence that after an 
unwanted event our 
decisions-making will 
stand up, in hindsight, 
to critical external 
scrutiny? 
15.   Does the board use any 
formal organisation model 
during their deliberations?  
If members only use their 
own individual mental 
models, how do the group 
ensure that it is working to 
a common model? 
How do we ensure that 
all the members of the 
board/executive have a 
shared view & 
understanding of the 
organisation, the way it 
works and its risk? 
16.   
To assess whether their 
plans and policies, which 
are a product of their 
bureaucratic process, are 
likely to withstand ‘an 
abrupt and brutal audit’. 
What evidence can be 
provided that our plans and 
policies are robust enough 
to withstand an accident (“a 
brutal audit”). 
What evidence can be 
provided that our plans 
and policies are robust 
enough to withstand a 
disruptive event. 
17.  How to recognise “drift” as 
it occurs. 
How might our organisation 
recognise the dysfunctional 
decoupling of practice from 
formalised procedures or 
policy (“drift”) as it occurs 
How might we notice 
where an emerging gap 
between our practice 
and our formal 
procedures becomes  a 
potential source of risk? 
18.  To debate the appropriate 
use of the five mechanisms 
of action and coordination 
(standards, plans, mutual 
adjustment, rules and 
experience) and how to 
enhance each and 
safeguard the organisations 
against the weakness of 
each. 
When would we expect our 
people to use their 
experience and initiative 
rather than adhering strictly 
to written plans or 
standards?  
When might this cause 
problems? 
When would we expect 
our people to use their 
experience and 
initiative rather than 
adhering strictly to 
written plans or 
standards; when might 
this cause problems? 
Where might our “rule-
book” actually hamper 
the achievement of our 
organisational goals?  
To be aware of the strength 
and limitation of rule-based 
and knowledge-based 
approaches and be clear 
when each should be 
applied within their 
organisation. 
Where might our “rule-
book” hamper the 
achievement of our 
organisational gaols? 
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Summarising Questions 
19.  What might occur (including 
the inconceivable): 
(1) what might cause it, (2) 
how might we prevent it, (3) 
is the necessary process in 
place, (4) are our people 
effectively trained, (5) do 
they have the necessary 
resources, (6) will they 
recognise the problem 
should it arise, (7) will they 
see the right action to take, 
(8) will they implement the 
necessary action 
appropriately, and (9) will 
we get the same answers if 
we ask these questions 
tomorrow? 
What “unwanted” 
occurrences (including 
those perceived as 
“inconceivable”) might 
effect the organisation? 
 
What “unwanted” 
occurrences (including 
those perceived as 
“inconceivable”) might 
affect our organisation? 
20.  To question whether there 
is clear evidence that they 
do not fall into the category 
of an “error-inducing” 
organisation. 
What evidence is there that 
we are not an “error-
inducing” organisation?. 
What evidence exists to 
show that our 
organisation’s culture, 
structure or processes 
do NOT provoking 
errors or rule 
violations? 
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Appendix C Stage 2 Question Development 
 Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 Version 5 
Problem 
1.  Are our rules for which 
issues (scenarios) are 
included in and excluded 
from the risk register clear 
and fully justifiable? 
Are our rules for which 
issues (scenarios) are 
included in and excluded 
from the risk register clear 
and fully justifiable? 
Are our rules for which 
issues (scenarios) are 
included in and excluded 
from the risk register clear 
and fully justifiable? 
Do we have clear and fully 
justifiable rules for which 
scenarios are included in and 
excluded from our risk 
management process? 
Do we have clear and fully 
justifiable rules for which 
scenarios are included in 
and excluded from our 
risk management 
process? 
2.  Are we clear about whether 
our key risks are related to 
our processes or our 
outcomes and, is the 
jeopardy associated with 
each clear? 
Are we clear about whether 
our key risks are related to 
our processes or our 
outcomes and, is the 
jeopardy associated with 
each clear? 
Are we clear about whether 
our key risks are related to 
our processes or our 
outcomes and, is the 
jeopardy associated with 
each clear? 
While we normally monitor  
“outcomes”, where do we need 
to monitor the  processes that 
might create unacceptable 
outcomes? 
While we normally monitor  
“outcomes”, where do we 
need to monitor the  
processes that might 
create unacceptable 
outcomes? 
3.  What risks are “acceptable” 
to us and why; how have we 
tested our reasoning (against 
both internal and external 
yardsticks) to ensure that our 
reasoning is robust?   
What risks are “acceptable” 
to us and why; how have 
we tested our reasoning 
(against both internal and 
external yardsticks) to 
ensure that our reasoning is 
robust?   
What risks are “acceptable” 
to us and why; how have we 
tested our reasoning 
(against both internal and 
external yardsticks) to 
ensure that our reasoning is 
robust?   
What risks are “acceptable” to 
us and why; how have we tested 
our reasoning (against both 
internal and external yardsticks) 
to ensure that our reasoning is 
robust? 
What risks are 
“acceptable” to us and 
why; how have we tested 
our reasoning (against 
both internal and external 
yardsticks) to ensure that 
our reasoning is robust? 
4.  Of those issues that we label 
as, so improbable as to be 
“inconceivable”, which still 
have such potentially serious 
consequences 
(unacceptable) that we must 
stay alert to them? 
Of those issues that we 
label as, so improbable as 
to be “inconceivable”, which 
still have such potentially 
serious consequences 
(unacceptable) that we 
must stay alert to them? 
Of those issues that we 
label as, so improbable as 
to be “inconceivable”, which 
still have such potentially 
serious consequences 
(unacceptable) that we must 
stay alert to them? 
Of those issues that we judge to 
be, so improbable as to be 
“inconceivable”, which of these 
still have such potentially 
serious consequences 
(unacceptable) that we must stay 
alert to them? 
Of those issues that we 
judge to be, so improbable 
as to be “inconceivable”, 
which of these still have 
such potentially serious 
consequences 
(unacceptable) that we 
must stay alert to them? 
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5.  Are we clear about in what 
circumstances (1) we will 
prepare an alternative plan 
(anticipation), (2) we will set 
aside reserve capacity 
(resilience) or (3) where we 
just react to situations 
(reactive)? 
Are we clear about in what 
circumstances (1) we will 
prepare an alternative plan 
(anticipation), (2) we will set 
aside reserve capacity 
(resilience) or (3) where we 
just react to situations 
(reactive)? 
Are we clear about in what 
circumstances (1) we will 
prepare an alternative plan 
(anticipation), (2) we will set 
aside reserve capacity 
(resilience) or (3) where we 
just react to situations 
(reactive)? 
Do we agree about in what 
circumstances (1) we will prepare 
an alternative plan 
(anticipation), (2) we will set 
aside reserve capacity 
(resilience) or (3) where we just 
react to situations (reactive)?  
Do we agree about in 
what circumstances (1) 
we will prepare an 
alternative plan 
(anticipation), (2) we will 
set aside reserve capacity 
(resilience) or (3) where 
we just react to situations 
(reactive)?  
6.  What are the risks to our 
organisation and society 
from being too cautious? 
What are the risks to our 
organisation and society 
from being too cautious? 
What are the risks to our 
organisation and society 
from being too cautious? 
How might our approach to risk 
taking be stifling our 
organisations? 
How might our approach 
to risk taking be stifling 
our organisations? 
The Group 
7.  Are we aware of the 
personal and organisational 
filters that might inhibit us 
from seeing available 
warning signs? 
Are we aware of the 
personal and organisational 
filters that might inhibit us 
from seeing available 
warning signs? 
Are we aware of the 
personal and organisational 
filters that might inhibit us 
from seeing available 
warning signs? 
Are we aware of what factors that 
might (1) inhibit us from taking 
note of warning signs,  (2) 
those that might affect our 
perception of them or (3) those 
that might restrain us from 
acting upon them? 
Are we aware of factors 
that might (1) inhibit us 
from taking note of 
warning signs,  (2) those 
that might affect our 
perception of them or (3) 
those that might restrain 
us from acting upon 
them? How well do we understand 
the factors that might affect 
our perception of  the 
“signals” available to us? 
How well do we understand 
the factors that might affect 
our perception of  the 
warning signs available to 
us? 
How well do we understand 
the factors that might affect 
our perception of  the 
warning signs available to 
us? 
Are our views on the validity 
of the available data 
prejudiced by our views on 
the source of the data and, if 
so, can our views be 
justified? 
Are we aware how our 
willingness to listen to 
warnings may be affected 
by our views on the source 
of the information? 
Are we aware how our 
willingness to listen to 
warnings may be affected 
by our views on the source 
of the information? 
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8.  How well do we understand: 
our system, those who will 
have to handle potential 
crises and whether they are 
mentally equipped to do so? 
 
How well do we understand 
our system’s operating 
modes; how well do we 
know those who will have to 
handle potential crises and 
are we sure they are 
mentally equipped to do 
so? 
How well do we understand 
our system’s operating 
modes; how well do we 
know those who will have to 
handle potential crises and 
are we sure they are 
mentally equipped to do so? 
How well do we understand our 
system’s operating modes; how 
well do we know those who will 
have to handle potential crises 
and are we sure they are 
equipped to do so? 
How well do we 
understand our system’s 
operating modes; how 
well do we know those 
who will have to handle 
potential crises and are 
we sure they are equipped 
to do so? 
9.  How do we judge the most 
appropriate level within our 
organisations for decisions to 
be  made and that each 
decision maker has the 
appropriate “seat of 
understanding”,  resource 
power and the ability to act in 
a timely manner? 
Are we familiar with the 
phenomena which may 
cause our inaction as 
individuals and as a group 
and what are we doing about 
them? 
How do we judge the most 
appropriate level within our 
organisations for decisions 
to be  made and that each 
decision maker has the 
appropriate “seat of 
understanding”,  resources 
and the ability to act in a 
timely manner? 
How do we judge the most 
appropriate level within our 
organisations for decisions 
to be  made and that each 
decision maker has the 
appropriate “seat of 
understanding”,  resources 
and the ability to act in a 
timely manner? 
How do we judge the most 
appropriate level within our 
organisations for decisions to be  
made and that each decision 
maker has the appropriate “seat 
of understanding”,  resources 
and the ability to act in a timely 
manner? 
How do we judge the most 
appropriate level within 
our organisations for 
decisions to be  made and 
that each decision maker 
has the appropriate “seat 
of understanding”,  
resources and the ability 
to act in a timely manner? 
Are we aware of the 
psychological factors that 
may restrain us from acting 
as individuals and as a 
group and what are we 
doing about them? 
Are we aware of the 
psychological factors that 
may restrain us from acting 
as individuals and as a 
group and what are we 
doing about them? 
10.  Are we familiar with the 
forms of dynamics that might 
cause our group to be 
dysfunctional and what are 
we doing to counter them? 
 
 
Are we familiar with the 
dynamics that might cause 
our group to be 
dysfunctional and what are 
we doing to counter them? 
Are we familiar with the 
dynamics that might cause 
our group to be 
dysfunctional and what are 
we doing to counter them? 
Are we familiar with the 
dynamics and person 
interactions that might cause our 
executive team to be 
dysfunctional (thereby 
generating risk) and what are we 
doing to ensure that we do not 
fall into these traps? 
Are we familiar with the 
dynamics and personal 
interactions that might 
cause our executive team 
to be dysfunctional 
(thereby generating risk) 
and what are we doing to 
ensure that we do not fall 
into these traps? 
 Appendix C  198 
 
 Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 Version 5 
The Process 
11.  From what lessons do we 
look to learn and what have 
we learnt that might prevent 
the unwanted from 
happening? 
From where do we seek our 
lessons and what have we 
learnt that might prevent the 
unwanted from happening 
to us? 
From where do we seek our 
lessons and what have we 
learnt that might prevent the 
unwanted from happening 
to us? 
Can we show that we have a 
culture that take every key 
opportunity to learn from 
unwanted events? 
Can we show that we 
have a culture that takes 
every available 
opportunity to learn from 
unwanted events? 
12.  Are we aware of what data is 
available, do we understand 
it relevance (both positive or 
negative) and are we able to 
justify its inclusion or 
exclusion from the debate? 
Are we aware of what data 
is available, do we 
understand its relevance 
(both positive or negative) 
and are we able to justify its 
inclusion or exclusion from 
our risk discourse? 
Are we aware of what data 
is available, do we 
understand its relevance 
(both positive or negative) 
and are we able to justify its 
inclusion or exclusion from 
our risk discourse? 
How do we, as an executive 
group and as an organisation, 
ensure that we are getting the 
appropriate and relevant data 
to feed into our risk discourse? 
How do we judge appropriate 
and relevant? 
How do we, as an 
executive group and as an 
organisation, ensure that 
we are getting the 
appropriate and relevant 
data to feed into our risk 
discourse? How do we 
judge “appropriate” and 
“relevant”? How do we be sure that the 
right information is getting to 
the right people within the 
right timeframe? 
How can we be sure that 
the right information is 
getting to the right people 
within the right timeframe? 
How can we be sure that 
the right information is 
getting to the right people 
within the right timeframe? 
13.  How do we judge whether 
our methods of analysis 
(both formal and informal) 
are appropriate to the 
problems at hand? 
How do we judge whether 
our methods of analysis 
(both formal and informal) 
are appropriate to the 
problems at hand? 
How do we judge whether 
our methods of analysis 
(both formal and informal) 
are appropriate to the 
problems at hand? 
How do we judge whether our 
methods of risk analysis are 
appropriate to the risks faced? 
How do we judge whether 
our methods of risk 
analysis are appropriate 
to the risks faced? 
14.  Might the criteria that we use 
for making decisions be 
viewed by others, at some 
later stage (post-accident),as 
amoral? 
Might the criteria that we 
use for making decisions be 
viewed by others, at some 
later stage (post-accident), 
as amoral? 
Might the criteria that we 
use for making decisions be 
viewed by others, at some 
later stage (post-accident), 
as amoral? 
After an unwanted event will our 
decisions-making stand up, in 
hindsight, to critical external 
scrutiny? 
After an unwanted event 
will our decision-making 
stand up, in hindsight, to 
critical external scrutiny? 
15.  Does the board use any 
formal organisation model 
during their deliberations?  
Does the board use any 
formal model during their 
deliberations, in order to 
understand the interactive 
Does the board use any 
formal model during their 
deliberations, in order to 
understand the interactive 
How do we ensure that all the 
members of the executive have a 
shared view & understanding 
of the organisation, the way it 
How do we ensure that all 
the members of the 
executive have a shared 
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 Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 Version 5 
If members only use their 
own individual mental 
models, how do the group 
ensure that it is working to a 
common model? 
complexity of the 
organisation?  
If members only use their 
own individual mental 
models, how does the 
group ensure that it is 
working to a common 
model? 
complexity of the 
organisation?  
If members only use their 
own individual mental 
models, how does the group 
ensure that it is working to a 
common model? 
works and its risk? view & understanding of 
the organisation, the way 
it works and its risk? 
16.  What evidence can be 
provided that our plans and 
policies are robust enough to 
withstand an accident (“a 
brutal audit”). 
What evidence can be 
provided that our plans and 
policies are robust enough 
to withstand an accident (“a 
brutal audit”). 
What evidence can be 
provided that our plans and 
policies are robust enough 
to withstand an accident (“a 
brutal audit”). 
What evidence can be provided 
that our plans and policies are 
robust enough to withstand an 
accident (“a brutal audit”). 
What evidence can be 
provided that our plans 
and policies are robust 
enough to withstand an 
unwanted event (“a brutal 
audit”). 
17.  How might our organisation 
recognise the dysfunctional 
decoupling of practice from 
formalised procedures or 
policy (“drift”) as it occurs 
How might we notice where 
an emerging gap between 
our practice and our formal 
procedures becomes 
potentially dysfunctional 
(“drift”)? 
How might we notice where 
an emerging gap between 
our practice and our formal 
procedures becomes 
potentially dysfunctional 
(“drift”)? 
How might we notice where an 
emerging gap between our 
practice and our formal 
procedures becomes potentially 
dysfunctional (“drift”)? 
How might we notice 
where an emerging gap 
between our practice and 
our formal procedures 
becomes potentially 
dysfunctional (“drift”)? 
18.  When would we expect our 
people to use their 
experience and initiative 
rather than adhering strictly 
to written plans or 
standards?  
When might this cause 
problems? 
When would we expect our 
people to use their 
experience and initiative 
rather than adhering strictly 
to written plans or 
standards?  
When might this cause 
problems? 
When would we expect our 
people to use their 
experience and initiative 
rather than adhering strictly 
to written plans or 
standards?  
When might this cause 
problems? 
When would we expect our 
people to use their experience 
and initiative rather than 
adhering strictly to written plans 
or standards; when might this 
cause problems? Where might 
our “rule-book” actually 
hamper the achievement of our 
organisational goals?  
When would we expect 
our people to use their 
experience and initiative 
rather than adhering 
strictly to written plans or 
standards; when might 
this cause problems? 
Where might our “rule-
book” actually hamper 
the achievement of our 
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 Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 Version 5 
Where might our “rule-book” 
hamper the achievement of 
our organisational gaols? 
Where might our “rule-
book” hamper the 
achievement of our 
organisational goals? 
Where might our “rule-book” 
hamper the achievement of 
our organisational goals? 
organisational goals?  
Summarising Questions 
19.  What “unwanted” 
occurrences (including those 
perceived as 
“inconceivable”) might effect 
the organisation? 
What “unwanted” 
occurrences (including 
those perceived as 
“inconceivable”) might 
affect our organisation? 
What “unwanted” 
occurrences (including 
those perceived as 
“inconceivable”) might affect 
our organisation? 
What “unwanted” occurrences 
(including those perceived as 
“inconceivable”) might effect our 
organisation? 
What “unwanted” 
occurrences (including 
those perceived as 
“inconceivable”) might 
affect our organisation? 
20.  What evidence is there that 
we are not an “error-
inducing” organisation?. 
What evidence is there that 
we are not an “error-
inducing” organisation? 
What evidence exists to 
show we are NOT an “error-
inducing” organisation? 
What evidence exists to show 
that our organisation’s culture, 
structure or processes do NOT 
provoking errors or rule 
violations? 
What evidence exists to 
show that our 
organisation’s culture, 
structure or processes do 
NOT provoke errors or 
rule violations? 
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Appendix D “Workbook 5” 
Introduction  
I am conducting research into a phenomenon referred to as “failure of foresight” 
and considering how it might be forestalled. Failure of foresight is cited when 
corporate executives are blamed for failing to see and then act upon warnings 
of impeding corporate “disasters”, thereby becoming responsible for letting them 
happen.   The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), a benchmark of best 
practice, requires that ‘The board should establish formal and transparent 
arrangements for considering how they should apply … risk management’; it 
emphasises that the risk management system should be “robust and 
defensible”.  The purpose of the questions developed by this research is to 
provide assistance to a board’s deliberations as to ‘the nature and extent of the 
significant risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives’. 
 
The questions presented have been distilled from a review of the academic  
literature related to accident, crisis and risk management. The questions are 
derived from research into the causes of disasters and other unwanted events. 
The research has highlighted the failures that have been seen to contribute to 
these events.  My proposition is that awareness amongst executives of these 
factors may help to forestall future failure within their organisations. The 
questions posed are seen to provide an alternative to the more traditional 
“bottom-up” approach to the risk management/ governance process.  
The purpose of this research is to examine which concepts and theories 
developed within the academic literature are seen by practitioners to be usable 
and useful and whether, as practitioners, they see any benefit from engaging 
with the research that underlies the questions. 
It should be noted that all responses will be anonymised and that, as 
volunteers, you are free to withdraw at anytime. The only references to you 
personally will be by general detail, e.g. your gender, years of experience, 
business/ professional qualifications, personal specialisation, and operating 
sector. 
Setting 
The setting for this work is the governance of risk, performed at the business 
unit or corporate board level. The aim of the questions is to assist board 
members in performing their function as an “investigator”; to ask the penetrating 
questions of their supporting staff. Therefore the setting in which the following 
questions should be answered is in the context of a review of your risk 
management/ governance process. However, no details of organisation or 
internal deliberations are required to be disclosed.  
Within this document, due to the ambiguous nature of the word “risk”, the idea 
has been replaced by the term “unwanted”. The term “unwanted” should be 
considered as any circumstance or phenomenon that may precipitate “the 
potential nightmares” that stalk all organisations. The term covers: 
• The non-delivery of an intended organisational output. 
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• Barriers to delivery. 
• Unwanted inputs. 
• Unexpected interactions. 
• Unwanted outputs. 
• Unintended consequences. 
• The unknown/uncertain.  
There are 20 questions divided into 4 blocks: 
 Problem: this section contains 6 questions that relate to the nature of 
unwanted problems. 
 Group: this section contains 4 questions that relate to the interaction of 
the board, as a group, that may increase the organisation’s vulnerability 
to unwanted occurrences. 
 The Process: this section contains 8 questions that relate to aspects of 
the organisation’s process that may precipitate the unwanted. 
 General Questions: this section contains 2 overarching questions in 
order to set the more detailed questions into a wider context. 
Some background to the question is provided. This states the aim of each 
question and a selection of the work from which it was derived; key concepts 
from the literature are in bold text. 
Action 
You are asked: 
1. To consider the questions in the context of a review of your 
organisation’s risk management process rather than looking at the 
questions in isolation to practice. No reference to your organisation is 
required. The issue is whether the questions asked are usable, useful 
and could feasibly be used as part of senior leadership discussions. In 
addition to your answers to the more formal questions, I am interested in 
your reaction to the questions and how you think your colleagues might 
perceive them. 
2. To each of the 20 questions, please answer with either “I agree” or “I 
disagree” to each of the following 4 queries: 
 
o Usability  (I understood the question at face value). 
o Utility  (the question provided a useful prompt to my thinking). 
o Feasibility  (I could use the question as part of a risk-based 
discussion). 
o I see benefit from learning more on the issues that underlie the 
question.  
3. To “strike through” the unwanted “I agree” or “I disagree” option on the 
answer sheet on page 10 in order to record your answer. 
4. To provide additional explanation where you disagree, using the sheets 
on pages 11-12. 
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5. To add additional comments as you see fit. Please put these comments, 
opposite the relevant question, in the space provided on pages 11-12. 
You might also consider the “Squirm test”; this is that visceral feeling you 
get when you read a question. Was it because: 
 “We should have thought of this issue before”. 
 “We should do this but how?” (“It is just too difficult.”) 
 “We should do this, but I am afraid of the answer that we will get”. 
6. You are also requested to provide a personal profile containing; 
Male/Female, years of experience, business/ professional qualifications, 
personal specialisation, and operating sector. [This is required in order to 
compare responses as part of the analysis process.]  
7. Once you have had time to consider your response, we need to meet to 
discuss your response. This may be done face to face, over the internet 
(for example using Skype) or over the phone. To ensure that I record 
your comments accurately, I ask that I can tape the session; at the end of 
the meeting, I would also ask for a copy of sheets on which you have 
recorded your views. 
8. If you wish, I will provide you with a copy of the report once it has been 
validated by my scrutiny panel. 
Thank you for your time and contribution. 
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Forestalling Failure of Foresight: Question Workbook 
 
 Questions Background 
Problem 
1.  Do we have clear and fully 
justifiable rules for which 
scenarios are included in 
and excluded from our risk 
management process? 
The aim of this question is to examine why problems 
or other possible unwanted events are included or 
excluded from an organisation’s risk management 
discourse. It is designed to stimulate discussion as  
to what unwanted events might arise and whether 
they might be initiated by  errors, violations, 
unforeseen interaction or by act of  commission or 
omission. 
The question is based on the following academic 
work: 
 “Design-Base Accidents” (DBA) and “Beyond 
DBA” (BDBA) criteria designed to established 
which issues have been identified in the design 
stage and been taken into account 
 The “Seven Dimensions of Risk” and “Lines, 
Circles and Dots” frameworks designed to 
facilitate risk discourse 
 The need for “Sensitivity to Operations” and 
“Preoccupation with Failure” coming from the 
debate about high reliability organisations 
 Whether the organisation is prudent to simply 
“Focus on Core” operations or whether this 
strategy might also have hidden dangers.  
2.  While we normally monitor  
“outcomes”, where do we 
need to monitor the  
processes that might 
create unacceptable 
outcomes? 
 
The aim of the question is to provoke questions about 
which processes or their management need to be 
monitored by the executive because the inherent 
dangers are too great to be allowed to manifest 
themselves. 
The question is based on research that has identified 
that there is a point within organisations where the 
management role changes from dealing with 
“Routine to the Novel”; from the “Specifics to 
Principles”; from the “Full Detail to managing by 
Exception”. This changes the individual from 
“Expert to Investigator”. Also relevant is the idea 
of Management Distancing. The research shows 
that, at this level, managers or executives tend to 
manage by exception based on outcomes and that 
this has inherent dangers 
3.  What risks are “acceptable” 
to us and why; how have 
we tested our reasoning 
(against both internal and 
external yardsticks) to 
ensure that our reasoning is 
The aim of the question is to provoke discussion about 
what risks are acceptable to the organisation and 
why the criteria used is justifiable. The question 
starts the process of turning vague tacit values into 
explicit, actionable and auditable ones. 
Alternatively it will start the process of exposing 
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 Questions Background 
robust? those issues that might be “taboo” to the 
organisation. 
The question is based on research that examines how 
organisations establish which risks are deemed to be 
“acceptable”,   
 The Substitution Test 
 Boundaries of acceptability  
 How might the context (Pre-event/ Post-event) 
affect what might be deemed to be acceptable 
 How to balance concepts of “Inevitable” and bad 
luck with good fortune as in the “Union Carbide 
factor” 
4.  Of those issues that we 
judge to be, so improbable 
as to be “inconceivable”, 
which of these still have 
such potentially serious 
consequences 
(unacceptable) that we 
must stay alert to them? 
The aim of the question is to keep alive in the debate 
those issues that organisations think they have 
under control but, should they occur, are likely to 
have such serious consequences that the 
executive might wished to have remained alert to 
them.  
The question is based on research into  
 The impossible accident 
 Black Swans 
 The worst case 
5.  Do we agree about in what 
circumstances (1) we will 
prepare an alternative plan 
(anticipation), (2) we will 
set aside reserve capacity 
(resilience) or (3) where 
we just react to situations 
(reactive)?  
The aim of the question is to prompt those engaged in 
the debate to clarify the terms they are using and 
then to move on to establishing criteria by which 
they decide their risk mitigation strategies. 
The question is based on research that: 
 Outlines strategy options such as: Remove the 
source of the issue, mitigate the effect , cease the 
activity that creates potential jeopardy or try to 
transfer the risk to someone else. 
 Strategies related to Simple issues,  complex 
issues, for uncertainty and for ambiguous issues  
 Options for safety 
 Defining barrier types  
 The Swiss Cheese Model  
 Capacity (“limited resources”) to cope can be 
stretched and thereby limited; see the Rubber-
band Model. 
Research also shows that there is little consistency in 
the use of relevant terms such as: 
 Security 
 Reliability/ “Dynamic non-event” 
 Redundancy (either Serial or Parallel / 
“Reciprocity) 
 Resilience 
 Robustness 
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 Questions Background 
 Bricolage 
Research also warns that the use of redundancy has it 
own downsides described as Fallacy of Redundancy 
and other such phenomena. 
6.  How might our approach to 
risk taking be stifling our 
organisations? 
 
The aim of the question is to stimulate the debate 
about the balancing of risk and reward. 
The question is based on research: 
 That sees all risks being associated with a benefit 
(an organisational output) and asks where you are 
unable to do so, why are you taking them?  
 Into the relationship between risk and 
performance management regimes. 
 That see organisations and their clients benefiting 
from the proposed activity and therefore there will 
also be downside from being overcautious. 
The Group 
7.  Are we aware of factors that 
might (1) inhibit us from 
taking note of warning 
signs,  (2) those that might 
affect our perception of 
them or (3) those that might 
restrain us from acting 
upon them? 
The aim of the question is to bring to the debate the 
factors that impede the perception of risk which 
cause risk signals to be missed, mis-perceived or 
not acted upon.  
The question is based on research that has: 
Factors that impede people accepting warnings 
include: 
 Barriers, within the individual, such as (1) being 
more concerned by things that affect us directly, 
rather than things that affect others (2) the short-
term is privileged over the long term and (3) the 
tangible is privileged over the intangible.  
 These barriers are both cultural and managerial. 
This pattern of seeing the details but being unable 
to recognise the big picture is commonplace in 
accidents hence the proposal of ideas such as:  
o “Mindfulness”. 
o People, acting within social organisations, 
downplay certain risks and emphasise others 
 Organisational cultures may desensitise 
perceptions and thus create (issues of “Can-do 
Culture” and Atavism). 
 Hubris 
 Blind spots 
 Inattentional blindness 
 Fallacy of complete reporting 
 The  “Organisational distortion of information”  
 The social status or perceived credibility of the 
messenger. 
 The organisation’s cultural orientation towards 
risk  
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 Questions Background 
Factors that affect the perception of risk include:  
 The relationship between the individuals 
(“stakeholders”), the organisation and the event. 
This in turn may be affected by history, 
competition, scarcity, bureaucratic procedures, 
power, rules and norms, hierarchy, culture, and 
patterns of information.  
 The relationship between “ victim groups” and 
the organisation 
 “Risk Distribution” 
 Whether they are seen as “insiders” or 
“outsiders”.  
 How perceptions may change over time 
 How individuals or organisations “forget to be 
afraid”  
 How individuals might be affected by “risk 
homeostasis” 
 Whether a scientific or intuitive approach is used,  
 The “problem of induction” 
 “Fallacy of centrality  
 
The phenomena that have been seen to prevent 
appropriate action being taken are:  
 Denial / “it couldn’t happen here”  
 “The unresponsive bystander”  
 The “Unrocked boat”  
 “Learned helplessness”  
 Social shirking 
 Failure to ask the “right” question.  
8.  How well do we 
understand our system’s 
operating modes; how well 
do we know those who will 
have to handle potential 
crises and are we sure they 
are equipped to do so? 
 
The aim of the question is to prompt consideration of 
operational modes other than that which is 
considered to be normal; the normal being that 
state which predominates in formal procedures. 
This may be both a heightened state of activity, as 
in an emergency or a reduced level of activity such 
as a power station during a period of maintenance. 
Both are states of operation with which operaters 
are less familiar and therefore have been found to 
be more prone to making errors. 
The question is based on research that has: 
 Identified that some causes of unwanted events 
are due to mistakes when organisations rotate 
between “Operational Modes”. 
 Identified that due to human attention and 
understanding being limited and transitory, they 
may experience difficulty retaining accurate 
Situational Awareness resulting in  Loosing the 
bubble or Cosmological episodes.  
 Identified that systems degrade thereby create 
 Appendix D  209 
 
 Questions Background 
gaps that provide opportunities for unwanted 
events to occur (Incubation Period/ Disaster 
Incubation Theory) and for management to catch 
the problem and resolve it before the unwanted 
occurs (Recovery Window) 
 
9.  How do we judge the most 
appropriate level within 
our organisations for 
decisions to be  made and 
that each decision maker 
has the appropriate “seat of 
understanding”,  resources 
and the ability to act in a 
timely manner? 
 
The aim of the question is to stimulate debate about 
where within the organisation decisions are being 
made and whether this is appropriate for the 
organisation’s need compared to the risks they 
face. 
The question is based on research into: 
 Seat of understanding  
 The Intuitive understanding of an issue  
 Decision making with incomplete information 
 Issues inside or outside of analysis 
 Leaders as Expert or Investigator 
 “Deference to Expertise” 
 Whether “Centralisation or Decentralisation” 
would be in the best interest of the organisation.  
 Whether judgement may be clouded by issues 
such as hierarchy, the “Need for control”, ego 
and hubris.  
10.  Are we familiar with the 
dynamics and personal 
interactions that might 
cause our executive team 
to be dysfunctional 
(thereby generating risk) 
and what are we doing to 
ensure that we do not fall 
into these traps? 
 
The aim of the question is to stimulate debate into 
whether the key decision group is impeded in their 
endeavours by recognised issues concerning 
group dynamics and understanding the risk that 
this might create. 
The origin of the question is in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) which, in Section B, 
requires “The board should undertake a formal 
and rigorous annual evaluation of its own 
performance and that of its committees and 
individual directors”. The factors identified in the 
research may adversely affect the board’s risk 
management performance. 
The question is based on research into 
organisational bias that might include: 
 Talking past each other 
 Groupthink/ polarization 
 Folly 
 Being a “real team” 
 Failure to launch 
 Risk thermostat 
 Social Amplification of Risk/ “Risky shift” 
The Process 
11.  Can we show that we have The aim of the question is to encourage an 
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 Questions Background 
a culture that takes every 
available opportunity to 
learn from unwanted 
events? 
 
examination of whether the organisation is taking 
every appropriate opportunity to learn from both 
their own experience and that of others. 
The question is based on research into learning from: 
 Free lessons 
 Cheap lessons/ vicarious learning  
 Expensive lessons  
 Superstitious learning 
This research also relates to how the organisation 
guards against:  
 
 “Looking without seeing” /Inattentional blindness 
 Forgotten lessons 
 Lost saliency 
 Distancing through differencing 
 Difficulty in learning from rare events 
 Management distancing 
12.  How do we, as an executive 
group and as an 
organisation, ensure that 
we are getting the 
appropriate and relevant 
data to feed into our risk 
discourse? How do we 
judge “appropriate” and 
“relevant”? 
 
The aim of the question is motivate an executive team 
to examine how they can ensure that the right 
information (needed to monitor and manage their 
risks) is getting to the right people within the right 
timeframe, and to examine what the available data 
actually tells them. 
 
The question is based on research into Failure of 
communications. This encompasses: 
 Data from audit and regulatory processes and 
the advantages and disadvantages between the 
various configurations for internal & external audit 
or regulation. 
 Use of Risk Indicators and other management 
performance data 
 When “reporting by exception” would be 
inappropriate 
 Variable disjuncture  
 Distributed Intelligence 
 Fallacy of complete reporting 
 Taboo data/ facilitation 
 Misinterpreting Signals  
13.  How do we judge whether 
our methods of risk 
analysis are appropriate to 
the risks faced? 
The aim of the question is to encourage a re-
examination of the way the organisation analyses 
its risks and how it judges whether what they do is 
appropriate to the risks faced.  
The question is based on research into issues around 
how risks are assessed and analysed: 
 The analysis being based on consideration of Two 
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 Questions Background 
Dimensions of Risk or Six Dimensions of Risk 
 Risk Wheels 
 Paradigm flip 
 Compound abstraction  
 Frequency or Probability 
 Statistical or qualitative analysis 
 Fallacy of linearity 
 Failure of imagination  
 Requisite imagination  
 Over or underestimate risk potential (such as 
“Feynman’s Numbers” and other  steps to 
‘reduce the effect of personal bias’)  
 Compound risk 
 Safe Space Model 
As part of the analytical process consideration has 
also been given to the mechanism of conscious or 
sub-conscious factors associated with risk 
decisions 
 Context,  
 Efficiency Thoroughness Trade-Off”s  
 Satisficing 
 Sacrificing  
 Suffisance,   
 Minimising cognitive effort, Minimising workload  
 (sub)-optimisation,  
  “cost-benefit” trade-offs 
14.  After an unwanted event 
will our decision-making 
stand up, in hindsight, to 
critical external scrutiny? 
 
The aim of the question is to encourage debate as to 
whether, in hindsight, decisions stand up to the 
most hostile scrutiny and can be justified . 
The question is based on research into  
 Insider /outsider analysis 
 Unethical behaviour/ amoral calculations  
 Executive Failure  
 The darkside of leadership 
 Good people/ Bad Work 
15.  How do we ensure that all 
the members of the 
executive have a shared 
view & understanding of 
the organisation, the way it 
works and its risk? 
 
The aim of the question is to stimulate debate into 
whether all members of the executive team see 
the organisation in the same way and therefore 
are making judgements using sufficiently 
consistent paradigms. Difficulties in this area may 
be manifested in different members of a group 
trying to resolve different issues while believing 
that they are working on the same one to the same 
end. 
The question is based on research into: 
 Shared understanding 
 Common Understanding 
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 Questions Background 
 Cross-understanding 
 Mental models/ schema 
The difficulty people have in handling complexity: 
 The desire to simplify  
  Reluctance to simplify 
 The  “Tame, Wicked and Critical framework; 
Tame, Wicked and Wicked Messy frameworks;  
Cynefin frameworks  
Tackling the interactions within Organisational 
Design: 
 Interactive Complexity and close coupling  
 The Space Between 
 Dysfunctional interactions  
16.  What evidence can be 
provided that our plans and 
policies are robust enough 
to withstand an unwanted 
event (“a brutal audit”). 
The aim of the question is to fuel debate as to whether 
the organisation’s plans and policies meet their 
proscribed purpose or whether they perform 
simply a symbolic function. The test for such 
policies is to examination in foresight  whether in 
hindsight, after a major unwanted event, they will 
be found to be fit for purpose. 
The question is based on research about 
 Abrupt and brutal audits 
 Fantasy documents 
 Myth management 
17.  How might we notice where 
an emerging gap between 
our practice and our formal 
procedures becomes 
potentially dysfunctional 
(“drift”)? 
The aim of the question is to arouse discussion over 
whether the organisation is vulnerable due to the 
slow decoupling of current practice from formal 
polices and whether this is desirable or dangerous 
for the organisation .   
The question is based on research into how an 
organisation may identify such “drift”. This covers 
such facets as: 
 Event incubation/ Disaster Incubation Theory 
 Safety drift 
 Practical Drift 
 Normalisation of Deviance 
o (1) Production of Culture 
o (2) Culture of Production;  
o (3) Structural Secrecy  
 Strategic drift. 
 Muddling through  
18.  When would we expect our 
people to use their 
experience and initiative 
rather than adhering strictly 
to written plans or 
standards; when might this 
The aim of the question is to fuel debate over the 
place and role, advantages and disadvantages for 
rule-based action within and organisation.  
The question is based on research into  
 Appendix D  213 
 
 Questions Background 
cause problems? Where 
might our “rule-book” 
actually hamper the 
achievement of our 
organisational goals?  
 
 Control v. Management 
 Centralisation v. Decentralisation  
 Pooled, Sequential and Reciprocal 
Interdependence/ “Practical Sailing” 
 Rule-based v. Knowledge-based 
 Feed Forward systems  
 Verbatim Compliance or accept the need for 
variance in both performance and process in 
order to adapt 
 Types of Violations  
 Permission to Break Rules and where might this 
create significant vulnerabilities? 
 Liability of Newness 
 Unruly Technology 
Summarising Questions 
19.  What “unwanted” 
occurrences (including 
those perceived as 
“inconceivable”) might 
affect our organisation? 
 
The aim of the question is to broaden the debate in 
order to encourage discussion over the concept of 
the “unwanted occurrence”, why events may be 
considered to be “inconceivable”, to make explicit 
the assumptions that underlie these judgements 
and to consider how this may lead to “failures of 
foresight” 
The question is based on research into considering 
how we can ascertain: 
(1) What might cause an unwanted occurrence,  
(2) How might we prevent it,  
(3) Whether there is a formal process in place 
designed to deliver the goal or prevent the unwanted 
occurrence,  
(4) Whether our people are effectively trained,  
(5) Whether they have the necessary resources,  
(6) Whether they would recognise problems should 
they arise,  
(7) Whether they would see the right action to take,  
(8) Whether they would implement the necessary 
action appropriately, 
(9) Whether we would get the same answers if we 
asked these questions tomorrow? 
20.  What evidence exists to 
show that our organisation’s 
culture, structure or 
processes do NOT provoke 
errors or rule violations? 
The aim of the question is to provoke an overarching 
discussion as to whether an organisation by its 
action may, unwittingly, cause errors and mistakes 
to happen within that organisation. 
The question is based on research into:  
 Error-inducing organisations  
 Error-provoking organisations 
 The five classic patterns of error creating  
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 The risk exposure calculator 
 Vulnerable System Syndrome 
 Production Pressure 
 Latent error/ “Resident pathogens/ the Knotted 
Rubber Band Model” 
 The wrong kind of Excellence 
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 Usability 
(I understood the 
question at face 
value) 
Utility 
(the question 
provides a useful 
prompt to my 
thinking) 
Feasibility 
(I could use the 
question as part of 
risk focused 
discussion) 
I see benefit from 
learning more on 
the issues that 
underlie the 
question 
1.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
2.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
3.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
4.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
5.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
6.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
7.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
8.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
9.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
10.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
11.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
12.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
13.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
14.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
15.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
16.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
17.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
18.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
19.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
20.  I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree I agree / I disagree 
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 Questions Background 
Problem 
1.  Do we have clear and fully justifiable 
rules for which scenarios are included in 
and excluded from our risk management 
process? 
 
2.  While we normally monitor  “outcomes”, 
where do we need to monitor the  
processes that might create 
unacceptable outcomes? 
 
3.  What risks are “acceptable” to us and 
why; how have we tested our reasoning 
(against both internal and external 
yardsticks) to ensure that our reasoning 
is robust? 
 
4.  Of those issues that we judge to be, so 
improbable as to be “inconceivable”, 
which of these still have such potentially 
serious consequences (unacceptable) 
that we must stay alert to them? 
 
5.  Do we agree about in what 
circumstances (1) we will prepare an 
alternative plan (anticipation), (2) we will 
set aside reserve capacity (resilience) or 
(3) where we just react to situations 
(reactive)?  
 
6.  How might our approach to risk taking 
be stifling our organisations? 
 
The Group 
7.  Are we aware of factors that might (1) 
inhibit us from taking note of warning 
signs,  (2) those that might affect our 
perception of them or (3) those that 
might restrain us from acting upon 
them? 
 
8.  How well do we understand our 
system’s operating modes; how well do 
we know those who will have to handle 
potential crises and are we sure they are 
equipped to do so? 
 
9.  How do we judge the most appropriate 
level within our organisations for 
decisions to be  made and that each 
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decision maker has the appropriate 
“seat of understanding”,  resources and 
the ability to act in a timely manner? 
10.  Are we familiar with the dynamics and 
personal interactions that might cause 
our executive team to be dysfunctional 
(thereby generating risk) and what are we 
doing to ensure that we do not fall into 
these traps? 
 
The Process 
11.  Can we show that we have a culture that 
takes every available opportunity to 
learn from unwanted events? 
 
12.  How do we, as an executive group and 
as an organisation, ensure that we are 
getting the appropriate and relevant 
data to feed into our risk discourse? How 
do we judge “appropriate” and “relevant”? 
 
13.  How do we judge whether our methods 
of risk analysis are appropriate to the 
risks faced? 
 
 
14.  After an unwanted event will our 
decision-making stand up, in hindsight, 
to critical external scrutiny? 
 
15.  How do we ensure that all the members 
of the executive have a shared view & 
understanding of the organisation, the 
way it works and its risk? 
 
16.  What evidence can be provided that our 
plans and policies are robust enough to 
withstand an unwanted event (“a brutal 
audit”). 
 
17.  How might we notice where an emerging 
gap between our practice and our formal 
procedures becomes potentially 
dysfunctional (“drift”)? 
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18.  When would we expect our people to use 
their experience and initiative rather 
than adhering strictly to written plans or 
standards; when might this cause 
problems? Where might our “rule-book” 
actually hamper the achievement of our 
organisational goals?  
 
Summarising Questions 
19.  What “unwanted” occurrences (including 
those perceived as “inconceivable”) 
might affect our organisation? 
 
20.  What evidence exists to show that our 
organisation’s culture, structure or 
processes do NOT provoke errors or 
rule violations? 
 
21.  Additional Comments 
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Appendix E Post Stage 3 Question Revisions 
 
The Problems 
1.  Do Where do we need to we have clear and fully justifiable rules criteria for 
which events or scenarios are included in and excluded from our risk 
management process? 
2. While we normally monitor  “outcomes” (“end”), where do we need to 
monitor the  processes (“means”) that might create unacceptable 
outcomes? 
3. What risks are “acceptable” to us and why; how have we tested our 
reasoning for both core and non-core activity (against both internal and 
external yardsticks) to ensure that our reasoning is robust? 
4.  Of those issues that we judge to be so improbable as to be “inconceivable”, 
which of these still have such potentially serious consequences 
(unacceptable) that we must stay alert to them? 
5.  Do we agree about in what circumstances What evidence do we have that 
we have a shared understanding about when: 
(1) when we will prepare an alternative plan (anticipation),  
(2) when we will set aside reserve capacity (resilience) or  
(3) where we just react to situations (reactive)? 
6.  How might our approach to risk taking be stifling our organisations? 
The Group 
7.  Are we aware of what factors that might:  
(1) inhibit us from taking note of warning signs,   
(2) those that might affect our perception of them or 
(3) those that might restrain us from acting upon them? 
8.  a. How well do we understand our system’s operating modes (routine, 
high tempo, emergency and maintenance) &and manage the transition 
between them? 
b. How well do we know those who will have to handle potential crises and 
are we sure they are equipped to do so? 
9.  How do we judge the most appropriate level within our organisations for 
decisions to be made and that whether each decision maker has the 
appropriate “seat of  intuitive understanding of the issues and the 
organisation,  resources and the ability to act in a timely manner? 
10.  Are we familiar with What proof is there that we are conscious of the 
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dynamics and personal interactions that might cause our board and 
executive team to be dysfunctional (thereby generating risk) and what are 
we doing to ensure that we do not fall into these traps? 
The Process 
11.  Can we show How can we be sure that we have a culture that takes every 
key opportunity to learn from unwanted events experienced within the 
organisation (accidents and near-misses) and from the experience of other 
organisations? 
12.  How do we, as an the board/executive group and as an organisation, 
ensure that we are getting the appropriate and relevant data to feed into 
our risk discourse? How do we judge appropriate and relevant? 
13.  How do we judge whether the way we analyse risk is our methods of risk 
analysis are appropriate to the risks we faced? 
14.  What might give us confidence that after an unwanted event will our 
decisions-making will stand up, in hindsight, to critical external 
scrutiny? 
15.  How do we ensure that all the members of the board/executive have a 
shared view and& understanding of the organisation, the way it works 
and its risks? 
16.  What evidence can be provided that our plans and policies are robust 
enough to withstand a disruptive event (“a brutal audit”). 
17.  How might we notice where an emerging gap between our practice and our 
formal procedures becomes  a potentially dysfunctional source of risk 
(“drift”)? 
18.  When would we expect our people to use their experience and initiative 
intuition rather than adhering strictly to written plans or standards; when 
might this cause problems? Where might our “rule-book” actually 
hamper the achievement of our organisational goals?  
Summarising Questions 
19.  What “unwanted” occurrences (including those perceived as 
“inconceivable”) might eaffect our organisation? 
20.  What evidence exists to show that our organisation’s culture, structure or 
processes do NOT provoke errors or rule violations? 
 
